Relocating The AFRICOM To Nigeria: The Geo-Political Dimensions Of An Unwanted Necessity

By Bola Akinterinwa

AFRICOM is the acronym for Africa Command, and also a short form
for United States Africa Command, which was created within the
framework of the reorganisation of the US Military Command
structure in February 2007, under the George W. Bush
administration. As explained by the first Commander of the AFRICOM,
General William ‘KIP’ Ward, the rationale for establishing the
AFRICOM was to enable good governance in Africa without undermining
the national sovereignty of any country. What is good governance in
this case?

President Bush explained the mission statement of the AFRICOM
thus: ‘this new Command will strengthen our security cooperation
with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the
capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance
our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of
Africa and promote our common goals of development, health,
education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.’ In fact, as
President Bush further presents it, ‘Africa is of strategic and
economic importance. Our focus is to build the capacity of our
African partners to reduce conflict, improve security, defeat
terrorists and support US Government activities across Africa to
integrate US interagency efforts and assist diplomacy and
development efforts.’

Additionally, President Bush made an important statement that
should have largely convinced African leaders about the seriousness
of purpose and non-imperialist agenda of the United States, when he
said his country did not have any intention of establishing a
military base in Africa, but, at the same time, admitted that this
never meant that there would not be an office in Africa. As he put
it: ‘we do not contemplate adding new bases… I know there’s rumour
in Ghana… That doesn’t mean we won’t develop some kind of office
somewhere in Africa. We haven’t made our minds up. This is a new
concept… I want to dispel the notion that all of a sudden, America,
you know, is bringing all kinds of military to Africa. It’s just
simply not true… The whole purpose of AFRICOM is to help leaders
deal with African problems (vide ‘’No Plan for Military Base in
Africa – George Bush,’’ Nigerian Tribune, 21 February, 2008,
p.4).

When Donna Blair resumed duty as US Consul General to Nigeria,
she submitted that ‘there is no anti-Americanism in Nigeria. The
AFRICOM will further strengthen the existing ties with Nigeria and
other African countries. We urge them to receive it positively
rather than negatively…We are very concerned about the Niger Delta,
but it is a domestic issue for Nigeria. We are willing to assist
Nigeria on the crisis based on request.’ Thus, The way the AFRICOM
is presented gives the impression that the Command was
altruistically created to serve the purposes of Africa, whereas the
USA only wants to assist Africa in order to better secure its
national development and live in peace. If AFRICOM will be allowed
to function on the basis of win-win, without military base, there
are no qualms about it, but there are.

AFRICOM: An Unwanted Necessity
AFRICOM formally began its operations on October 1, 2007, with the
objective of building its headquarters and having its members of
staff within the following one year. There is yet to be an African
office for the Command, which is currently located in Kelley
Barracks in Stuttgart-Moehringen, Germany. On October 1, 2008, the
AFRICOM was unified and made an independent Command, combining
military and civil functions. Explained differently, even though
AFRICOM was headed by a four-star Army General, General William
Ward, the deputy commander was a civilian, an ambassador from the
State Department. This was unique to the AFRICOM at the time of
inception. According to US Ambassador Loftis, the AFRICOM resembles
the mission statement of other regional Commands but the
‘difference is that building partnership is first and foremost of
the strategies.’

What is noteworthy at this juncture is that, the United States
has 11 Combatant Commands, one of which is the AFRICOM. Each
Command has its specific mission. According to the US Department of
Defence, the ‘US Africa Command, with partners, counters
transnational threats and malign actors, strengthens security
forces, and responds to crises in order to advance US national
interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity.’
For these purposes, a military base was established in Stuttgart in
Germany, which used to ‘house the former Air Force base which
served as the facility where over 400,000 US soldiers, who fought
the Second World War, withdrawn between 1948-1992, were kept’
(Julianah Taiwo, ‘’Location of US African Command Worries FG,’’ The
Guardian, 02 October, 2007, p.9).

However, for various reasons, including domestic pressure from
the host State, Germany, the US began to make efforts to relocate
the AFRICOM to Africa in the mid-2000s, but the efforts have been
to no avail. In Nigeria, for example, the Nigerian military
favoured the AFRICOM to be in Nigeria. On 23 October, 2003, the
Chief of Defence Staff, General Andrew Owoye Azazi, justified the
need for it. As he explained it, ‘I want to believe that wherever
the US has some business, they want relative peace to undertake
their business. Anywhere you are talking of defence of an
environment, it is a cooperative venture. So would it be wrong if
you say US troops are interested in Gulf of Guinea because they
want to make sure that as we undertake the normal business of oil
exploration, there is relative peace in that environment for
everybody to partake. So I think it (US troops’ presence) is in the
interest of ensuring that there is relative peace in that
environment for the business of oil to go on (The Guardian, 24
October, 2007, p.3). In this regard, can it be expected that there
will be relative peace in Nigeria with PMB’s call for AFRICOM? Does
the call imply the establishment of a military base?

