The quest for the restructuring of the faltering Nigerian
Federation, keeps resonating and rearing its head at any given
opportunity. For the first time, however, voices which were
hitherto opposed to, or which naturally oppose, such agitations,
have oozed out of their closets in support of the latest clamour
for restructuring, signposting hope that meaningful engagement on
the subject might yield results.
Since any meaningful restructuring must entail a deep amendment
of our Constitution, I will, in this article, attempt a comparative
analysis between provisions of our Constitution on the one hand,
and the provisions of several other Constitutions of sovereign
countries on the other hand, to see if we can objectively find
solutions to the major issues of concern.
Before then, however, let me remind my dear compatriots of what
the Supreme Court of Nigeria feels about the evolvement of an ideal
Constitution for any given country, including Nigeria. In DANGANA
vUSMAN (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349) 50 at 93, the Apex Court held that
the Constitution of any country is “the embodiment of what the
people of that country’s desire to be their light in governance”.
Also, in A-G KADUNA STATE v HASSAN (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 483, the
Supreme Court held that the Nigerian Constitution is “meant to
cater for the uniqueness of Nigeria as a nation”.
The comparative analysis below, therefore, should be understood
in the light of my attempt to make our Constitution the way it will
best suit us as a people. Due to limited space, I will only look at
major areas of concern.
Fiscal Federalism
This is one area clamoured or agitated for the most, by
protagonists of structural changes in Nigeria. The dominant view is
that ‘let each State of the Federation control its resources and
only remit taxes to the central or Federal Government.’ We shall
now examine how tenable this can be, starting with a historical
expedition.
Part I paragraph 25 of the Schedule to the 1960 Independence
Constitution vested exclusive legislative powers in the Federal
Government over and concerning “Mines and minerals, including oil
fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas.” The
framers of the 1963 Constitution retained this provision verbatim,
also in paragraph 25 of Part I of the Schedule to the 1963
Constitution. These provisions completely knocked off regional
control of resources and placed them under the exclusive powers of
the central Government.
The Presidential Constitution of 1979, the aborted 1989
Presidential Constitution and the 1999 Constitution as amended all
retained these provisions, clearly, therefore vesting exclusive
powers over mineral resources in the Federal Government. This has
consequently put control of these resources firmly in the hands of
the central Government. But et seq.
We shall examine other Federal Constitutions around the world.
Article 73 of the German Constitution, 1990, which contains the
Federal Exclusive List, is rather very short and says nothing about
control of mineral resources. Rather, Article 74(11), which
contains the Concurrent List, vests jointly in the Federal and the
Regional Governments power to make laws “relating to economic
matters (mining, industry, supply of power, crafts, trades,
commerce, banking and stock exchanges, private insurance).”
In India, which is another Federation, Articles 53 and 54 of the
Exclusive List of the Indian Constitution of 1950 as amended in
2003 have listed “oil fields and mineral resources, petroleum and
petroleum products; other liquids and substances,” etc and “mines
and mineral development” as items to be legislated upon exclusively
by the central Government.
Also, Article 22(XII) of the Constitution of Brazil, 1988, vests
exclusive legislative powers in the Federal Government on “mineral
deposits, other mineral resources, and metallurgy.” Similarly,
Article 24(0)(I) provides that “It is incumbent upon the Union, the
States, and the Federal District to legislate concurrently on: tax,
financial, penitentiary, economic and city planning law.” Even
then, section 24(1) provides that “Within the scope of concurrent
legislation, the jurisdiction of the Republic [i.e. the Federal
Government] is limited to establishing general rules.” Article
25(2) provides that the states “shall have the power to operate,
directly or by any means of concession, the local services of piped
gas, as provided for by law, it being forbidden to issue any
provisional measure for its regulation.” Of grave importance, too
are the provisions of TITLE VI (Articles 145-162), which have made
elaborate provisions relating to taxation by the Federal, State and
Municipal Governments, thereby putting a constitutional seal
against issues like illegal or multiple taxation. Of equal
importance is the elevation to constitutional status, of
agriculture and agrarian reforms, in TITLE VII, Chapter III,
thereby putting agricultural policies beyond the whims and caprice
of successive regimes! This is most commendable! I quickly
recommend this for Nigeria.
The Federal Constitutions of Australia (1990) and South Africa
(1997) and Russia (1993) are rather silent on “resource control.”
In constitutional jurisprudence, generally, the States/Regions of
these countries and their central Governments are having
coterminous powers over the natural resources of the said
countries.
On the other hand, the US Constitution, vide Article 8(1)
thereof, has provided that “The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises, to pay the debts
and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States; but all duties, imports and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.” Also, the 16th Amendment which came
into force in 1913 provides thus:
“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.”
On the other hand, Article 10(2) of the same Constitution limits
the fiscal powers of the States as follows:
(2) No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net
Produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or
exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States;
and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of
the Congress.
From the above, none of the countries operating a federal
Constitution has permitted total fiscal autonomy to the federating
units as has been consistently canvassed in Nigeria.
Knowing the truth is one sure way of achieving peace. In this
case, I submit that the Nigerian Federal Government – made up of
the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary – have for a long
time been taking bold steps to assuage ethnic and regional
agitations for resource control or fiscal federalism. One of those
steps was the enactment of section 162 of the 1999 Constitution as
amended, which for lack of space, will not be reproduced here, but
which has been tested in court severally – with the Judiciary
handing down decisions that sound proactively in support of
regional control of resources. We shall briefly examine some of
those decisions here.
In A-G FEDERATION v A-G ABIA & ORS. (2002) 4 SCNJ 1, it was
argued by the 8 littoral States of the Nigerian southern coastline
that the Federal Government (FG) had ceded the ownership of
Nigeria’s offshore to them, by virtue of the Allocation of Revenue
(Federation Account, etc) (Amendment) Decree No. 106 of 1992. The
littoral States had argued that this Decree abolished the
onshore/offshore dichotomy on the sharing of oil and non-oil
revenues. The issue of 13% derivation and its applicability to
“natural” and “mineral” resources was also raised. The Supreme
Court, in a landmark judgment, held inter alia as follows:
• There was no time the FG had ceded the area beyond the
low-water mark to the littoral States as contended; hence the
seaward boundary of each littoral State, for the purpose of
calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation
Account, is the low-water mark of the surface thereof, or as in the
case of Cross-River State which has no archipelago of islands, the
seaward limits of the inland waters of that State.
