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CASE TITLE:
                       
MOHAMMED ARGUNGU v. PROSPER IGBOELI

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JUDGMENT DATE:
          26TH MARCH,
2021

JUSTICES:
                          
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA

JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, JCA

OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, JCA

DIVISION:
                          
ABUJA

PRACTICE AREA:
             
Tort

FACTS:

The Respondent, as Plaintiff at the High Court of the Federal
Capital Territory, had by his Statement of Claim sued the
Appellant, his former landlord, in respect of the property at No.
39 T.Y. Danjuma Street, Asokoro, FCT, seeking the following
reliefs:

“1. A sum of N2,000,000,000.00 (Two Billion Naira) on the
footing of aggravated and exemplary damages for the libellous
letter of 3rd October 2012 addressed to the Medical and Dental
Practitioners Investigative Panel by the Defendant against the
Plaintiff which said letter has attracted embarrassment to the
Plaintiff and negatively affected the public estimation of his
person and qualification as a medical practitioner and reduced the
level of patients’ patronage of his In-vitro- Fertilization (IVF)
and Fertility Clinic.

  1. AN ORDER directing Defendant to make and/or render public,
    clear, categorical and unequivocal retraction of said malicious and
    libellous letter.
  2. AN ORDER directing Defendant to render and/or tender an
    unreserved apology in writing to Plaintiff for the said
    letter.
  3. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction, restraining the Defendant,
    either by himself, his officers, agents, privies, servants or
    acting through any person or persons howsoever or by any means
    whatsoever from publishing or further writing, disseminating the
    said libellous publications/writings concerning or relating to the
    Plaintiff and his medical practice.
  4. The cost of this suit, N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira).
  5. And for such FURTHER ORDER(S) that the Honourable Court may
    deem fit to grant in the circumstances of the case.”

The Appellant, by his Statement of Defence, denied the claim,
raising the defences of justification and privileged communication.
After the trial, the Court found the letter written by the
Appellant to the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria (MDCN), of
and concerning the Respondent, to be defamatory. The trial Court
rejected the defences of Justification and Qualified Privilege
raised by the Appellant and awarded the sum of One Hundred Million
Naira (N100,000,000.00) as damages against the Appellant, who was
ordered to write a letter of retraction to MDCN and another to the
Respondent. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Court of
Appeal.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:

The Court determined the appeal on the following issues:

“1. Whether there was Publication of the alleged defamatory
material having regard to the evidence led.

  1. Whether the trial Court was right by holding that the Appellant
    was liable in damages for the publication of the alleged defamatory
    matter to the Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary
    Committee.
  2. Whether the paragraphs of the libellous Petition (Exhibit G1)
    relied on by the lower Court in making a finding of the tort of
    libel against the Appellant were pleaded and reproduced in the
    Respondent’s pleadings.
  3. Whether the award of damages in the sum of One Hundred Million
    Naira (N100, 000.000:00) with post-judgment interest of 10% against
    the Appellant was wrong.
  4. Whether the judgment of the trial Court is against the weight
    of evidence”.

DECISION/HELD:

In conclusion, the Court resolved all the issues for
determination against the Appellant. The Court held that the appeal
fails and was thereby dismissed.

RATIOS:

  1. TORT – LIBEL: What constitutes publication of
    a libel

“The learned authors of GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 9th Edition
at Page 127, Paragraph 6.1, stated:

“No civil action can be maintained for libel or slander unless
the words complained of have been published.

The material part of the cause of action in libel is not the
writing, but the publication of the libel. In order to constitute
publication, the matter must be published to (communicated to) a
third party, that is to say, at least one person other than the
Plaintiff.”

Underlining Mine

As also held by the Supreme Court in the case of Nsirim v Nsirim
(1990) 3 NWLR Part 138 Page 285 at 297 Para H per Obaseki JSC:

“By publication is meant the making known of the defamatory
matter to some persons other than the person of whom it is written…
It is the reduction of libellous matter to writing and its delivery
to any person other than the person injuriously affected thereby
that is publication. The name of the person to whom delivery of the
libellous document was made must be pleaded”.