True enough, PMB appealed to the international community during
a virtual meeting with the US Secretary of State, Mr Anthony
Blinken, on Tuesday, April 27, 2021 for support in the efforts by
his government to contain insecurity in Nigeria. His request can be
partly commended, but should mostly be condemned for particularly
not investigating well the implications before making the request.
In spite of this, the plea is still partly commendable because many
concerned Nigerians have asked him to seek foreign help, because of
the criticality of the struggle against the boko haramic
insurrection in the country. Calling on the Washingtonian
authorities for possible help from the AFRICOM means that he is now
listening to public opinion.

Partly again commendable is the fact that the PMB administration
does not have all the required wherewithal to contain the
multidimensional insurgency in the country. The need for public
safety and national survival makes PMB’s request a desideratum.
From this perspective, the proponents of welcoming an AFRICOM may
therefore be right. On the contrary, requesting for AFRICOM cannot
but be an unwanted necessity, because it is more critically
detrimental to national security to the extent that the purpose of
requesting for AFRICOM cannot but be defeated in various ways.

AFRICOM as Obstacle to African Personality
First, in conception and design, the AFRICOM is supposed to be an
instrument of US foreign and defence policy and, therefore, cannot
be subjected to any supranational authority, even in its host
country. The land of its location cannot but also have a diplomatic
exterritorial status. This is why the AFRICOM has the potential to
negate whatever Africa may purport to be. It should be recalled
that in April 2007, some top American defence officials visited not
only Nigeria, but also South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya and
Ethiopia to canvass the goodness in the AFRICOM for the whole of
Africa. US security support may be good and needed, it necessarily
conflicts with the decision of the Maritime Organisation of West
Africa and Central Africa to set up a single coast guard to curb
various maritime crimes, like the spate of armed banditry and
piracy. The AFRICOM necessarily prevents Africa from owning its own
home-grown instrument of anti-insecurity, especially in light of
the fact that the United States wants to control the Gulf of
Guinea, which is also the natural sphere of influence of West and
Central African countries.

Second, with AFRICOM, the strategic agenda of the United States
is to bring the whole of Africa under one single umbrella, but with
the exception of Egypt, which is attached to the US Central
Command. The exception of Egypt cannot but be fraught with
suspicions and difficulties. Egypt is both an African country by
geo-political location and an Arab country by religio-cultural
affinities. Egypt cannot be expected to behave like a typical black
African country when its security interests run into conflict with
those of the Arab world. This is one of the main reasons why Africa
has always been divided against itself.

Egypt also poses another problematic at the level of possible
permanent representation of Africa at the level of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). Following the heated controversial
debates in Addis Ababa and the Ezulwini Consensus on candidates to
be sponsored by the African Union for the UNSC seats, there were
three main contending countries, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt.
In this regard, contrary to the wishes of the African Union that
wanted five Permanent Members on the basis of one representative
per one region of Africa, the international community only agreed
in principle for Africa to be represented by two countries. By
implication, one of the three contending candidates must be
withdrawn.

In this case, the United States wanted a Permanent Seat for the
Arabian world but which does not constitute a region of the world
as defined by the United Nations. Representation in the UNSC is not
only determined on the basis of how much of assessed dues is paid
and extent of involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, the
conditionality of regional representation must also be met.
Consequently, in the strategic calculations of the United States,
Egypt should be assisted to be an African candidate, leaving
Nigeria and South Africa to struggle for the other one seat left.
It is against this background that a whole AFRICOM without Egypt
should be seen.

Third, complaints by the people in countries playing host to
American Military Command have not been complimentary. It is
generally observed that ‘America cares more about the prosperity of
its people than the suffering of other peoples under tyrannical
regimes.’ There should not be any qualms if the US Government seeks
to give priority to the protection of its citizens. Only
responsible Governments can do that.

However, when seeking to protect the national interest, it must
be done on the basis of truth and objectivity of purpose. It must
never be done by destroying other people to enable Americans to
survive. When there are people who are hostile to Americans living
in peace and harmoniously, yes such people should be seriously
dealt with and neutralised, but only on the basis of truth as
determinant.
For example, the objective of the United States in sending troops
to Africa and also to Iraq was to protect its economic interests.
The United States invaded Iraq, certainly not because of any
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction, but because of the need
to have access to its huge crude oil reserves.