• The phrase “mineral resources” in section 162(2) of the
Constitution excludes or does not contemplate “natural resources” –
as argued by the Northern or Middle-Belt States that had filed
counter-claims.
• The FCT Abuja is neither a State nor a Local Government, hence
cannot enjoy derivation under section 162(3) of the
Constitution.
• Section 1(d)(iv) of the Allocation of Revenue Act, Cap. 16,
LFN, 1990, in so far as it stipulated derivation of 1% instead of
“not less than 13%”, was null and void.
Following the above judgment, the Olusegun Obasanjo-led
Government qua the National Assembly bowed to pressure from Niger
Delta agitators and enacted the Revenue Allocation (Abolition of
Dichotomy in the Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act,
2004. Section 1(1) of this Act provides thus:
1.-(1) As from the commencement of this Act, two hundred metre
water depth isobaths contiguous to a State of the Federation shall
be deemed to be part of that State for the purposes of computing
the revenue accruing to the Federation from the State pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999 or any other enactment.
In A-G CROSS RIVER v A-G FEDERATION (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 646)
408 S.C., the question was whether Cross River had ceased to become
a littoral State by virtue of the judgment of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), which had yanked off the Bakassi Peninsula
from Nigeria and had ceded same to Cameroon. Central for
consideration was section 1(1) of the new Revenue Allocation Act,
2004, quoted above. The apex Court agreed that by virtue of the ICJ
judgment, Cross River State was no more a littoral State, hence the
revenue from the oil wells which hitherto was accruing to it now
accrued to Akwa Ibom State.
It must be noted that the word “deemed” was used in section 1(1)
of the 2004 Act, quoted above. If the legal interpretation of that
word is to be applied [for which see SAVANNAH BANK LTD. v AJILO
(1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305 at 325 SC], then the several decisions
reached by the Supreme Court on revenue accruing from littoral
States would not have been so reached. One of such decisions was
the case of A-G ADAMAWA v A-G FEDERATION (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 299)
1450 S.C. In this case, the plaintiffs, invoking the original
jurisdiction of the apex Court, argued that section 1(1) of the
2004 Act had unconstitutionally extended the seaward boundaries of
the littoral States, in contravention of section 8 of the 1999
Constitution. Uwais, CJN, who delivered the lead judgment of the
Court, held rather proactively, with due respect, as follows:
This, with respect, is not a correct interpretation of the
provisions of the Act, because the Act specifically states that the
extension is only to be deemed, in other words, it is not real but
notional, and it is specifically intended for the purpose of
computing the revenue which accrues to the Federation Account from
the littoral States.
What a public policy judicial opinion! If it was only
“notional,” why then enforce it? The Supreme Court was later to
admit in A-G RIVERS STATE v A-G AKWA IBOM STATE (2011) All FWLR
(Pt. 579) 1023 at 1081 that the agitations in the Niger Delta
following the 2002 ‘resource control’ decision of the Supreme Court
in A-G Federation vs. A-G Abia, supra, constituted the sole factor
that made the National Assembly to promulgate the 2004 Act!
As it stands now, therefore, all the three arms of the
Federal Government of Nigeria have over time consistently exhibited
resolve to quench violent agitations from the Niger Delta Region
especially over ‘resource control’ or fiscal federalism, as
indicated in this piece, using constitutional means. I will briefly
further adumbrate on this, as follows:
• Chapter XII of the 1963 Republican Constitution had established
the “Niger Delta Development Board,” which under section 159(4) of
that Constitution was to be “responsible for advising the
Government of the Federation and the Governments of Eastern Nigeria
and Mid-Western Nigeria with respect to physical development of the
Niger Delta.” This Board was to last until 1st July, 1969.
• In the course of time, several critical States were created
for the Niger Delta Region – Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa State and Delta.
Abia and Imo States have also joined in the enjoyment of 13%
derivation and have also been deriving benefits from developmental
bodies like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC).
• The Ibrahim Babangida-led administration established the Oil
Minerals Producing Development Commission (OMPADEC) to cater for
the special needs of the Niger Delta. Today, the NDDC is
statutorily established and is undertaking similar, if not graver
assignments.
• The 1999 Constitution, as shown above, established the revenue
formula whereby Niger Delta and some Eastern Nigeria States take
13% of all oil revenues. As shown above, attempt by some Northern
and Middle-Belt States to equate “mineral resources” with “natural
resources” so as to benefit from this constitutional largesse was
rebuffed by the Supreme Court.
• The Federal Government, as admitted by the Supreme Court,
bowed to pressure from the Niger Delta to enact section 1(1) of the
2004 Revenue Act, which for all intents and purposes is in conflict
with Treaties entered into by Nigeria – like the Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958; the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 1958 and the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 1982. This is a grave national sacrifice!
For now, all reasonable agitations from the Niger Delta have
been reasonably addressed, in my humble opinion – which is
expressed here just to let the truth be known – because my Bible
tells me that we should know the truth, which shall then set us
free.
My conclusion, for lack of space, therefore, is that the
Nigerian Government has over time been fair to the constituent
States, especially the Niger Delta Region, on issues of fiscal
federalism. Roundtable engagement to further improve on this is,
however, not ruled out. “Jaw-jaw” instead of “war-war” is my humble
plea.
Regional and Municipal Autonomy
Many countries have granted regional and municipal semi-autonomy to
the components thereof. The examples here are not limited to
Federal Constitutions; but they are relevant to show that Nigeria
needs to toe this line urgently – for the instantaneous development
of rural areas. We shall demonstrate this here.