The same Court, per His Lordship, Ayoola JSC in Offoboche v
Ogoja LG (2001) LPELR-2265(SC) at Pages 13-14 Para F-A held:

“The essence of libel is that the libellous material exists in
permanent form. It is thus essentially continuous in existence.
However, its publication is a different matter. What exists in a
permanent form is not ‘published’ until it is made known”

Thus, the publication is simply the making known of the
defamatory matter to some person other than the person of whom it
is written.” Per ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A.

  1. TORT – QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE:
    Circumstance where a defendant will not be entitled to the
    defence of qualified privilege

“On whether the Appellant was entitled to rely on the plea of
qualified privilege, the lower Court held:

“The Defendant had earlier written on same issues to the Police
and EFCC but it appears the responses from these security agencies
were not satisfactory to him, he decided to write Exhibit G1 to the
Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria who has nothing to do with
public interest. The Defendant wrote Exhibit G1 to MDCN with
malice.”

It cited the case of Tsikata v Newspaper Publishing (1997) 1 All
ER 655 where the Court observed:

“The defence of qualified privilege may be lost if the
publication is misleading in the light of subsequent developments,
as this may not be in the public interest or may be evidence of
malice.”

The Supreme Court, in the case of Iloabachie V. Iloabachie
(2005) LPELR-1492(SC) held, per Pats-Acholonu JSC, at Page 17 Para
A-C:

“A privileged occasion arises if the communication is of such a
nature that it could be fairly said that those who made it had an
interest in making a communication and those to whom it was made
had a corresponding interest in having it made to them. Where those
two co-exist the occasion is privileged.

…In order to destroy or neutralize the defence of privilege or
qualified privilege, it is incumbent on the appellant to prove
malice.”

It was further held in the same case by the same respected
Jurist, as follows:

“Consider too the case of Pullman v. Hill Ltd. (1891) 1 QB.
Where Lord Esher, M. R. said:-

“…Equally too, the Court should consider the motive for the
publication to examine whether it is actuated by purely altruistic
principles or tendencies, or malicious and injurious motive.”

In Onah v Schlumberger (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 17 NWLR Part 1647 Page
84 at 102 Para A-C, the same Court held, per Rhodes-Vivour JSC,
reading the lead judgment, as follows:

“The defence of qualified privilege is available when there is a
common interest between the maker of a defamatory statement and the
person to whom it is made. There must be a reciprocity of
interest….The Court must consider the motive for the publication,
to be satisfied that the maker of the defamatory statement was not
actuated by malice. The defence of qualified privilege collapses
when malice is established, and the onus is on the Plaintiff to
satisfy the Court that the publication was actuated by malice. The
truth or falsity of the libellous matter is irrelevant when
considering the defence of qualified privilege.”

It was similarly held, in the case of Mainstreet Bank v Binna
(2016) 2 SCNJ Page 422 at 442 lines 8-20, per Kekere-Ekun JSC,
similarly reading the lead judgment and adopting the dictum in
Chief S.B. Bakare v Alhaji Ado Ibrahim (1973) 6 SC 147 at 152-153
where it was held:

“If the publication is shown to be false, malice is inferred by
operation of law, it is enough to show that the words complained
are completely false…Where defamatory words are published without
lawful excuse, the law conclusively presumes that the Defendant is
motivated by what is often described as malice in law, accordingly,
the Plaintiff is usually not required to give particulars of the
facts on which he seeks to rely in support of the allegation that
the words were published ‘maliciously’ “.

In the instant case, it is not in doubt that the Medical and
Dental Council of Nigeria is a body that has an interest in
receiving complaints against members of its body. The twin
question, however, has also to be answered in favour of the
Appellant and that is whether the Appellant had a moral duty to
make the complaint to the Council and whether the letter was
actuated by purely altruistic principles or from a malicious and
injurious motive.

As observed by the lower Court, the Appellant had written
similar letters to both the Police and the EFCC, the former of
which had absolved the Respondent of any wrongdoing. Not satisfied,
it again wrote to the Medical and Dental Council, making the same
allegations. It is instructive to note that the letter to the
Council was written well after the Respondent had vacated the
premises and was demanding for a refund of his rent, and was after
the Respondent had instituted an action against both the Appellant
and his agent.