Besides, there is the case of South Koreans where the United
States has a military base and where the host people do not see the
Americans as a protector but as people whose presence on their soil
has the potential to provoke a North Korean attack. And true enough
again, South Koreans have been publicly demonstrating against US
military presence, which is also one major issue militating against
a better understanding between the two Koreas. Perhaps one should
also ask why Germans also want the relocation of the AFRICOM from
their soil? Why the people of Nigeria also kicked against AFRICOM
in Nigeria?

Fourth, in Nigeria, no one is left in doubt that the United
States has a policy of seeking to mould the whole world in the
image of America. However, the US attitudinal modalities have been
sending wrong signals. For instance, ‘an American missile destroyed
a factory in Sudan after the attacks on the American embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The Americans claimed the target was an
arms factory owned by terrorists, but the Sudanese authorities said
the factory manufactured medicines.’ In this regard, it is also
argued that ‘America is not concerned about the death of innocent
people when it fires a missile or carries out a bombing raid. It
calls the death of innocent people collateral damage, a very
callous coinage’ (See “A US Military Command in Africa?”, Nigerian
Tribune’s Editorial, Monday, 10 September, 2007, p. 8).

Fifth, location of the AFRICOM in any part of Africa gives the
wrong impression that Africans cannot be capable of self-security
unless with outside help, and therefore raising the issue of new
form of re-colonisation and permanent dependency on developed
countries. In fact, many members of the US Congress, concerned
organisations and individuals in both the United States and Africa
created a campaign platform, called ‘’Resist AFRICOM’’ in August
2006 in order to mobilise public and congressional opposition to
AFRICOM, which was considered as imperialistic, paternalistic and
an underhand tactics of accessing more of Africa’s oil. Some
observers even argued that the AFRICOM is to be used to wage war
against terror, but without having due regards for Africa’s needs
and dignity.

The proponents of AFRICOM have argued to the contrary: as a
result of the establishment of the AFRICOM, the United States has
not only increased her funding of International Military Education
and Training (IMET) programme and foreign military programmes in
Africa, but has also increased funding for the peacekeeping
operations in Africa. And true enough, the Department of Defence
budgeted US278 million as operation and maintenance funds in the
2010 budget. The sum of US$ 263 million was earmarked for provision
of additional manpower, airlift and communications support for the
AFRICOM. AFRICOM has the potential to deter not only terror but
also military adventurism, and by so doing, also ensuring political
stability on a long-term basis. Thus, that AFRICOM has its merits
cannot be in dispute.

Sixth, domestic support for the AFRICOM in the United States
waned drastically at a point in time. For instance, the House
Appropriations Committee in the US Congress ‘believes that
traditional US military operations are not an appropriate response
to most or many of the challenges facing Africa.’ As a result of
this belief, the Appropriation Committee decided in September 2008
to cut AFRICOM’s budget of $390 to only $80 million. This is a
pointer to the perception of a decline in importance of the
AFRICOM.

Seventh, only Liberia and Morocco offered as at 2008 to play
host to the US military base, but there was nothing to suggest that
the US wanted to consider their offer. The US appeared to have
specific interest in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, the problem was
never non-availability of place of location, even if most African
countries were hostile to the establishment of foreign military
bases on their soil for various reasons. The problem was the
refusal of the targeted host country. The US Department of Defence
never wanted Liberia or Morocco or any other, to host the AFRICOM.
Nigeria was the targeted country but the Nigerian Federal Executive
Council not only rejected the AFRICOM in Nigeria, the Nigerian
Senate was also hostile to it.

But perhaps more disturbingly, when President Umaru Musa
Yar’Adua had a tête à tête with his US counterpart at the White
House, and declared thereafter at a press briefing that ‘we have
discussed on security issues, security within Nigeria, Niger Delta,
the Gulf of Guinea and peace and security on the African continent.
We shall partner AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria, but also the
African continent to actualise its peace and security initiatives.
It is an initiative to have Standby Forces in each of the regional
economic groupings in Africa’ (See Constance Ikokwu and Paul Ohia,
‘’Yar’Adua in White House, Ready to Partner US on AFRICOM, ThisDay,
14 December, 2007, p.1).

What is noteworthy here is that Nigerians were vehemently
opposed to President Yar’Adua’s intended partnership with AFRICOM.
The hostility was to the extent that the Special Assistant to the
President on Communications, Mr. Olusegun Adeniyi, had to make a
clarification that President Yar’Adua’s declaration of support did
not mean that he wanted its headquarters sited in Nigeria (ThisDay,
18 January 2008). Mr. Adeniyi’s clarification had very little or no
impact, as Nigerians asked President Barak Obama to support the
African Standby Force rather than sponsoring the AFRICOM. It is
against the background of the afore-analysed issues that the
request by PMB for AFRICOM should be understood. Apart from the
reasons given above as to why AFRICOM is an unwanted necessity,
there is also the factor of error of terror.