Section 25(0) of the Federal Constitution of Brazil, 1988, permits
the States to be “organized and governed by the Constitutions and
laws which they may adopt, with due regard for the principles of
this Constitution,” while section 30 of the Constitution grants
“Municipal Self Government.” See, also, section 116 of the
Australian Constitution of 1900. Several other Constitutions have
also provided for regional or municipal partial autonomy without
strings. See Part IXA (sections 243P-243ZG of the Indian
Constitution); sections 104-105 of the Armenian Constitution of
1995; section 142 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, 1995; Chapter
III of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 2004; section 28A of the
Constitution of Ireland, 1937; section 141(3) of the Constitution
of Afghanistan, 2004 and Article 108(3) and (4) of the Constitution
of Albania, 1998. Indeed, Article 111(2) of the Albanian
Constitution provides inter alia that “The units of local
government have an independent budget.”
In a similar fashion, section 153 of the Constitution of South
Africa, 1997, which is also a Federal Constitution, has mandated
each local government council to “structure and manage its
administration, and budgeting and planning process to give priority
to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and
economic development of the community.” Also, section 154(1)
compulsorily requires both the national and regional governments
“by legislative and other measures,” to “support and strengthen the
capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to execute
their powers and to perform their functions.” That Constitution has
no similar provision as 162(6) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria,
which has established a Joint State/Local Government Account.
In 2005, the National Assembly of Nigeria, apparently seeking to
sidetrack section 162(6) of the Constitution (for good intentions,
I must say), enacted the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local
Governments Act, 2005. The Supreme Court wasted no time, in A-G
ABIA STATE v A-G FEDERATION (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 338) 604 S.C., to
strike it down as being unconstitutional. I hereby strongly suggest
that section 162(6) of the Constitution be deleted, to pave way for
a complete autonomy of Local Government Councils, as is obtainable
in South Africa – another Federation. Similarly, the apex Court, in
the consolidated suits of A-G OGUN STATE v A-G FEDERATION (2003)
FWLR (Pt. 143) 206 S.C., had held that by virtue of section 162(5),
(6) and (8) of the Constitution, the Federal Government had no
power to pay directly any amount standing to the credit of the
Local Government Councils to such Councils. This decision, too,
would have been otherwise, but for the named provisions of the
Constitution. An amendment to remove or modify the said provisions
is hereby suggested.
Other Constitutions that have either granted semi-self
government to the municipalities or have provided that the
administration of this level of government shall be strictly as
stipulated by law are: the Irish Constitution of 1937 – section 28A
thereof; the Constitution of Cameroon – section 55(2) thereof; the
Constitution of Croatia, 1990, as amended in 2000 and 2001 –
section 132 thereof; the Constitution of Belgium, 1970 – section 39
thereof, etc.
The Constitution of Namibia, 1990, in section 111, has vested
control of local councils in the National Legislature of that
country. If this provision were in place in Nigeria, the Supreme
Court would not have reached the decision it reached in A-G ABIA
STATE v A-G FEDERATION, supra and A- G Ogun State vs. A-G
Federation, supra.
My suggestion, therefore, is an amendment of relevant provisions of
the 1999 Constitution to either straightaway remove the Local
Governments under the grip of the State Governments, or to place
them under the National Assembly. The grassroots of Nigeria will
fare much better if either of these is effected.
I will further suggest that we revert to the 1963 Constitution
whereby the Regions were given powers to enact their Constitutions,
which Constitutions were, by virtue of sections 1 and 5, subject to
the Federal Constitution. I would like to see a situation whereby
the States or the geo-political zones of Nigeria will have their
Constitutions, Supreme Courts, etc, as is the case with the US and
other Federal Constitutions.
Citizenship
This is another contentious area – though agitations and tensions
are limited to discriminating against Nigerians resident in other
States apart from their States of origin. This should not be, in
view of section 42(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, which
has prohibited discrimination against any citizen on account of his
having come from a particular community or a place of origin.
Most Constitutions of countries of the world have less elaborate
provisions on citizenship, if compared to the Nigerian
Constitution, yet their political leaderships are always honest to
keep discrimination amongst the citizenry at bay. This is not so in
Nigeria, where a ‘non-indigene’ is merely tolerated in his State of
residence. This should not be. In order to be proactive, therefore,
I will suggest a few constitutional amendments – to put the
naysayers where they belong on this issue.
Article 6(2) of the Constitution of Russia, 1993, provides that
“Every citizen of the Russian Federation shall have all the rights
and liberties on its territory and bear equal duties stipulated by
the Constitution.” Also, Article IV, section 2(1) of the US
Constitution provides that “The citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States.”
I hereby suggest a constitutional amendment in Nigeria to
reflect these – to avoid the present ugly situation whereby the
youth of one ‘Region’ will be handing down quit notice to an entire
race or tribe whose members are full citizens of Nigeria. To fully
realise and practicalise these amendments, further amendments be
put in place to ensure that if any particular State or ‘Region’ is
reluctant or unwilling to implement the suggested amendments, if
enacted, the Federal Government can step in to enforce them in any
given case. I have the backing of the US Constitution on this. The
XIV Amendment to the US Constitution, which was effected in 1868
and which made provisions on citizenship by naturalisation, etc,
was capped up with the following provision in section 5 of the
Article thus:
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Also, the XV Amendment which was made in 1870 and which guaranteed
voting rights to all Americans in spite of “race, color, or
previous condition of servitude,” was capped with the following
provision in section 2:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Nigeria needs similar provisions even more than the USA, given our
infamous practical experience of State officials looking the other
way when citizens of other tribal or cultural origins are being
abused!
Pruning down Powers of State Officials
It is generally acceptable that the powers exercisable by the
President of Nigeria and State Governors are too enormous and tend
to gravitate to absolutism and tyranny. A few suggestions on how to
prune down those excesses will hereby be made.
Article II, section 3 of the US Constitution mandatorily requires
the US President to “from time to time give to the Congress
information on the State of the Union.” This sounds symbolic; but
it helps to keep the President in check.
