Call For Legislative And Judicial Autonomy: Matters Arising

By David D. IHUA-MADUENYI, ESQ.

INTRODUCTION

In the past few weeks, there has been a continuous call for both
the Legislature and the Judiciary, especially at the various States
to be autonomous. The Calls made by the Parliamentary Staff
Association of Nigeria (PASAN), and Judiciary Staff Union of
Nigeria (JUSUN), have become the loudest, culminating into a
nation-wide strike called by both PASAN and JUSUN.

No need to remind us of the effects of the strike actions, but
suffice to say that the strike called by JUSUN, has very
devastating effect upon lawyers, litigants and the ordinary
citizens of Nigeria.

Other well-meaning citizens have also stood up in support and
defence of the actions of both PASAN and JUSUN. One common
denominator, in the actions of PASAN and JUSUN, is that they are
asking the Executive arm of Government to implement financial
autonomy for the Legislature and the Judiciary, as enshrined in the
4^th Alteration, which amended Section 121 (3) of the
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In fact,
JUSUN had gone a step further in this struggle. It has a subsisting
judgment of a court to support and backup its fight. And the
President Muhammadu Buhari has done well by bringing the issue to
the fore for implementation, by signing Executive Order 10 on
22^nd May, 2020.

MATTERS ARISING

Flowing from the above is the following matters:-

1. The call and actions of PASAN and JUSUN, has now become a
   constitutional matter. A call upon the State Executives to adhere,
   obey and comply with constitutional provisions.
2. Their call and action is not just for the implementation of the
   constitution, but for the enforcement of the subsisting judgment of
   a court of competent jurisdiction.
3. The members of the PASAN and JUSUN should not have been “left
   alone” to shoulder this “fight”, over a constitutional issue.
4. The action now should not be to ‘beg’ the Governors, but to put
   up a joint effort, by ordinary Nigerian citizens, championed by the
   Nigerian Bar Association and the Labour Union/Congress, to push the
   Governors to compliance. This is why the national action taken by
   the Nigerian Bar Association in the nation-wide peaceful match,
   though coming late is a welcome development. It is not only
   face-saving, but encouraging. The Bar should now take over the
   struggle. For the objectives of the NBA is among others
   “maintenance and defence of the integrity and independence of the
   Bar and the Judiciary”. This fight is for the independence of the
   Judiciary.
5. The members of the PASAN and JUSUN are not going to be the
   ultimate beneficiaries of the “fruits” of the autonomy. Rather, all
   Nigerians would be the beneficiaries, by having quality,
   independent, impactful and people oriented legislations passed; and
   having very unbiased, bold and fearless judgments and orders from
   our courts actually, without fear or favour.
6. There is a constitutional provision which seems to embolden the
   heads of the Executive arms (at both the federal and states
   levels), that they (the executives) are the custodian of the
   peoples’ mandate. They see themselves as the head of all the other
   organs of government, “the guardian of the People”. See Sections
   130 and 176 of the 1999 CFRN as Amended.

The above assertion finds support in other provisions in the
following instances:-

1. The executives have the sole prerogative to make all major
   appointments. See Sections 147, 171, 192 and 193 of the 1999 CFRN
   as Amended. The Legislatures are only involved in their
   ‘Confirmation’.
2. The executives control the finances and votes in the country.
   Even though the power of appropriation lie with the Legislatures.
   See Sections 163 and 164 of the 1999 CFRN as amended.
3. The executives control the states’ instruments of force and
   cohesion, i.e. the Security Agencies. See Sections 215 and 218 of
   the 1999 CFRN as Amended.
4. Only the heads of the executives have constitutional
   immunities. See Section 308 of the CFRN as Amended.

The members of the other organs enjoy only what I call
Institutional Privileges. Which are the privileges of a legislator
or a judicial officer from civil liabilities arising from the
performance of their legislative and judicial functions. See
Section 3 of the LEGISLATIVE HOUSE (POWER AND PRIVILEGES) ACT CAP.
L 12 LFN 2004. See also EL-RUFAI V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2003
FWLR (PT. 173) 162. And the Laws (Acts) of the various Courts for
that of the Judicial Officers.