AFRICOM: Beyond the Error of Terror
Terrorists have always made the error of using terror to seek
political interests. The United States is also making the error by
believing that counter-terror will be sufficient to neutralise the
terrorists without full mobilisation of all proponents of
anti-terrorism as a way of life. Terrorism, in whatever
ramification it exists is, at best, very barbaric. Consequently, in
fighting terrorism, under no circumstance should any anti-terror
struggle be couched under socio-political or economico-cultural
interests. If the objectives of AFRICOM are, stricto sensu,
presented to the world as anti-terror, or grosso modo, as
anti-global insecurity, and in this regard, the global community is
constructively mobilised to support the struggle, AFRICOM will not
have been a subject of controversy, but agents of terrorism would
have also learnt how not to be terroristic.

One unofficially declared objective for creating the AFRICOM is
to protect the routes of export and import of mineral resources
needed by the United States. In its analysis of the ‘’US Military
Bases in Africa,’’ The Daily Times (of 12 May 1983, p 8), had it
that the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency ‘alleged
vulnerability in the event shipment to it (of) some strategic
commodities were discontinued.’ In other words, ‘the USA was fifty,
and in some cases a hundred percent, dependent on imports of 23 out
of 40 commodities considered indispensable for US security… [T]he
overwhelming quantity of strategic minerals imported by the USA
came from Africa. And since the USA cannot survive without those
commodities… the problem of assuring their uninterrupted supply had
to become a priority.’ It is against this background that the
future establishment of the AFRICOM should also be understood.

The future challenge of the AFRICOM is how Nigeria will be an
active participant in the protection of US interest in this
case
In fact, in September 1998, the United States called for a new
military bilateral relationship. In the words of US Assistant
Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, Mr.
Franklin Kramer, who paid an official visit to Abuja on 27
September, 1998, ‘we also see an opportunity for extensive dialogue
and for cooperation of what might be possible in a whole variety of
areas, once the transition is completed… [W]e need to look for an
expanded relationship that exists across the board in all aspects
and overtime, a relationship that will include new
military-to-military relationships’’ (National Concord, 28
September, 1998, p.1). Opportunity for extensive dialogue, there
will always be. But will be the nature of the dialogue: horizontal
or vertical?

Probably in reaction to the US initiative, the Nigerian Senate
considered signing a military pact with the United States, with the
objective of using the pact to contain future coups d’état. The
Senate, considering that democratic governance in Nigeria had been
unstable and vulnerable to military incursions, that Nigeria had
had eight coups, and believing that there was the need to uphold,
protect, maintain and treasure democratic principles, values and
structures in Nigeria, the Senate directed that the Government of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria should immediately commence
negotiation and sign a military pact with the United States of
America and any other democratic European nation for the protection
of democracy in Nigeria (vide National Concord of July 9, 1999 and
Omorodion Omoregbe’s ‘’Military pact with superpowers,’’ The
Guardian of 26 July, 1999, p.53).

And true, in the spirit of cooperation, in April 2003, the
United States donated two 30-year old warships (SS Kyanwa and SS
Ologbo) to Nigeria. The ships are 180-feet Balsam class buoys and
are ‘’the first of a total of seven ships to be transferred to
Nigeria under the United States security assistance programme’’
(The Guardian, 9 April, 2003, p.37).

In essence, to what extent can the spirit of cooperation between
the United States and Nigeria be sustained on the basis of PMB’s
call for AFRICOM, which was suspended in January 2008 for ten years
because of the unwelcoming reactions of African countries? In 2012,
the AFRICOM Commander, General Carter Ham, at a Military and Media
Symposium held in Garmisch near Munich, Germany, said the US would
no longer establish the headquarters of the AFRICOM in any part of
the African continent due to its heavy financial demand (ThisDay,
07 September, 2012, p.12a). In this case, will PMB’s call imply
heavy financial demand and a military base in Nigeria? Whatever is
the case, Nigeria does not need and does not want any
military-based AFRICOM because it unnecessarily subjects Nigeria’s
sovereignty into ridicule through dependency. Assistance of the US,
through equipment donation and capacity development is what is
needed.

The US should support Africa’s Standby Force, rather than
sponsoring the AFRICOM and help to fight terror without tying it
into establishment of a military base and undermining Nigeria’s
sovereignty. PMB’s call for AFRICOM can seriously undermine
national sovereignty, and therefore, most unfortunate. AFRICOM
cannot solve the problem of intra-governmental corruption
responsible for the recidivist boko haramic insurgency in
Nigeria.

