* The Supreme Court rules against the federal government in
Sessions v. Dimaya.
Today the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act which dealt with the power of the
U.S. government to deport any alien, including a lawful permanent
resident, convicted of an “aggravated felony.” The 5-4 ruling was
written by Justice Elena Kagan and joined by Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Neil
Gorsuch, who concurred in part and joined in the judgment, provided
the tie-breaking fifth vote.
At issue in Sessions v. Dimaya is a provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act which lists being convicted of “a crime of
violence” as one of the types of aggravated felony convictions that
can trigger an alien’s deportation. This provision defines “a crime
of violence” to include any offense that “is a felony and that, by
its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”
In its opinion today, the Court struck down that provision as
unconstitutionally vague. “The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as we
have called it,” observed the majority opinion of Justice Kagan,
“guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct
a statute proscribes.”
In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch explained the constitutional
principle that demanded this result:
Before holding a lawful permanent resident alien like James
Dimaya subject to removal for having committed a crime, the
Immigration and Nationality Act requires a judge to determine that
the ordinary case of the alien’s crime of conviction involves a
substantial risk that physical force may be used. But what does
that mean? Just take the crime at issue in this case, California
burglary, which applies to everyone from armed home intruders to
door-to-door salesmen peddling shady products. How, on that vast
spectrum, is anyone supposed to locate the ordinary case and say
whether it includes a substantial risk of physical force? The truth
is, no one knows. The law’s silence leaves judges to their
intuitions and the people to their fate. In my judgment, the
Constitution demands more.
The upshot of today’s ruling is that it is now more difficult
for the federal government to deport aliens under the terms of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya is available
here
Culled from Reason
* The Supreme Court rules against the federal government in
Sessions v. Dimaya.
Today the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act which dealt with the power of the
U.S. government to deport any alien, including a lawful permanent
resident, convicted of an “aggravated felony.” The 5-4 ruling was
written by Justice Elena Kagan and joined by Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Neil
Gorsuch, who concurred in part and joined in the judgment, provided
the tie-breaking fifth vote.
At issue in Sessions v. Dimaya is a provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act which lists being convicted of “a crime of
violence” as one of the types of aggravated felony convictions that
can trigger an alien’s deportation. This provision defines “a crime
of violence” to include any offense that “is a felony and that, by
its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”
In its opinion today, the Court struck down that provision as
unconstitutionally vague. “The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as we
have called it,” observed the majority opinion of Justice Kagan,
“guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct
a statute proscribes.”
In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch explained the constitutional
principle that demanded this result:
Before holding a lawful permanent resident alien like James
Dimaya subject to removal for having committed a crime, the
Immigration and Nationality Act requires a judge to determine that
the ordinary case of the alien’s crime of conviction involves a
substantial risk that physical force may be used. But what does
that mean? Just take the crime at issue in this case, California
burglary, which applies to everyone from armed home intruders to
door-to-door salesmen peddling shady products. How, on that vast
spectrum, is anyone supposed to locate the ordinary case and say
whether it includes a substantial risk of physical force? The truth
is, no one knows. The law’s silence leaves judges to their
intuitions and the people to their fate. In my judgment, the
Constitution demands more.
The upshot of today’s ruling is that it is now more difficult
for the federal government to deport aliens under the terms of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya is available
here
Culled from Reason