Section 27(2) of the Constitution of Namibia stipulates that
“The executive powers of the Republic of Namibia shall vest in the
President and the Cabinet.” The word “and” deters an elected
President from taking several months to constitute his cabinet. In
this regard, too, we should revert back to the provisions of
section 145(1) and (2) of the botched 1989 Constitution of Nigeria,
where the President was placed under constitutional duty to assign
executive duties to the Vice-President and the Ministers.
Part 2, Chapter 1, section 70 of the Algerian Constitution states
that “The President of the Republic, Head of the State, embodies
the unity of the nation,” who “is the guarantor of the
Constitution.” Similar provisions can be found in Article 49 of the
Constitution of Armenia, 1995. Breach of these ordinarily should
attract impeachment, hence our Constitution be amended to
accommodate them.
The nagging issue of immunity can also be addressed as is done
in section 123(2) of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, 1995, where
the Prime Minister loses his immunity if “he has been caught in the
act of crime.” Alternatively, the immunity clause can be removed
altogether, as is the case with countless number of other
Constitutions.
Abuse of power is, however, not limited to the Executive – as
experience in Nigeria has shown that members of the Legislature are
also guilty of this. Article 54 of the Constitution of Brazil has
forbidden members of the Legislature from doing certain things that
are contrary to their office; while Article 55 thereof stipulates
automatic loss of their office if they are in breach. That
Constitution, unlike that of Nigeria, has not given any room for
process of recall of a Legislator, to give such erring member the
chance of instituting a court action to stop his removal from
office!
Restructuring of Office of Attorney-General and Minister
of Justice
As things stand out today, it is probably only Nigeria that is
still combining the office of Attorney- General and
Minister/Commissioner of Justice, thereby making the holder of that
office both a general Ombudsman and a politician. This is not good
for the smooth working of the system and should be stopped via
constitutional amendment.
See section 76 of the Constitution of India, 1950; section 64 of
the Constitution of Bangladesh, 2004; section 30 of the
Constitution of Ireland, 1937; section 134 of the Constitution of
Afghanistan, 2004; and the Constitution of Argentina, 1853, etc,
have all established/recognised ‘A-G’ without the addition
‘Minister of Justice’. And of course, we know that the US also has
‘A-G’ simpliciter. These are all random examples – meant to show
that Nigeria is lagging far behind in this regard, hence the
imperative of a constitutional amendment.
But if we insist on retaining the status quo, I will suggest
creation of the office of The Ombudsman – as in section 86 of the
Argentine Constitution, section 77 of the Constitution of
Bangladesh and section 89 of the Constitution of Namibia; or the
office of The Public Protector – as in section 182 of the
Constitution of South Africa, 1997; or the office of The Public
Defender – as in Article 134 of the Constitution of Brazil,
etc.
State Police
In the US, the Texas Rangers, founded in 1823 by Stephen F. Austin
to protect the settlers from attacks by the indigenous Indians,
remains the earliest form of State policing in the USA. To cut a
long story short, however, modern day State policing in that
country is traceable to May 2, 1905, when the State of Pennsylvania
established by law the first organised State Police in the USA. For
lack of space, I will have to say that Nigeria is also VERY RIPE
for State police; and all relevant portions of the Constitution and
Federal laws should be amended to accommodate this.
Referendums and Plebiscites
Making provisions for the convocation of referendums or plebiscites
is one other sure way of restructuring our Constitution with a view
to guaranteeing public peace and accountability in public affairs.
Examples from other countries will suffice here.
Article 49(XV) of the Constitution of Brazil allows federal
legislation which would “authorize a referendum and to call a
plebiscite” in deserving circumstances. Articles 150-152 of the
Constitution of Albania also allow referendum in deserving
circumstances. Section 47 of the Constitution of Ireland provides
that even that Constitution can be amended through a referendum.
Ditto Armenia – by virtue of Chapter 8 of the Constitution of
Armenia, 1995.
Reforms in the Judiciary
I have already briefly touched on this above; but I will add that
serious reforms in the Judiciary are of critical importance. I
totally support creation of special courts for trial of corruption
cases, to save time and enhance better administration of justice in
that subsector. Section 127 of the Constitution of India, 1950, has
permitted the appointment of ad hoc Judges, who may have retired
from the Bench. I recommend this for corruption and election cases
– for obvious reasons.
I also suggest that Regional Courts of Appeal and Supreme Courts be
created, as in the USA, to ease the workload on the Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court.
Salaries and emoluments of Judicial Officers should be reviewed
upwards – to stem corruption in the Judiciary. In 2013, I rolled
out figures from the USA, Canada, Australia and even Ghana – to
show that our Judicial Officers are receiving pittance. For
instance, a Chief Magistrate in the US receives far more than what
the Chief Justice of Nigeria receives as his emoluments! This is
humiliating, to say the least.
Miscellany
There should be in our Constitution the following provisions, as
can be found in some of the Constitutions indicated:
• Provisions for social security – as in Chapter II of the
Constitution of Brazil.
• Children’s rights – as in section 15 of the Namibian
Constitution, including a constitutional prohibition against
children being employed as factory workers – as in section 24 of
the Indian Constitution.
• Protection of minority tribes in Nigeria – as in sections 29 and
30 of the Indian Constitution.
• Making some of the critical provisions of Chapter II of the
Constitution justiciable. In Ireland, Chapter XIII of its
Constitution, dealing with “Directive Principles of Social Policy,”
the equivalent of Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution, is even
made justiciable.
Finally, relevant security and anti-corruption agencies – the
EFCC, ICPC, Code of Conduct Bureau, Customs and Excise, NAPTIP,
etc, should be strengthened and better funded. A few years ago, I
rolled out data showing that the US population is about twice more
than that of Nigeria; that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) has a total budget that is 50 times more than that of
Nigeria’s EFCC and ICPC combined; and that it also has staff
strength which is at least 10 times more than that of the EFCC and
the ICPC combined. Yet, Nigeria occupies a higher position on the
corruption index than the USA! Prosecution of crime, let alone of
corrupt enrichment, is very costly, hence the imperative of these
reforms.