By Bola Akinterinwa

AFRICOM is the acronym for Africa Command, and also a short form
for United States Africa Command, which was created within the
framework of the reorganisation of the US Military Command
structure in February 2007, under the George W. Bush
administration. As explained by the first Commander of the AFRICOM,
General William ‘KIP’ Ward, the rationale for establishing the
AFRICOM was to enable good governance in Africa without undermining
the national sovereignty of any country. What is good governance in
this case?

President Bush explained the mission statement of the AFRICOM
thus: ‘this new Command will strengthen our security cooperation
with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the
capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance
our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of
Africa and promote our common goals of development, health,
education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.’ In fact, as
President Bush further presents it, ‘Africa is of strategic and
economic importance. Our focus is to build the capacity of our
African partners to reduce conflict, improve security, defeat
terrorists and support US Government activities across Africa to
integrate US interagency efforts and assist diplomacy and
development efforts.’

Additionally, President Bush made an important statement that
should have largely convinced African leaders about the seriousness
of purpose and non-imperialist agenda of the United States, when he
said his country did not have any intention of establishing a
military base in Africa, but, at the same time, admitted that this
never meant that there would not be an office in Africa. As he put
it: ‘we do not contemplate adding new bases… I know there’s rumour
in Ghana… That doesn’t mean we won’t develop some kind of office
somewhere in Africa. We haven’t made our minds up. This is a new
concept… I want to dispel the notion that all of a sudden, America,
you know, is bringing all kinds of military to Africa. It’s just
simply not true… The whole purpose of AFRICOM is to help leaders
deal with African problems (vide ‘’No Plan for Military Base in
Africa – George Bush,’’ Nigerian Tribune, 21 February, 2008,
p.4).

When Donna Blair resumed duty as US Consul General to Nigeria,
she submitted that ‘there is no anti-Americanism in Nigeria. The
AFRICOM will further strengthen the existing ties with Nigeria and
other African countries. We urge them to receive it positively
rather than negatively…We are very concerned about the Niger Delta,
but it is a domestic issue for Nigeria. We are willing to assist
Nigeria on the crisis based on request.’ Thus, The way the AFRICOM
is presented gives the impression that the Command was
altruistically created to serve the purposes of Africa, whereas the
USA only wants to assist Africa in order to better secure its
national development and live in peace. If AFRICOM will be allowed
to function on the basis of win-win, without military base, there
are no qualms about it, but there are.

AFRICOM: An Unwanted Necessity
AFRICOM formally began its operations on October 1, 2007, with the
objective of building its headquarters and having its members of
staff within the following one year. There is yet to be an African
office for the Command, which is currently located in Kelley
Barracks in Stuttgart-Moehringen, Germany. On October 1, 2008, the
AFRICOM was unified and made an independent Command, combining
military and civil functions. Explained differently, even though
AFRICOM was headed by a four-star Army General, General William
Ward, the deputy commander was a civilian, an ambassador from the
State Department. This was unique to the AFRICOM at the time of
inception. According to US Ambassador Loftis, the AFRICOM resembles
the mission statement of other regional Commands but the
‘difference is that building partnership is first and foremost of
the strategies.’

What is noteworthy at this juncture is that, the United States
has 11 Combatant Commands, one of which is the AFRICOM. Each
Command has its specific mission. According to the US Department of
Defence, the ‘US Africa Command, with partners, counters
transnational threats and malign actors, strengthens security
forces, and responds to crises in order to advance US national
interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity.’
For these purposes, a military base was established in Stuttgart in
Germany, which used to ‘house the former Air Force base which
served as the facility where over 400,000 US soldiers, who fought
the Second World War, withdrawn between 1948-1992, were kept’
(Julianah Taiwo, ‘’Location of US African Command Worries FG,’’ The
Guardian, 02 October, 2007, p.9).

However, for various reasons, including domestic pressure from
the host State, Germany, the US began to make efforts to relocate
the AFRICOM to Africa in the mid-2000s, but the efforts have been
to no avail. In Nigeria, for example, the Nigerian military
favoured the AFRICOM to be in Nigeria. On 23 October, 2003, the
Chief of Defence Staff, General Andrew Owoye Azazi, justified the
need for it. As he explained it, ‘I want to believe that wherever
the US has some business, they want relative peace to undertake
their business. Anywhere you are talking of defence of an
environment, it is a cooperative venture. So would it be wrong if
you say US troops are interested in Gulf of Guinea because they
want to make sure that as we undertake the normal business of oil
exploration, there is relative peace in that environment for
everybody to partake. So I think it (US troops’ presence) is in the
interest of ensuring that there is relative peace in that
environment for the business of oil to go on (The Guardian, 24
October, 2007, p.3). In this regard, can it be expected that there
will be relative peace in Nigeria with PMB’s call for AFRICOM? Does
the call imply the establishment of a military base?