1. The absence of Code of Conduct, that holds the heads of the
   executives accountable in anyway, even after their tenure. Nothing
   holds them to even their Campaign promises or Party
   manifestos/programme.
2. Government and governance in Nigeria is personalised, not
   institutionalised. The individual sees himself as the
   government.
3. The heads of the executives should not see the issue of
   autonomy as an affront on its authority. Or see it as doing the
   Legislature and the Judiciary a favour, by implementing financial
   autonomy.

This is why the statement credited to the Chief Justice of
Nigeria (CJN), while urging the JUSUN to suspend the strike, that
he (the CJN) cannot call on the Governors to comply, as the
Governors would in return ask him for ten favours in return, is not
a good way to understand the issue.

8. This case has shown the common man that a person can have the
   judgment of a court in his favour, and still beg the judgment
   debtor for negotiation. This should call for a rethinking of our
   judgment enforcement process.
9. The JUSUN who already has a subsisting judgment of a court of
   competent jurisdiction in its favour of the implementation of
   judicial autonomy should proceed to court, for the enforcement of
   the judgment.

CONCLUSION

The States whose Governors are already implementing the
financial autonomy for the legislature and the judiciary should be
“named and hailed”.

While those whose Governors have refused to implement, should be
“named and shamed” as enemies of democracy and rule of law.

Since the federal government appears to be sympathetic to the
plights of the States Legislature and Judiciary, JUSUN should move
to enforce the terms of the subsisting judgment, by compelling the
Federal Government (Accountant-General of the Federation), to
deduct from the funds accruing to the states, from the Federation
accounts, and pay same to the Consolidated Revenue Funds in favour
of the States legislature and Judiciary, to be accessed by the
other states organs directly.

Once this is done, the Governors would be the ones begging for a
meeting and a political settlement to the issue.

* David D. Ihua-Maduenyi, Esq. is a Chief
Magistrate with the Rivers State Judiciary.

By David D. IHUA-MADUENYI, ESQ.

INTRODUCTION

In the past few weeks, there has been a continuous call for both
the Legislature and the Judiciary, especially at the various States
to be autonomous. The Calls made by the Parliamentary Staff
Association of Nigeria (PASAN), and Judiciary Staff Union of
Nigeria (JUSUN), have become the loudest, culminating into a
nation-wide strike called by both PASAN and JUSUN.

No need to remind us of the effects of the strike actions, but
suffice to say that the strike called by JUSUN, has very
devastating effect upon lawyers, litigants and the ordinary
citizens of Nigeria.

Other well-meaning citizens have also stood up in support and
defence of the actions of both PASAN and JUSUN. One common
denominator, in the actions of PASAN and JUSUN, is that they are
asking the Executive arm of Government to implement financial
autonomy for the Legislature and the Judiciary, as enshrined in the
4^th Alteration, which amended Section 121 (3) of the
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In fact,
JUSUN had gone a step further in this struggle. It has a subsisting
judgment of a court to support and backup its fight. And the
President Muhammadu Buhari has done well by bringing the issue to
the fore for implementation, by signing Executive Order 10 on
22^nd May, 2020.