Chief Sebastine Hon, SAN, FCIArb, Constitutional Lawyer
and Authordies
Thisday
The quest for the restructuring of the faltering Nigerian
Federation, keeps resonating and rearing its head at any given
opportunity. For the first time, however, voices which were
hitherto opposed to, or which naturally oppose, such agitations,
have oozed out of their closets in support of the latest clamour
for restructuring, signposting hope that meaningful engagement on
the subject might yield results.
Since any meaningful restructuring must entail a deep amendment
of our Constitution, I will, in this article, attempt a comparative
analysis between provisions of our Constitution on the one hand,
and the provisions of several other Constitutions of sovereign
countries on the other hand, to see if we can objectively find
solutions to the major issues of concern.
Before then, however, let me remind my dear compatriots of what
the Supreme Court of Nigeria feels about the evolvement of an ideal
Constitution for any given country, including Nigeria. In DANGANA
vUSMAN (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349) 50 at 93, the Apex Court held that
the Constitution of any country is “the embodiment of what the
people of that country’s desire to be their light in governance”.
Also, in A-G KADUNA STATE v HASSAN (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 483, the
Supreme Court held that the Nigerian Constitution is “meant to
cater for the uniqueness of Nigeria as a nation”.
The comparative analysis below, therefore, should be understood
in the light of my attempt to make our Constitution the way it will
best suit us as a people. Due to limited space, I will only look at
major areas of concern.
Fiscal Federalism
This is one area clamoured or agitated for the most, by
protagonists of structural changes in Nigeria. The dominant view is
that ‘let each State of the Federation control its resources and
only remit taxes to the central or Federal Government.’ We shall
now examine how tenable this can be, starting with a historical
expedition.
Part I paragraph 25 of the Schedule to the 1960 Independence
Constitution vested exclusive legislative powers in the Federal
Government over and concerning “Mines and minerals, including oil
fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas.” The
framers of the 1963 Constitution retained this provision verbatim,
also in paragraph 25 of Part I of the Schedule to the 1963
Constitution. These provisions completely knocked off regional
control of resources and placed them under the exclusive powers of
the central Government.
The Presidential Constitution of 1979, the aborted 1989
Presidential Constitution and the 1999 Constitution as amended all
retained these provisions, clearly, therefore vesting exclusive
powers over mineral resources in the Federal Government. This has
consequently put control of these resources firmly in the hands of
the central Government. But et seq.
We shall examine other Federal Constitutions around the world.
Article 73 of the German Constitution, 1990, which contains the
Federal Exclusive List, is rather very short and says nothing about
control of mineral resources. Rather, Article 74(11), which
contains the Concurrent List, vests jointly in the Federal and the
Regional Governments power to make laws “relating to economic
matters (mining, industry, supply of power, crafts, trades,
commerce, banking and stock exchanges, private insurance).”
In India, which is another Federation, Articles 53 and 54 of the
Exclusive List of the Indian Constitution of 1950 as amended in
2003 have listed “oil fields and mineral resources, petroleum and
petroleum products; other liquids and substances,” etc and “mines
and mineral development” as items to be legislated upon exclusively
by the central Government.
Also, Article 22(XII) of the Constitution of Brazil, 1988, vests
exclusive legislative powers in the Federal Government on “mineral
deposits, other mineral resources, and metallurgy.” Similarly,
Article 24(0)(I) provides that “It is incumbent upon the Union, the
States, and the Federal District to legislate concurrently on: tax,
financial, penitentiary, economic and city planning law.” Even
then, section 24(1) provides that “Within the scope of concurrent
legislation, the jurisdiction of the Republic [i.e. the Federal
Government] is limited to establishing general rules.” Article
25(2) provides that the states “shall have the power to operate,
directly or by any means of concession, the local services of piped
gas, as provided for by law, it being forbidden to issue any
provisional measure for its regulation.” Of grave importance, too
are the provisions of TITLE VI (Articles 145-162), which have made
elaborate provisions relating to taxation by the Federal, State and
Municipal Governments, thereby putting a constitutional seal
against issues like illegal or multiple taxation. Of equal
importance is the elevation to constitutional status, of
agriculture and agrarian reforms, in TITLE VII, Chapter III,
thereby putting agricultural policies beyond the whims and caprice
of successive regimes! This is most commendable! I quickly
recommend this for Nigeria.
The Federal Constitutions of Australia (1990) and South Africa
(1997) and Russia (1993) are rather silent on “resource control.”
In constitutional jurisprudence, generally, the States/Regions of
these countries and their central Governments are having
coterminous powers over the natural resources of the said
countries.
On the other hand, the US Constitution, vide Article 8(1)
thereof, has provided that “The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises, to pay the debts
and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States; but all duties, imports and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.” Also, the 16th Amendment which came
into force in 1913 provides thus:
“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.”
On the other hand, Article 10(2) of the same Constitution limits
the fiscal powers of the States as follows:
(2) No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net
Produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or
exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States;
and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of
the Congress.
From the above, none of the countries operating a federal
Constitution has permitted total fiscal autonomy to the federating
units as has been consistently canvassed in Nigeria.
Knowing the truth is one sure way of achieving peace. In this
case, I submit that the Nigerian Federal Government – made up of
the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary – have for a long
time been taking bold steps to assuage ethnic and regional
agitations for resource control or fiscal federalism. One of those
steps was the enactment of section 162 of the 1999 Constitution as
amended, which for lack of space, will not be reproduced here, but
which has been tested in court severally – with the Judiciary
handing down decisions that sound proactively in support of
regional control of resources. We shall briefly examine some of
those decisions here.
In A-G FEDERATION v A-G ABIA & ORS. (2002) 4 SCNJ 1, it was
argued by the 8 littoral States of the Nigerian southern coastline
that the Federal Government (FG) had ceded the ownership of
Nigeria’s offshore to them, by virtue of the Allocation of Revenue
(Federation Account, etc) (Amendment) Decree No. 106 of 1992. The
littoral States had argued that this Decree abolished the
onshore/offshore dichotomy on the sharing of oil and non-oil
revenues. The issue of 13% derivation and its applicability to
“natural” and “mineral” resources was also raised. The Supreme
Court, in a landmark judgment, held inter alia as follows:
• There was no time the FG had ceded the area beyond the
low-water mark to the littoral States as contended; hence the
seaward boundary of each littoral State, for the purpose of
calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation
Account, is the low-water mark of the surface thereof, or as in the
case of Cross-River State which has no archipelago of islands, the
seaward limits of the inland waters of that State.