Exhibit G1 was clearly not written for any altruistic motive but
was a venomous vendetta against the Respondent, for no apparent
reason except to destroy the Respondent’s career as a doctor or
possibly an attempt to stall or stop the Respondent from collecting
a refund of his rent paid to his agent.

The defence of qualified privilege has been proved by the
Respondent as actuated by malice and thus “collapses”, I hold.” Per
ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A.

  1. TORT – LIBEL: Whether
    words alleged to be libellous must be specifically
    pleaded

“It is well settled that a Plaintiff in an action for libel must
set out in his Statement of Claim the exact words complained of to
be defamatory of his person.

In the oft-cited authority of Okafor v Ikeanyi (1979) 3-11 SC
Page 65 at 68 Lines 4-15 per M. Bello JSC (as he then was), it was
held as follows:

“It has always been the law in England that in an action of
libel the precise words of the document are material within the
meaning of the rule regulating the content of pleading in that
country and it has always been the practice to set out verbatim the
words complained of in the statement of claim ….. In a recent case,
the Court of Appeal in England has stated that where libel arises
out of a long article in a newspaper, the Plaintiff must set forth
in his Statement of Claim the particular passages which he
complains of and if he complains of the whole publication, then the
whole publication must be set forth in the Statement of Claim”

It was also held in Onyejike V. Anyasor (1992) NWLR Part 218
Page 437 at 450 Para Para E-F, per Katsina-Alu, JCA (as he then
was), that:

“In a libel action, the words complained of must be pleaded. The
words used are the material facts and they must therefore be set
out in the Plaintiff’s pleadings to enable the Court determine
whether they constitute a ground of action. The law requires him to
set out the words in his pleadings with reasonable certainty …
However, if the action is in respect of certain libellous passages
in a letter, the Plaintiff is not required to set out the whole
letter, it is sufficient to set out the passages complained of only
provided their meaning is clear.” Per ADEFOPE-OKOJIE,
J.C.A. 

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FIRST TO KNOW here.
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Be The First To Know By
Lawpavilion

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CASE TITLE:
                       
MOHAMMED ARGUNGU v. PROSPER IGBOELI

image

JUDGMENT DATE:
          26TH MARCH,
2021

JUSTICES:
                          
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA

JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, JCA

OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, JCA

DIVISION:
                          
ABUJA

PRACTICE AREA:
             
Tort

FACTS:

The Respondent, as Plaintiff at the High Court of the Federal
Capital Territory, had by his Statement of Claim sued the
Appellant, his former landlord, in respect of the property at No.
39 T.Y. Danjuma Street, Asokoro, FCT, seeking the following
reliefs:

“1. A sum of N2,000,000,000.00 (Two Billion Naira) on the
footing of aggravated and exemplary damages for the libellous
letter of 3rd October 2012 addressed to the Medical and Dental
Practitioners Investigative Panel by the Defendant against the
Plaintiff which said letter has attracted embarrassment to the
Plaintiff and negatively affected the public estimation of his
person and qualification as a medical practitioner and reduced the
level of patients’ patronage of his In-vitro- Fertilization (IVF)
and Fertility Clinic.

  1. AN ORDER directing Defendant to make and/or render public,
    clear, categorical and unequivocal retraction of said malicious and
    libellous letter.
  2. AN ORDER directing Defendant to render and/or tender an
    unreserved apology in writing to Plaintiff for the said
    letter.
  3. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction, restraining the Defendant,
    either by himself, his officers, agents, privies, servants or
    acting through any person or persons howsoever or by any means
    whatsoever from publishing or further writing, disseminating the
    said libellous publications/writings concerning or relating to the
    Plaintiff and his medical practice.
  4. The cost of this suit, N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira).
  5. And for such FURTHER ORDER(S) that the Honourable Court may
    deem fit to grant in the circumstances of the case.”

