Beluolisa Nwafor, Stripped Of SAN Title, Cries Out For Justice

person to become the accuser and the judge at the same time.

“Under the 1999 Constitution, there is no right of appeal from a
decision of the High Court of the FCT, Abuja, straight to the
Supreme Court, as the Court of Appeal cannot be by-passed.”

Appeal for justice

In a letter to former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Idris
Kutigi, dated December 13, 2017, Nwafor chronicled what transpired
at the panel, stating that, throughout the proceedings at the Court
of Appeal, he acted professionally and was never cited for any
contempt of court.

“The Court of Appeal rather commended me and other counsel for
‘eloquent oral submissions’ in the same case.

“It is common knowledge that any person who commits contempt of
court is usually tried by a court. If the contempt is in the face
of the court, then the court will immediately deal with it by
conducting trial for such offence.

“It is noteworthy that, although I was accused of ‘contemptuous
behaviour before the Court of Appeal,’ there is nowhere in the
letter it was shown what exactly I said that amounts to ‘unruly and
contemptuous conduct’ or ‘speaking and acting rudely to the
court.’”

He regretted that even after paying N3 million each to the three
Justices of the Court of Appeal as directed by the Supreme Court,
his rank of SAN was still withdrawn. He said he was denied fair
hearing by the disciplinary panel, in breach of his constitutional
rights under Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution.

“By directing me to call my witness when no prima facie case was
made out by the petitioners against me, my constitutional rights
under Section 36 (11) were breached,” he said, adding that the
petitioner was allowed to cross-examine him and his three
witnesses.

“Hearing was conducted in secret without allowing the public
access to the venue of the proceedings. The petitioner refused to
give evidence, refused to adopt its petition by itself, refused to
call any witness to prove its allegations and refused to make
himself available to be cross-examined because the counsel said it
was undignified for the learned justices of the Court of Appeal to
be subjected to cross-examination, and also because the chief
registrar who signed the petition did not have personal knowledge
of what transpired at the time I argued the case at the Court of
Appeal.”

While denying the allegations against him, Nwafor said the
certified true copy of the record of proceedings by the Court of
Appeal was altered and riddled with inconsistencies. He also
alleged bias against him, as the CJN who had earlier formed an
adverse opinion against him also sat as chairman of the LPPC.

He appealed to the former CJN to “intervene in this
constitutional crisis situation that has arisen in my case by
urging the LPPC to withdraw or set aside its decision withdrawing
my rank as SAN and to restore my rank wrongly withdrawn.”

LPPC’s position

But the LPPC has justified its action. The body, through its
counsel, Chief Ogwu Onoja (SAN), dismissed Nwafor’s
allegations.

In its brief of argument, dated November 15, 2018, the
committee said, during the hearing of the petition by the panel,
Nwafor was satisfied with the adoption of the petition by counsel
to the chief registrar of the Court of Appeal, L.E. Nwosu (SAN)
without insisting on the personal appearance of the chief registrar
for cross-examination.

“After the petitioner’s case, Nwafor sought leave to make a
no-case submission and he was granted. Thereafter, he testified for
himself and called three witnesses to testify for him and also had
the opportunity to submit final written address.

“At the end of the investigation exercise by the disciplinary
panel of the LPPC, he was found guilty of professional misconduct
and, accordingly, his rank of SAN was withdrawn.

“It is respectively submitted that appellant was grossly in
error when he misconceived the subject matter of the petition to
mean criminal contempt proceedings. He took a very narrow and
technical view of the word ‘contemptuous’ to mean criminal offence.
The word ‘contemptuous’ used in the petition in its ordinary
connotation means reprehensible conduct, spiteful use of words,
insolence, disrespectful, abuse of a privilege, menacing look and
utterances, disorderly conduct as well as undignifying
carriage.

“It is our humble contention that to address the honourable
justices of the Court of Appeal with so much disdain, disrespect,
rudeness and abusive utterances as the appellant did in this case
when he appeared before the Court of Appeal, is undoubtedly
unprofessional conduct contemplated by Section 24(1)(a) and (b) of
the guidelines referred to above.

“It is also on record that the appellant joined the honourable
justices in their personal capacities to the motions on notice he
filed in the Supreme Court in which he sought to restrain the said
justices from performing their constitutional/judicial duties. This
is clearly a professional misconduct unexpected of a person holding
the rank of a Senior Advocate of Nigeria.

“In the instant case, the allegation against the appellant and
pursuant to which his rank of Senior Advocate was withdrawn was the
breach of professional code of conduct. The only body saddled with
the power to exercise disciplinary control and award the
appropriate sanction is the LPPC. It, therefore, smacks of mischief
and bad faith for the appellant to argue that the allegations
against him were criminal in nature and that he ought to be tried
in a court of law for the offence of contempt before he can be
disciplined by the LPPC.”

The LPPC also said the requirement of sitting in public under
Section 36 (4) of the 1999 Constitution applies only to court or
tribunal when trying an accused person for criminal offences: “In
the instant case, the appellant was not tried for criminal offence.
Moreover, the disciplinary sub-committee that investigated the
complaint against the appellant is not a court or tribunal, but a
fact-finding panel constituted by the LPPC.”

“The paramount consideration is whether the appellant and his
witnesses were accorded access to the venue where the disciplinary
subcommittee/panel of the LPPC held sitting to investigate the
allegation against him.

“What is fundamentally required to satisfy the principle of fair
hearing is to give equal opportunities to parties to be heard as
enunciated in the Supreme Court decision in INEC v Musa (2003),”
the LPPC submitted.