• The phrase “mineral resources” in section 162(2) of the
Constitution excludes or does not contemplate “natural resources” –
as argued by the Northern or Middle-Belt States that had filed
counter-claims.
• The FCT Abuja is neither a State nor a Local Government, hence
cannot enjoy derivation under section 162(3) of the
Constitution.
• Section 1(d)(iv) of the Allocation of Revenue Act, Cap. 16,
LFN, 1990, in so far as it stipulated derivation of 1% instead of
“not less than 13%”, was null and void.
Following the above judgment, the Olusegun Obasanjo-led
Government qua the National Assembly bowed to pressure from Niger
Delta agitators and enacted the Revenue Allocation (Abolition of
Dichotomy in the Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act,
2004. Section 1(1) of this Act provides thus:
1.-(1) As from the commencement of this Act, two hundred metre
water depth isobaths contiguous to a State of the Federation shall
be deemed to be part of that State for the purposes of computing
the revenue accruing to the Federation from the State pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999 or any other enactment.
In A-G CROSS RIVER v A-G FEDERATION (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 646)
408 S.C., the question was whether Cross River had ceased to become
a littoral State by virtue of the judgment of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), which had yanked off the Bakassi Peninsula
from Nigeria and had ceded same to Cameroon. Central for
consideration was section 1(1) of the new Revenue Allocation Act,
2004, quoted above. The apex Court agreed that by virtue of the ICJ
judgment, Cross River State was no more a littoral State, hence the
revenue from the oil wells which hitherto was accruing to it now
accrued to Akwa Ibom State.
It must be noted that the word “deemed” was used in section 1(1)
of the 2004 Act, quoted above. If the legal interpretation of that
word is to be applied [for which see SAVANNAH BANK LTD. v AJILO
(1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305 at 325 SC], then the several decisions
reached by the Supreme Court on revenue accruing from littoral
States would not have been so reached. One of such decisions was
the case of A-G ADAMAWA v A-G FEDERATION (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 299)
1450 S.C. In this case, the plaintiffs, invoking the original
jurisdiction of the apex Court, argued that section 1(1) of the
2004 Act had unconstitutionally extended the seaward boundaries of
the littoral States, in contravention of section 8 of the 1999
Constitution. Uwais, CJN, who delivered the lead judgment of the
Court, held rather proactively, with due respect, as follows:
This, with respect, is not a correct interpretation of the
provisions of the Act, because the Act specifically states that the
extension is only to be deemed, in other words, it is not real but
notional, and it is specifically intended for the purpose of
computing the revenue which accrues to the Federation Account from
the littoral States.
What a public policy judicial opinion! If it was only
“notional,” why then enforce it? The Supreme Court was later to
admit in A-G RIVERS STATE v A-G AKWA IBOM STATE (2011) All FWLR
(Pt. 579) 1023 at 1081 that the agitations in the Niger Delta
following the 2002 ‘resource control’ decision of the Supreme Court
in A-G Federation vs. A-G Abia, supra, constituted the sole factor
that made the National Assembly to promulgate the 2004 Act!
As it stands now, therefore, all the three arms of the
Federal Government of Nigeria have over time consistently exhibited
resolve to quench violent agitations from the Niger Delta Region
especially over ‘resource control’ or fiscal federalism, as
indicated in this piece, using constitutional means. I will briefly
further adumbrate on this, as follows:
• Chapter XII of the 1963 Republican Constitution had established
the “Niger Delta Development Board,” which under section 159(4) of
that Constitution was to be “responsible for advising the
Government of the Federation and the Governments of Eastern Nigeria
and Mid-Western Nigeria with respect to physical development of the
Niger Delta.” This Board was to last until 1st July, 1969.
• In the course of time, several critical States were created
for the Niger Delta Region – Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa State and Delta.
Abia and Imo States have also joined in the enjoyment of 13%
derivation and have also been deriving benefits from developmental
bodies like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC).
• The Ibrahim Babangida-led administration established the Oil
Minerals Producing Development Commission (OMPADEC) to cater for
the special needs of the Niger Delta. Today, the NDDC is
statutorily established and is undertaking similar, if not graver
assignments.
• The 1999 Constitution, as shown above, established the revenue
formula whereby Niger Delta and some Eastern Nigeria States take
13% of all oil revenues. As shown above, attempt by some Northern
and Middle-Belt States to equate “mineral resources” with “natural
resources” so as to benefit from this constitutional largesse was
rebuffed by the Supreme Court.
• The Federal Government, as admitted by the Supreme Court,
bowed to pressure from the Niger Delta to enact section 1(1) of the
2004 Revenue Act, which for all intents and purposes is in conflict
with Treaties entered into by Nigeria – like the Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958; the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 1958 and the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 1982. This is a grave national sacrifice!
For now, all reasonable agitations from the Niger Delta have
been reasonably addressed, in my humble opinion – which is
expressed here just to let the truth be known – because my Bible
tells me that we should know the truth, which shall then set us
free.
My conclusion, for lack of space, therefore, is that the
Nigerian Government has over time been fair to the constituent
States, especially the Niger Delta Region, on issues of fiscal
federalism. Roundtable engagement to further improve on this is,
however, not ruled out. “Jaw-jaw” instead of “war-war” is my humble
plea.
Regional and Municipal Autonomy
Many countries have granted regional and municipal semi-autonomy to
the components thereof. The examples here are not limited to
Federal Constitutions; but they are relevant to show that Nigeria
needs to toe this line urgently – for the instantaneous development
of rural areas. We shall demonstrate this here.