True enough, PMB appealed to the international community during
a virtual meeting with the US Secretary of State, Mr Anthony
Blinken, on Tuesday, April 27, 2021 for support in the efforts by
his government to contain insecurity in Nigeria. His request can be
partly commended, but should mostly be condemned for particularly
not investigating well the implications before making the request.
In spite of this, the plea is still partly commendable because many
concerned Nigerians have asked him to seek foreign help, because of
the criticality of the struggle against the boko haramic
insurrection in the country. Calling on the Washingtonian
authorities for possible help from the AFRICOM means that he is now
listening to public opinion.

Partly again commendable is the fact that the PMB administration
does not have all the required wherewithal to contain the
multidimensional insurgency in the country. The need for public
safety and national survival makes PMB’s request a desideratum.
From this perspective, the proponents of welcoming an AFRICOM may
therefore be right. On the contrary, requesting for AFRICOM cannot
but be an unwanted necessity, because it is more critically
detrimental to national security to the extent that the purpose of
requesting for AFRICOM cannot but be defeated in various ways.

AFRICOM as Obstacle to African Personality
First, in conception and design, the AFRICOM is supposed to be an
instrument of US foreign and defence policy and, therefore, cannot
be subjected to any supranational authority, even in its host
country. The land of its location cannot but also have a diplomatic
exterritorial status. This is why the AFRICOM has the potential to
negate whatever Africa may purport to be. It should be recalled
that in April 2007, some top American defence officials visited not
only Nigeria, but also South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya and
Ethiopia to canvass the goodness in the AFRICOM for the whole of
Africa. US security support may be good and needed, it necessarily
conflicts with the decision of the Maritime Organisation of West
Africa and Central Africa to set up a single coast guard to curb
various maritime crimes, like the spate of armed banditry and
piracy. The AFRICOM necessarily prevents Africa from owning its own
home-grown instrument of anti-insecurity, especially in light of
the fact that the United States wants to control the Gulf of
Guinea, which is also the natural sphere of influence of West and
Central African countries.

Second, with AFRICOM, the strategic agenda of the United States
is to bring the whole of Africa under one single umbrella, but with
the exception of Egypt, which is attached to the US Central
Command. The exception of Egypt cannot but be fraught with
suspicions and difficulties. Egypt is both an African country by
geo-political location and an Arab country by religio-cultural
affinities. Egypt cannot be expected to behave like a typical black
African country when its security interests run into conflict with
those of the Arab world. This is one of the main reasons why Africa
has always been divided against itself.

Egypt also poses another problematic at the level of possible
permanent representation of Africa at the level of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). Following the heated controversial
debates in Addis Ababa and the Ezulwini Consensus on candidates to
be sponsored by the African Union for the UNSC seats, there were
three main contending countries, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt.
In this regard, contrary to the wishes of the African Union that
wanted five Permanent Members on the basis of one representative
per one region of Africa, the international community only agreed
in principle for Africa to be represented by two countries. By
implication, one of the three contending candidates must be
withdrawn.

In this case, the United States wanted a Permanent Seat for the
Arabian world but which does not constitute a region of the world
as defined by the United Nations. Representation in the UNSC is not
only determined on the basis of how much of assessed dues is paid
and extent of involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, the
conditionality of regional representation must also be met.
Consequently, in the strategic calculations of the United States,
Egypt should be assisted to be an African candidate, leaving
Nigeria and South Africa to struggle for the other one seat left.
It is against this background that a whole AFRICOM without Egypt
should be seen.

Third, complaints by the people in countries playing host to
American Military Command have not been complimentary. It is
generally observed that ‘America cares more about the prosperity of
its people than the suffering of other peoples under tyrannical
regimes.’ There should not be any qualms if the US Government seeks
to give priority to the protection of its citizens. Only
responsible Governments can do that.

However, when seeking to protect the national interest, it must
be done on the basis of truth and objectivity of purpose. It must
never be done by destroying other people to enable Americans to
survive. When there are people who are hostile to Americans living
in peace and harmoniously, yes such people should be seriously
dealt with and neutralised, but only on the basis of truth as
determinant.
For example, the objective of the United States in sending troops
to Africa and also to Iraq was to protect its economic interests.
The United States invaded Iraq, certainly not because of any
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction, but because of the need
to have access to its huge crude oil reserves.