MATTERS ARISING

Flowing from the above is the following matters:-

1. The call and actions of PASAN and JUSUN, has now become a
   constitutional matter. A call upon the State Executives to adhere,
   obey and comply with constitutional provisions.
2. Their call and action is not just for the implementation of the
   constitution, but for the enforcement of the subsisting judgment of
   a court of competent jurisdiction.
3. The members of the PASAN and JUSUN should not have been “left
   alone” to shoulder this “fight”, over a constitutional issue.
4. The action now should not be to ‘beg’ the Governors, but to put
   up a joint effort, by ordinary Nigerian citizens, championed by the
   Nigerian Bar Association and the Labour Union/Congress, to push the
   Governors to compliance. This is why the national action taken by
   the Nigerian Bar Association in the nation-wide peaceful match,
   though coming late is a welcome development. It is not only
   face-saving, but encouraging. The Bar should now take over the
   struggle. For the objectives of the NBA is among others
   “maintenance and defence of the integrity and independence of the
   Bar and the Judiciary”. This fight is for the independence of the
   Judiciary.
5. The members of the PASAN and JUSUN are not going to be the
   ultimate beneficiaries of the “fruits” of the autonomy. Rather, all
   Nigerians would be the beneficiaries, by having quality,
   independent, impactful and people oriented legislations passed; and
   having very unbiased, bold and fearless judgments and orders from
   our courts actually, without fear or favour.
6. There is a constitutional provision which seems to embolden the
   heads of the Executive arms (at both the federal and states
   levels), that they (the executives) are the custodian of the
   peoples’ mandate. They see themselves as the head of all the other
   organs of government, “the guardian of the People”. See Sections
   130 and 176 of the 1999 CFRN as Amended.

The above assertion finds support in other provisions in the
following instances:-

1. The executives have the sole prerogative to make all major
   appointments. See Sections 147, 171, 192 and 193 of the 1999 CFRN
   as Amended. The Legislatures are only involved in their
   ‘Confirmation’.
2. The executives control the finances and votes in the country.
   Even though the power of appropriation lie with the Legislatures.
   See Sections 163 and 164 of the 1999 CFRN as amended.
3. The executives control the states’ instruments of force and
   cohesion, i.e. the Security Agencies. See Sections 215 and 218 of
   the 1999 CFRN as Amended.
4. Only the heads of the executives have constitutional
   immunities. See Section 308 of the CFRN as Amended.

The members of the other organs enjoy only what I call
Institutional Privileges. Which are the privileges of a legislator
or a judicial officer from civil liabilities arising from the
performance of their legislative and judicial functions. See
Section 3 of the LEGISLATIVE HOUSE (POWER AND PRIVILEGES) ACT CAP.
L 12 LFN 2004. See also EL-RUFAI V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2003
FWLR (PT. 173) 162. And the Laws (Acts) of the various Courts for
that of the Judicial Officers.

1. The absence of Code of Conduct, that holds the heads of the
   executives accountable in anyway, even after their tenure. Nothing
   holds them to even their Campaign promises or Party
   manifestos/programme.
2. Government and governance in Nigeria is personalised, not
   institutionalised. The individual sees himself as the
   government.
3. The heads of the executives should not see the issue of
   autonomy as an affront on its authority. Or see it as doing the
   Legislature and the Judiciary a favour, by implementing financial
   autonomy.

This is why the statement credited to the Chief Justice of
Nigeria (CJN), while urging the JUSUN to suspend the strike, that
he (the CJN) cannot call on the Governors to comply, as the
Governors would in return ask him for ten favours in return, is not
a good way to understand the issue.

8. This case has shown the common man that a person can have the
   judgment of a court in his favour, and still beg the judgment
   debtor for negotiation. This should call for a rethinking of our
   judgment enforcement process.
9. The JUSUN who already has a subsisting judgment of a court of
   competent jurisdiction in its favour of the implementation of
   judicial autonomy should proceed to court, for the enforcement of
   the judgment.

CONCLUSION

The States whose Governors are already implementing the
financial autonomy for the legislature and the judiciary should be
“named and hailed”.

While those whose Governors have refused to implement, should be
“named and shamed” as enemies of democracy and rule of law.

Since the federal government appears to be sympathetic to the
plights of the States Legislature and Judiciary, JUSUN should move
to enforce the terms of the subsisting judgment, by compelling the
Federal Government (Accountant-General of the Federation), to
deduct from the funds accruing to the states, from the Federation
accounts, and pay same to the Consolidated Revenue Funds in favour
of the States legislature and Judiciary, to be accessed by the
other states organs directly.

Once this is done, the Governors would be the ones begging for a
meeting and a political settlement to the issue.

* David D. Ihua-Maduenyi, Esq. is a Chief
Magistrate with the Rivers State Judiciary.