Section 25(0) of the Federal Constitution of Brazil, 1988, permits
the States to be “organized and governed by the Constitutions and
laws which they may adopt, with due regard for the principles of
this Constitution,” while section 30 of the Constitution grants
“Municipal Self Government.” See, also, section 116 of the
Australian Constitution of 1900. Several other Constitutions have
also provided for regional or municipal partial autonomy without
strings. See Part IXA (sections 243P-243ZG of the Indian
Constitution); sections 104-105 of the Armenian Constitution of
1995; section 142 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, 1995; Chapter
III of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 2004; section 28A of the
Constitution of Ireland, 1937; section 141(3) of the Constitution
of Afghanistan, 2004 and Article 108(3) and (4) of the Constitution
of Albania, 1998. Indeed, Article 111(2) of the Albanian
Constitution provides inter alia that “The units of local
government have an independent budget.”
In a similar fashion, section 153 of the Constitution of South
Africa, 1997, which is also a Federal Constitution, has mandated
each local government council to “structure and manage its
administration, and budgeting and planning process to give priority
to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and
economic development of the community.” Also, section 154(1)
compulsorily requires both the national and regional governments
“by legislative and other measures,” to “support and strengthen the
capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to execute
their powers and to perform their functions.” That Constitution has
no similar provision as 162(6) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria,
which has established a Joint State/Local Government Account.
In 2005, the National Assembly of Nigeria, apparently seeking to
sidetrack section 162(6) of the Constitution (for good intentions,
I must say), enacted the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local
Governments Act, 2005. The Supreme Court wasted no time, in A-G
ABIA STATE v A-G FEDERATION (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 338) 604 S.C., to
strike it down as being unconstitutional. I hereby strongly suggest
that section 162(6) of the Constitution be deleted, to pave way for
a complete autonomy of Local Government Councils, as is obtainable
in South Africa – another Federation. Similarly, the apex Court, in
the consolidated suits of A-G OGUN STATE v A-G FEDERATION (2003)
FWLR (Pt. 143) 206 S.C., had held that by virtue of section 162(5),
(6) and (8) of the Constitution, the Federal Government had no
power to pay directly any amount standing to the credit of the
Local Government Councils to such Councils. This decision, too,
would have been otherwise, but for the named provisions of the
Constitution. An amendment to remove or modify the said provisions
is hereby suggested.
Other Constitutions that have either granted semi-self
government to the municipalities or have provided that the
administration of this level of government shall be strictly as
stipulated by law are: the Irish Constitution of 1937 – section 28A
thereof; the Constitution of Cameroon – section 55(2) thereof; the
Constitution of Croatia, 1990, as amended in 2000 and 2001 –
section 132 thereof; the Constitution of Belgium, 1970 – section 39
thereof, etc.
The Constitution of Namibia, 1990, in section 111, has vested
control of local councils in the National Legislature of that
country. If this provision were in place in Nigeria, the Supreme
Court would not have reached the decision it reached in A-G ABIA
STATE v A-G FEDERATION, supra and A- G Ogun State vs. A-G
Federation, supra.
My suggestion, therefore, is an amendment of relevant provisions of
the 1999 Constitution to either straightaway remove the Local
Governments under the grip of the State Governments, or to place
them under the National Assembly. The grassroots of Nigeria will
fare much better if either of these is effected.
I will further suggest that we revert to the 1963 Constitution
whereby the Regions were given powers to enact their Constitutions,
which Constitutions were, by virtue of sections 1 and 5, subject to
the Federal Constitution. I would like to see a situation whereby
the States or the geo-political zones of Nigeria will have their
Constitutions, Supreme Courts, etc, as is the case with the US and
other Federal Constitutions.
Citizenship
This is another contentious area – though agitations and tensions
are limited to discriminating against Nigerians resident in other
States apart from their States of origin. This should not be, in
view of section 42(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, which
has prohibited discrimination against any citizen on account of his
having come from a particular community or a place of origin.
Most Constitutions of countries of the world have less elaborate
provisions on citizenship, if compared to the Nigerian
Constitution, yet their political leaderships are always honest to
keep discrimination amongst the citizenry at bay. This is not so in
Nigeria, where a ‘non-indigene’ is merely tolerated in his State of
residence. This should not be. In order to be proactive, therefore,
I will suggest a few constitutional amendments – to put the
naysayers where they belong on this issue.
Article 6(2) of the Constitution of Russia, 1993, provides that
“Every citizen of the Russian Federation shall have all the rights
and liberties on its territory and bear equal duties stipulated by
the Constitution.” Also, Article IV, section 2(1) of the US
Constitution provides that “The citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States.”
I hereby suggest a constitutional amendment in Nigeria to
reflect these – to avoid the present ugly situation whereby the
youth of one ‘Region’ will be handing down quit notice to an entire
race or tribe whose members are full citizens of Nigeria. To fully
realise and practicalise these amendments, further amendments be
put in place to ensure that if any particular State or ‘Region’ is
reluctant or unwilling to implement the suggested amendments, if
enacted, the Federal Government can step in to enforce them in any
given case. I have the backing of the US Constitution on this. The
XIV Amendment to the US Constitution, which was effected in 1868
and which made provisions on citizenship by naturalisation, etc,
was capped up with the following provision in section 5 of the
Article thus:
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Also, the XV Amendment which was made in 1870 and which guaranteed
voting rights to all Americans in spite of “race, color, or
previous condition of servitude,” was capped with the following
provision in section 2:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Nigeria needs similar provisions even more than the USA, given our
infamous practical experience of State officials looking the other
way when citizens of other tribal or cultural origins are being
abused!
Pruning down Powers of State Officials
It is generally acceptable that the powers exercisable by the
President of Nigeria and State Governors are too enormous and tend
to gravitate to absolutism and tyranny. A few suggestions on how to
prune down those excesses will hereby be made.
Article II, section 3 of the US Constitution mandatorily requires
the US President to “from time to time give to the Congress
information on the State of the Union.” This sounds symbolic; but
it helps to keep the President in check.