Besides, there is the case of South Koreans where the United
States has a military base and where the host people do not see the
Americans as a protector but as people whose presence on their soil
has the potential to provoke a North Korean attack. And true enough
again, South Koreans have been publicly demonstrating against US
military presence, which is also one major issue militating against
a better understanding between the two Koreas. Perhaps one should
also ask why Germans also want the relocation of the AFRICOM from
their soil? Why the people of Nigeria also kicked against AFRICOM
in Nigeria?

Fourth, in Nigeria, no one is left in doubt that the United
States has a policy of seeking to mould the whole world in the
image of America. However, the US attitudinal modalities have been
sending wrong signals. For instance, ‘an American missile destroyed
a factory in Sudan after the attacks on the American embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The Americans claimed the target was an
arms factory owned by terrorists, but the Sudanese authorities said
the factory manufactured medicines.’ In this regard, it is also
argued that ‘America is not concerned about the death of innocent
people when it fires a missile or carries out a bombing raid. It
calls the death of innocent people collateral damage, a very
callous coinage’ (See “A US Military Command in Africa?”, Nigerian
Tribune’s Editorial, Monday, 10 September, 2007, p. 8).

Fifth, location of the AFRICOM in any part of Africa gives the
wrong impression that Africans cannot be capable of self-security
unless with outside help, and therefore raising the issue of new
form of re-colonisation and permanent dependency on developed
countries. In fact, many members of the US Congress, concerned
organisations and individuals in both the United States and Africa
created a campaign platform, called ‘’Resist AFRICOM’’ in August
2006 in order to mobilise public and congressional opposition to
AFRICOM, which was considered as imperialistic, paternalistic and
an underhand tactics of accessing more of Africa’s oil. Some
observers even argued that the AFRICOM is to be used to wage war
against terror, but without having due regards for Africa’s needs
and dignity.

The proponents of AFRICOM have argued to the contrary: as a
result of the establishment of the AFRICOM, the United States has
not only increased her funding of International Military Education
and Training (IMET) programme and foreign military programmes in
Africa, but has also increased funding for the peacekeeping
operations in Africa. And true enough, the Department of Defence
budgeted US278 million as operation and maintenance funds in the
2010 budget. The sum of US$ 263 million was earmarked for provision
of additional manpower, airlift and communications support for the
AFRICOM. AFRICOM has the potential to deter not only terror but
also military adventurism, and by so doing, also ensuring political
stability on a long-term basis. Thus, that AFRICOM has its merits
cannot be in dispute.

Sixth, domestic support for the AFRICOM in the United States
waned drastically at a point in time. For instance, the House
Appropriations Committee in the US Congress ‘believes that
traditional US military operations are not an appropriate response
to most or many of the challenges facing Africa.’ As a result of
this belief, the Appropriation Committee decided in September 2008
to cut AFRICOM’s budget of $390 to only $80 million. This is a
pointer to the perception of a decline in importance of the
AFRICOM.

Seventh, only Liberia and Morocco offered as at 2008 to play
host to the US military base, but there was nothing to suggest that
the US wanted to consider their offer. The US appeared to have
specific interest in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, the problem was
never non-availability of place of location, even if most African
countries were hostile to the establishment of foreign military
bases on their soil for various reasons. The problem was the
refusal of the targeted host country. The US Department of Defence
never wanted Liberia or Morocco or any other, to host the AFRICOM.
Nigeria was the targeted country but the Nigerian Federal Executive
Council not only rejected the AFRICOM in Nigeria, the Nigerian
Senate was also hostile to it.

But perhaps more disturbingly, when President Umaru Musa
Yar’Adua had a tête à tête with his US counterpart at the White
House, and declared thereafter at a press briefing that ‘we have
discussed on security issues, security within Nigeria, Niger Delta,
the Gulf of Guinea and peace and security on the African continent.
We shall partner AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria, but also the
African continent to actualise its peace and security initiatives.
It is an initiative to have Standby Forces in each of the regional
economic groupings in Africa’ (See Constance Ikokwu and Paul Ohia,
‘’Yar’Adua in White House, Ready to Partner US on AFRICOM, ThisDay,
14 December, 2007, p.1).

What is noteworthy here is that Nigerians were vehemently
opposed to President Yar’Adua’s intended partnership with AFRICOM.
The hostility was to the extent that the Special Assistant to the
President on Communications, Mr. Olusegun Adeniyi, had to make a
clarification that President Yar’Adua’s declaration of support did
not mean that he wanted its headquarters sited in Nigeria (ThisDay,
18 January 2008). Mr. Adeniyi’s clarification had very little or no
impact, as Nigerians asked President Barak Obama to support the
African Standby Force rather than sponsoring the AFRICOM. It is
against the background of the afore-analysed issues that the
request by PMB for AFRICOM should be understood. Apart from the
reasons given above as to why AFRICOM is an unwanted necessity,
there is also the factor of error of terror.

