Boko Haram: Issues for engagement

Eze Onyekpere

Recent successful attacks by Boko Haram terrorists on military
formations and civilian communities bring to the fore the need to
re-evaluate and re-examine the strategies for the engagement of the
terrorists. The latest attack on the 157 Task Force Battalion at
Melete, Borno State where the casualty figures have not been
officially confirmed but different media organisations are quoting
different figures throws up so many posers. But let us start by
acknowledging the supreme sacrifice of our gallant soldiers who
have given their all. They died in defence of our lives. May God
grant them eternal rest and their families, the fortitude to
continue life without their loved ones.

This discourse intends to raise so many posers and issues which
the military and intelligence high commands need to answer or seek
answers to, in a bid to rejig their operations and adequately
protect Nigerians, as well as save the lives of men and officers on
the frontlines. This is not about blaming anyone but points in the
direction of the need for persons in authority to put on their
thinking caps.

The first issue that comes up for analysis is the state of
equipment and hardware available to our soldiers. At least, since
the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari, the defence
sector has been well-funded through appropriation and at least, we
are made to believe that there is no one diversion of and
disbursement of defence money for other purposes. We are also made
to believe that soldiers are paid on time and their motivation is
very high. Again, the administration states that Boko Haram has
been technically defeated and what they attack now are soft
targets, which is evidence of a “dying insurgency”, in its last
days and without the ability to take on hard core fights. But of
late, the insurgents have been taking on and routing military
formations which contradicts the postulation of a technical defeat.
How is it possible that the insurgents who are not in a position to
buy arms and ammunition legally, but only procure them through the
black and illegal market can get equipment to match and outgun
Nigerian troops whose source of procurement is official and the
Nigerian state has more resources available to it? Who is supplying
them the equipment and hardware to take on the Nigerian defence
forces?

The second issue is this; is it possible that a large contingent
of insurgents will move over so many kilometres without anyone
sighting them or the intelligence activated to warn soldiers to lay
ambush for them? Does it mean we do not have military equipment
that can sight humans and objects from afar and warn about
irregular movements? If we do not have such equipment, how much
will it cost to acquire them? What about the communities and
civilians? Would it be too much for the civil communities to give
information of irregular movement of persons to military
authorities? And this can be done through the telephone. What
exactly is happening?

The third issue is that in these attacks, especially on military
formations which last for a fairly long time, is it possible that
no one used the military signals or even mobile telecommunications
to contact the defence headquarters or the nearest level of command
for reinforcement? If the infantry is facing challenges and the air
force is available with fighters and other aircraft, it is expected
that they would come to the rescue of the infantry and overwhelm
the insurgents. But the news coming out of the attacks suggests
that a command under attack is left to shoulder the entire burden.
They will overcome or go down on the basis of their own strength
and ability. Flights between Lagos and Abuja or Port Harcourt or
Abuja to major destinations are usually of 45 minutes duration. It
is safely assumed that fight jets and military aircraft should be
faster than civilian transport aircraft and from any point in
Nigeria, should reach the desired destination under 30 minutes.
Even if the combat is such that aircraft cannot use bombs, the
aircraft could still track the insurgents to their base and pound
them with the relevant mortars and bombs.

The foregoing is appealing to common sense, reasoning, tactical
command and coordination. In the earlier attack on a civilian
community, the insurgents were reported to have set houses on fire,
used guns and knives to kill people and then loaded about 200
cattle and sheep into trucks and carted them away. The picture of
the foregoing is that they took their time attacking the community
and stealing their properties and this could have gone on for
hours. Moving 200 cattle and sheep will not be possible with sleek
salon cars. Rather, they would be done with trucks which hardly
speed up to 100 kilometres per hour. And they would therefore be
moved slowly and off-loading at the point of destination will also
be another time-consuming effort. So, no one could mobilise and
follow up on these bandits at a time they were bound by
circumstances to move rather slowly?

The fourth issue is that every time a military or civilian
target is successfully attacked by insurgents, they thereafter
literally vanish into thin air, with no trace. They simply
disappear only to reappear at their due time for the next attack?
How is this possible? We are dealing with large areas of land with
little or no vegetation and forest cover; barely shrub covers. It
would be easy, whether in follow-up infantry and or air force
engagement to track and target the terrorists and take them out.
Considering that the military engagement includes a multi-national
task force, even if the insurgents cross national boundaries,
proper coordination means that there would still be defence forces
waiting to engage them across the border.

The fifth is that while international organisations including
the United Nations organs and agencies have stated that Nigeria has
been paying ransom to secure the release of persons held by
insurgents, the government has been living in denial. The more
resources available to the insurgents, the more vicious they will
be and it appears that the Nigerian state is somehow funding and
supporting them when they receive this back-door money. A
re-examination of the need to pay ransom has to evolve.

Finally, the military high command should be forthcoming in
providing information when incidents such as the Melete attack
occur. It is not enough to condemn social and print media reports
and tag them as fake news, disinformation and even threaten to
prosecute persons who spread them. The press release from the
military authorities on the Melete event merely warned about
contravening the extant law without providing the official account
of what happened. Nature abhors a vacuum. To the extent that
official information is not forthcoming on a timely basis,
something else will take its place because Nigerians are hungry for
news about the performance of our beloved armed forces. Again, if
official information deviates from what eyewitnesses told
journalists, different accounts of such an incident will continue
to be in the media.

A new strategy is needed. The ball is in the court of Mr.
President and the Commander-in-Chief.

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