The Appellant, by his Statement of Defence, denied the claim,
raising the defences of justification and privileged communication.
After the trial, the Court found the letter written by the
Appellant to the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria (MDCN), of
and concerning the Respondent, to be defamatory. The trial Court
rejected the defences of Justification and Qualified Privilege
raised by the Appellant and awarded the sum of One Hundred Million
Naira (N100,000,000.00) as damages against the Appellant, who was
ordered to write a letter of retraction to MDCN and another to the
Respondent. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Court of
Appeal.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:

The Court determined the appeal on the following issues:

“1. Whether there was Publication of the alleged defamatory
material having regard to the evidence led.

  1. Whether the trial Court was right by holding that the Appellant
    was liable in damages for the publication of the alleged defamatory
    matter to the Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary
    Committee.
  2. Whether the paragraphs of the libellous Petition (Exhibit G1)
    relied on by the lower Court in making a finding of the tort of
    libel against the Appellant were pleaded and reproduced in the
    Respondent’s pleadings.
  3. Whether the award of damages in the sum of One Hundred Million
    Naira (N100, 000.000:00) with post-judgment interest of 10% against
    the Appellant was wrong.
  4. Whether the judgment of the trial Court is against the weight
    of evidence”.

DECISION/HELD:

In conclusion, the Court resolved all the issues for
determination against the Appellant. The Court held that the appeal
fails and was thereby dismissed.

RATIOS:

  1. TORT – LIBEL: What constitutes publication of
    a libel

“The learned authors of GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 9th Edition
at Page 127, Paragraph 6.1, stated:

“No civil action can be maintained for libel or slander unless
the words complained of have been published.

The material part of the cause of action in libel is not the
writing, but the publication of the libel. In order to constitute
publication, the matter must be published to (communicated to) a
third party, that is to say, at least one person other than the
Plaintiff.”

Underlining Mine

As also held by the Supreme Court in the case of Nsirim v Nsirim
(1990) 3 NWLR Part 138 Page 285 at 297 Para H per Obaseki JSC:

“By publication is meant the making known of the defamatory
matter to some persons other than the person of whom it is written…
It is the reduction of libellous matter to writing and its delivery
to any person other than the person injuriously affected thereby
that is publication. The name of the person to whom delivery of the
libellous document was made must be pleaded”.

The same Court, per His Lordship, Ayoola JSC in Offoboche v
Ogoja LG (2001) LPELR-2265(SC) at Pages 13-14 Para F-A held:

“The essence of libel is that the libellous material exists in
permanent form. It is thus essentially continuous in existence.
However, its publication is a different matter. What exists in a
permanent form is not ‘published’ until it is made known”

Thus, the publication is simply the making known of the
defamatory matter to some person other than the person of whom it
is written.” Per ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A.

  1. TORT – QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE:
    Circumstance where a defendant will not be entitled to the
    defence of qualified privilege

“On whether the Appellant was entitled to rely on the plea of
qualified privilege, the lower Court held:

“The Defendant had earlier written on same issues to the Police
and EFCC but it appears the responses from these security agencies
were not satisfactory to him, he decided to write Exhibit G1 to the
Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria who has nothing to do with
public interest. The Defendant wrote Exhibit G1 to MDCN with
malice.”

It cited the case of Tsikata v Newspaper Publishing (1997) 1 All
ER 655 where the Court observed:

“The defence of qualified privilege may be lost if the
publication is misleading in the light of subsequent developments,
as this may not be in the public interest or may be evidence of
malice.”

The Supreme Court, in the case of Iloabachie V. Iloabachie
(2005) LPELR-1492(SC) held, per Pats-Acholonu JSC, at Page 17 Para
A-C:

“A privileged occasion arises if the communication is of such a
nature that it could be fairly said that those who made it had an
interest in making a communication and those to whom it was made
had a corresponding interest in having it made to them. Where those
two co-exist the occasion is privileged.

…In order to destroy or neutralize the defence of privilege or
qualified privilege, it is incumbent on the appellant to prove
malice.”

It was further held in the same case by the same respected
Jurist, as follows:

“Consider too the case of Pullman v. Hill Ltd. (1891) 1 QB.
Where Lord Esher, M. R. said:-

“…Equally too, the Court should consider the motive for the
publication to examine whether it is actuated by purely altruistic
principles or tendencies, or malicious and injurious motive.”