AFRICOM: Beyond the Error of Terror
Terrorists have always made the error of using terror to seek
political interests. The United States is also making the error by
believing that counter-terror will be sufficient to neutralise the
terrorists without full mobilisation of all proponents of
anti-terrorism as a way of life. Terrorism, in whatever
ramification it exists is, at best, very barbaric. Consequently, in
fighting terrorism, under no circumstance should any anti-terror
struggle be couched under socio-political or economico-cultural
interests. If the objectives of AFRICOM are, stricto sensu,
presented to the world as anti-terror, or grosso modo, as
anti-global insecurity, and in this regard, the global community is
constructively mobilised to support the struggle, AFRICOM will not
have been a subject of controversy, but agents of terrorism would
have also learnt how not to be terroristic.

One unofficially declared objective for creating the AFRICOM is
to protect the routes of export and import of mineral resources
needed by the United States. In its analysis of the ‘’US Military
Bases in Africa,’’ The Daily Times (of 12 May 1983, p 8), had it
that the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency ‘alleged
vulnerability in the event shipment to it (of) some strategic
commodities were discontinued.’ In other words, ‘the USA was fifty,
and in some cases a hundred percent, dependent on imports of 23 out
of 40 commodities considered indispensable for US security… [T]he
overwhelming quantity of strategic minerals imported by the USA
came from Africa. And since the USA cannot survive without those
commodities… the problem of assuring their uninterrupted supply had
to become a priority.’ It is against this background that the
future establishment of the AFRICOM should also be understood.

The future challenge of the AFRICOM is how Nigeria will be an
active participant in the protection of US interest in this
case
In fact, in September 1998, the United States called for a new
military bilateral relationship. In the words of US Assistant
Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, Mr.
Franklin Kramer, who paid an official visit to Abuja on 27
September, 1998, ‘we also see an opportunity for extensive dialogue
and for cooperation of what might be possible in a whole variety of
areas, once the transition is completed… [W]e need to look for an
expanded relationship that exists across the board in all aspects
and overtime, a relationship that will include new
military-to-military relationships’’ (National Concord, 28
September, 1998, p.1). Opportunity for extensive dialogue, there
will always be. But will be the nature of the dialogue: horizontal
or vertical?

Probably in reaction to the US initiative, the Nigerian Senate
considered signing a military pact with the United States, with the
objective of using the pact to contain future coups d’état. The
Senate, considering that democratic governance in Nigeria had been
unstable and vulnerable to military incursions, that Nigeria had
had eight coups, and believing that there was the need to uphold,
protect, maintain and treasure democratic principles, values and
structures in Nigeria, the Senate directed that the Government of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria should immediately commence
negotiation and sign a military pact with the United States of
America and any other democratic European nation for the protection
of democracy in Nigeria (vide National Concord of July 9, 1999 and
Omorodion Omoregbe’s ‘’Military pact with superpowers,’’ The
Guardian of 26 July, 1999, p.53).

And true, in the spirit of cooperation, in April 2003, the
United States donated two 30-year old warships (SS Kyanwa and SS
Ologbo) to Nigeria. The ships are 180-feet Balsam class buoys and
are ‘’the first of a total of seven ships to be transferred to
Nigeria under the United States security assistance programme’’
(The Guardian, 9 April, 2003, p.37).

In essence, to what extent can the spirit of cooperation between
the United States and Nigeria be sustained on the basis of PMB’s
call for AFRICOM, which was suspended in January 2008 for ten years
because of the unwelcoming reactions of African countries? In 2012,
the AFRICOM Commander, General Carter Ham, at a Military and Media
Symposium held in Garmisch near Munich, Germany, said the US would
no longer establish the headquarters of the AFRICOM in any part of
the African continent due to its heavy financial demand (ThisDay,
07 September, 2012, p.12a). In this case, will PMB’s call imply
heavy financial demand and a military base in Nigeria? Whatever is
the case, Nigeria does not need and does not want any
military-based AFRICOM because it unnecessarily subjects Nigeria’s
sovereignty into ridicule through dependency. Assistance of the US,
through equipment donation and capacity development is what is
needed.

The US should support Africa’s Standby Force, rather than
sponsoring the AFRICOM and help to fight terror without tying it
into establishment of a military base and undermining Nigeria’s
sovereignty. PMB’s call for AFRICOM can seriously undermine
national sovereignty, and therefore, most unfortunate. AFRICOM
cannot solve the problem of intra-governmental corruption
responsible for the recidivist boko haramic insurgency in
Nigeria.