Boko Haram members
Boko
Boko Haram members
Boko Haram Terrorism in Context
By Timothy Antigha
In the last couple of years, there have been so many
commentaries about Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency in the Lake
Chad basin. A lot of these efforts have focused on the causality of
the conflict on the one hand and the response of the military on
the other. However, proportionate attention has not been given to
the context of Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency. In other words,
a framework within which analyses of Boko Haram insurgency and the
resultant counterinsurgency could be organized has not fully
emerged.
As a result, most conversations arising from the subject matter
clearly miss the point, misinform the public, reassure terrorists
and expose troops to avoidable danger. This scenario suggests that
analyses of Boko Haram insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts are
being done outside the context of 21st Century warfare.
Therefore, in seeking to put forward a plausible framework for
understanding the issues surrounding Boko Haram insurgency and
indeed counterinsurgency architecture of the Armed Forces of
Nigeria, it is relevant to understand first the ecology of the
conflict playing out in the North East.
NEW WAR
Following the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of conflicts
changed fundamentally. Warfare, which for hundreds of years was the
preserve of nation-States, witnessed the active participation of
non-State actors and sub–national entities. In other words, the
complexion of warfare changed, necessitating the coinage of the
controversial term “New War” by British academic, Mary Kaldor.
According to Kaldor “new wars have a logic that is different
from the logic of the ‘old wars’ – the idea of war that
predominated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”. For
instance, Old wars were fought by regular armed forces of states.
New wars are fought by varying combinations of networks of State
and non-State actors – regular armed forces, private security
contractors, mercenaries, jihadists, warlords, paramilitaries,
etc.
Secondly, Old wars were fought for geopolitical interests or for
ideology (democracy or socialism). New wars are fought in the name
of identity (ethnic, religious or tribal). Kaldor observes that
identity politics has a different logic from geo-politics or
ideology. Kaldor suggests that the aim is to gain access to State
authority for particular groups (that may be both local and
transnational), rather than to carry out particular policies or
programmes in the broader public interest. Viewed from this
perspective therefore, the Boko Haram phenomenon is still a strange
experience in our frame of reference; some of its ramifications are
just emerging.
FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE
Also relevant to this discourse is the fact that we are now
experiencing Fourth Generation Warfare. This is exemplified by a
period in the continuing evolution of war when nation-States lose
their monopoly on war. It is typified by a situation whereby State
militaries have found themselves fighting sub–national or non–State
opponents like the Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Al Shabab, the Taliban
and Boko Haram, among others. This period is characterized by
ambitious and audacious attacks like 9/11, attack at Police
Headquarters and the UN building in Abuja.
Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of
identity and culture; a phenomenon which Samuel Huntington dealt
with extensively in his book “The Clash of Civilizations”. Fourth
Generation is also epitomized by contrived migration intended to
tilt demography within populations for future political
advantage.
Furthermore, as militaries around the world ponder the
appropriate response to these issues, they also have to contend
with the reality that the enemy in the Fourth Generation battle
space is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention on the Laws of
Armed Conflict. Yet, the military who must fight him must abide by
the norms of the convention. It is also important to note that in
the Fourth Generation, victory does not necessarily lie in
manoeuver and firepower or organization and establishment, but in
the strategic, mental and moral domains where strange and
unexpected umpires include Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil
Society Groups.
Perhaps, of the greatest concern to military commanders is the
reality that in the Fourth Generation warfare, there is no strict
frontline or rear area. Everywhere is a battle front and in the
midst of civilians. Consequently, the asymmetry of methodologies
promotes decentralization, initiative, lone wolf syndrome, and
leaderless rebellion, thereby slanting the balance in favour of
non-State actors. The aftermath is that conflicts have become
increasingly complex and extremely difficult for militaries to deal
with, comparative to Third Generation warfare, when wars were
basically between opposing national militaries and in a
conventional setting.
THE ROLE OF NGOs / CSOs
Like all other conflicts, the Boko Haram insurgency in the North
East has generated its fair share of Complex Emergencies. It has
also attracted a gathering of assorted International and local
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs) in a bid to find solutions to the resultant
humanitarian crises. In my view, they have done well across the
spectrum of their responsibilities. However, the proliferation of
NGOs in the last couple of years and their pervasive influence have
ensured their movement from the backstage to center stage in
national and world politics respectively.