Section 27(2) of the Constitution of Namibia stipulates that
“The executive powers of the Republic of Namibia shall vest in the
President and the Cabinet.” The word “and” deters an elected
President from taking several months to constitute his cabinet. In
this regard, too, we should revert back to the provisions of
section 145(1) and (2) of the botched 1989 Constitution of Nigeria,
where the President was placed under constitutional duty to assign
executive duties to the Vice-President and the Ministers.
Part 2, Chapter 1, section 70 of the Algerian Constitution states
that “The President of the Republic, Head of the State, embodies
the unity of the nation,” who “is the guarantor of the
Constitution.” Similar provisions can be found in Article 49 of the
Constitution of Armenia, 1995. Breach of these ordinarily should
attract impeachment, hence our Constitution be amended to
accommodate them.
The nagging issue of immunity can also be addressed as is done
in section 123(2) of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, 1995, where
the Prime Minister loses his immunity if “he has been caught in the
act of crime.” Alternatively, the immunity clause can be removed
altogether, as is the case with countless number of other
Constitutions.
Abuse of power is, however, not limited to the Executive – as
experience in Nigeria has shown that members of the Legislature are
also guilty of this. Article 54 of the Constitution of Brazil has
forbidden members of the Legislature from doing certain things that
are contrary to their office; while Article 55 thereof stipulates
automatic loss of their office if they are in breach. That
Constitution, unlike that of Nigeria, has not given any room for
process of recall of a Legislator, to give such erring member the
chance of instituting a court action to stop his removal from
office!
Restructuring of Office of Attorney-General and Minister
of Justice
As things stand out today, it is probably only Nigeria that is
still combining the office of Attorney- General and
Minister/Commissioner of Justice, thereby making the holder of that
office both a general Ombudsman and a politician. This is not good
for the smooth working of the system and should be stopped via
constitutional amendment.
See section 76 of the Constitution of India, 1950; section 64 of
the Constitution of Bangladesh, 2004; section 30 of the
Constitution of Ireland, 1937; section 134 of the Constitution of
Afghanistan, 2004; and the Constitution of Argentina, 1853, etc,
have all established/recognised ‘A-G’ without the addition
‘Minister of Justice’. And of course, we know that the US also has
‘A-G’ simpliciter. These are all random examples – meant to show
that Nigeria is lagging far behind in this regard, hence the
imperative of a constitutional amendment.
But if we insist on retaining the status quo, I will suggest
creation of the office of The Ombudsman – as in section 86 of the
Argentine Constitution, section 77 of the Constitution of
Bangladesh and section 89 of the Constitution of Namibia; or the
office of The Public Protector – as in section 182 of the
Constitution of South Africa, 1997; or the office of The Public
Defender – as in Article 134 of the Constitution of Brazil,
etc.
State Police
In the US, the Texas Rangers, founded in 1823 by Stephen F. Austin
to protect the settlers from attacks by the indigenous Indians,
remains the earliest form of State policing in the USA. To cut a
long story short, however, modern day State policing in that
country is traceable to May 2, 1905, when the State of Pennsylvania
established by law the first organised State Police in the USA. For
lack of space, I will have to say that Nigeria is also VERY RIPE
for State police; and all relevant portions of the Constitution and
Federal laws should be amended to accommodate this.
Referendums and Plebiscites
Making provisions for the convocation of referendums or plebiscites
is one other sure way of restructuring our Constitution with a view
to guaranteeing public peace and accountability in public affairs.
Examples from other countries will suffice here.
Article 49(XV) of the Constitution of Brazil allows federal
legislation which would “authorize a referendum and to call a
plebiscite” in deserving circumstances. Articles 150-152 of the
Constitution of Albania also allow referendum in deserving
circumstances. Section 47 of the Constitution of Ireland provides
that even that Constitution can be amended through a referendum.
Ditto Armenia – by virtue of Chapter 8 of the Constitution of
Armenia, 1995.
Reforms in the Judiciary
I have already briefly touched on this above; but I will add that
serious reforms in the Judiciary are of critical importance. I
totally support creation of special courts for trial of corruption
cases, to save time and enhance better administration of justice in
that subsector. Section 127 of the Constitution of India, 1950, has
permitted the appointment of ad hoc Judges, who may have retired
from the Bench. I recommend this for corruption and election cases
– for obvious reasons.
I also suggest that Regional Courts of Appeal and Supreme Courts be
created, as in the USA, to ease the workload on the Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court.
Salaries and emoluments of Judicial Officers should be reviewed
upwards – to stem corruption in the Judiciary. In 2013, I rolled
out figures from the USA, Canada, Australia and even Ghana – to
show that our Judicial Officers are receiving pittance. For
instance, a Chief Magistrate in the US receives far more than what
the Chief Justice of Nigeria receives as his emoluments! This is
humiliating, to say the least.
Miscellany
There should be in our Constitution the following provisions, as
can be found in some of the Constitutions indicated:
• Provisions for social security – as in Chapter II of the
Constitution of Brazil.
• Children’s rights – as in section 15 of the Namibian
Constitution, including a constitutional prohibition against
children being employed as factory workers – as in section 24 of
the Indian Constitution.
• Protection of minority tribes in Nigeria – as in sections 29 and
30 of the Indian Constitution.
• Making some of the critical provisions of Chapter II of the
Constitution justiciable. In Ireland, Chapter XIII of its
Constitution, dealing with “Directive Principles of Social Policy,”
the equivalent of Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution, is even
made justiciable.
Finally, relevant security and anti-corruption agencies – the
EFCC, ICPC, Code of Conduct Bureau, Customs and Excise, NAPTIP,
etc, should be strengthened and better funded. A few years ago, I
rolled out data showing that the US population is about twice more
than that of Nigeria; that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) has a total budget that is 50 times more than that of
Nigeria’s EFCC and ICPC combined; and that it also has staff
strength which is at least 10 times more than that of the EFCC and
the ICPC combined. Yet, Nigeria occupies a higher position on the
corruption index than the USA! Prosecution of crime, let alone of
corrupt enrichment, is very costly, hence the imperative of these
reforms.
Chief Sebastine Hon, SAN, FCIArb, Constitutional Lawyer
and Authordies
Thisday
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