In Onah v Schlumberger (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 17 NWLR Part 1647 Page
84 at 102 Para A-C, the same Court held, per Rhodes-Vivour JSC,
reading the lead judgment, as follows:

“The defence of qualified privilege is available when there is a
common interest between the maker of a defamatory statement and the
person to whom it is made. There must be a reciprocity of
interest….The Court must consider the motive for the publication,
to be satisfied that the maker of the defamatory statement was not
actuated by malice. The defence of qualified privilege collapses
when malice is established, and the onus is on the Plaintiff to
satisfy the Court that the publication was actuated by malice. The
truth or falsity of the libellous matter is irrelevant when
considering the defence of qualified privilege.”

It was similarly held, in the case of Mainstreet Bank v Binna
(2016) 2 SCNJ Page 422 at 442 lines 8-20, per Kekere-Ekun JSC,
similarly reading the lead judgment and adopting the dictum in
Chief S.B. Bakare v Alhaji Ado Ibrahim (1973) 6 SC 147 at 152-153
where it was held:

“If the publication is shown to be false, malice is inferred by
operation of law, it is enough to show that the words complained
are completely false…Where defamatory words are published without
lawful excuse, the law conclusively presumes that the Defendant is
motivated by what is often described as malice in law, accordingly,
the Plaintiff is usually not required to give particulars of the
facts on which he seeks to rely in support of the allegation that
the words were published ‘maliciously’ “.

In the instant case, it is not in doubt that the Medical and
Dental Council of Nigeria is a body that has an interest in
receiving complaints against members of its body. The twin
question, however, has also to be answered in favour of the
Appellant and that is whether the Appellant had a moral duty to
make the complaint to the Council and whether the letter was
actuated by purely altruistic principles or from a malicious and
injurious motive.

As observed by the lower Court, the Appellant had written
similar letters to both the Police and the EFCC, the former of
which had absolved the Respondent of any wrongdoing. Not satisfied,
it again wrote to the Medical and Dental Council, making the same
allegations. It is instructive to note that the letter to the
Council was written well after the Respondent had vacated the
premises and was demanding for a refund of his rent, and was after
the Respondent had instituted an action against both the Appellant
and his agent.

Exhibit G1 was clearly not written for any altruistic motive but
was a venomous vendetta against the Respondent, for no apparent
reason except to destroy the Respondent’s career as a doctor or
possibly an attempt to stall or stop the Respondent from collecting
a refund of his rent paid to his agent.

The defence of qualified privilege has been proved by the
Respondent as actuated by malice and thus “collapses”, I hold.” Per
ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A.

  1. TORT – LIBEL: Whether
    words alleged to be libellous must be specifically
    pleaded

“It is well settled that a Plaintiff in an action for libel must
set out in his Statement of Claim the exact words complained of to
be defamatory of his person.

In the oft-cited authority of Okafor v Ikeanyi (1979) 3-11 SC
Page 65 at 68 Lines 4-15 per M. Bello JSC (as he then was), it was
held as follows:

“It has always been the law in England that in an action of
libel the precise words of the document are material within the
meaning of the rule regulating the content of pleading in that
country and it has always been the practice to set out verbatim the
words complained of in the statement of claim ….. In a recent case,
the Court of Appeal in England has stated that where libel arises
out of a long article in a newspaper, the Plaintiff must set forth
in his Statement of Claim the particular passages which he
complains of and if he complains of the whole publication, then the
whole publication must be set forth in the Statement of Claim”

It was also held in Onyejike V. Anyasor (1992) NWLR Part 218
Page 437 at 450 Para Para E-F, per Katsina-Alu, JCA (as he then
was), that:

“In a libel action, the words complained of must be pleaded. The
words used are the material facts and they must therefore be set
out in the Plaintiff’s pleadings to enable the Court determine
whether they constitute a ground of action. The law requires him to
set out the words in his pleadings with reasonable certainty …
However, if the action is in respect of certain libellous passages
in a letter, the Plaintiff is not required to set out the whole
letter, it is sufficient to set out the passages complained of only
provided their meaning is clear.” Per ADEFOPE-OKOJIE,
J.C.A. 

Read more Latest Judgments on BE THE FIRST TO KNOW
here.
[1]

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