Consequently, they have been exerting their power and influence
in every aspect of national and international politics and
policymaking. Naturally, abuses of power, influence and trust have
accompanied the growth of NGOs. The use of NGOs by terrorists as
cover for terror financing and other sordid engagements, as well as
the experience of OXFAM in Haiti are cases in point.
In the North East the issues with NGOs and CSOs have been the
under–reporting of atrocities committed by terrorists and the
targeting and misrepresentation of the military. The mostly one
sided reports by Amnesty International in particular and other
fringe interest groups alleging wrong doing by the Nigeria Army in
the conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations are usually based on
accounts of people who are themselves terrorists or accomplices of
terrorism. Also, the expectation that civilian casualties are
completely avoidable in the North East is totally wrong considering
the peculiarities of Fourth Generation warfare which I explained
earlier.
Furthermore, the tendency to evaluate Fourth Generation military
operations with the parametres developed for Third Generation
warfare can only lead to conclusions which are not in sync with
reality. This misunderstanding and failure to appreciate the
complexity of the new war have characterized relations between the
military and the NGO community in the North East and have not only
denied the military credit for successes achieved so far, it has
eroded the confidence of service personnel, questioned their
believe in the cause and threatened the cohesion and combat
efficiency of troops.
Inaccurate and prejudiced reports by NGOs have also diminished
the reputation of the military in the perception of the public. In
all of these instances, Boko Haram benefits. An urgent need exists
therefore for a new paradigm for assessing military operations in
the Fourth Generation.
BOKO HARAM TERRORISM/ INSURGENCY
There is no gain saying that Boko Haram has leveraged and
benefitted immensely from all the nuances and subterranean tactics
available in the Fourth Generation. In fact, Boko Haram has made a
vital contribution to the tactics of Fourth Generation war via its
introduction of mass abduction of school children, exemplified by
the Chibok and Dapchi incidents. It would be recalled that the
Ambazonia insurgents in Cameroon emulated the same tactics in
2018.
Perhaps, the critical advantage that Boko Haram has is the
intricate support system that it has managed to develop within the
population, using the instruments of religion and identity. As a
result of these two factors, Boko Haram has had a very successful
campaign of deploying Person Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(Suicide Bombing), considering that such terror tactics is
relatively new in our environment. Boko Haram has also leveraged
the expertise of Islamic State in all phases of its terror campaign
in the Lake Chad Basin.
THE NORTH EAST OPERATIONS
The issues discussed above shape and define the new conflict
ecosystem. Nevertheless, the Nigerian Armed Forces have responded
professionally to these realities. It would be recalled that at the
inception of the current administration in 2015, the President
directed the immediate relocation of the Military Command Centre to
Maiduguri for more effective coordination of military operations.
On his part, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur
Yusufu Buratai has initiated a series of concrete measures which
have repositioned the Nigerian Army to better deal with the
challenges of Fourth Generation Warfare.
These measures include the surge operation; exemplified by the
establishment of new formations and induction of units in the North
East.
The Chief of Army Staff also introduced mobile brigade concept
to enable the Nigerian Army deal with the ubiquity of Boko Haram
terrorists. Other enduring measures include establishment of
logistics bases, Human Rights desk to deal with issues abuses,
introduction of new platforms and improved troops welfare. The
results from the field have been encouraging. The inability of Boko
Haram to disrupt the 2019 elections and the leadership crisis in
Boko Haram are vivid success indicators.
Like the military have adopted new operational procedures and
tactics to deal with threats in the new conflict ecosystem, it
behooves Human Rights groups, Civil Society Organizations and other
bodies who exercise oversight functions on the conduct of military
operations to recognize that warfare is now in its Fourth
Generation.
Therefore there is the need to update the relevant statutes.
Furthermore, the dynamics and tactics are completely different from
what obtained in the Third Generation, therefore, a new template
for scrutinizing and evaluating military operations should be
developed.
Colonel Timothy Antigha is Chief of Military Public Information
of Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNNJT), N’Djamena, Chad