Presumption Of Innocence And Burden Of Proof: A Cardinal Principle Of Criminal Justice Administration.

By Festus Ibude

INTRODUCTION

The administration of justice as a system tries to maintain a
core balance between the search for truth, the fairness of the
process and ensuring justice. To this end, one of the major
cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence is that an accused
person must be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved
by credible and legal testimony beyond reasonable doubt. If there
is a single principle of criminal jurisprudence that is well rooted
and jealously guarded, it is that an accused person must in every
case be presumed to be innocent unless and until the contrary is
established. This is enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, in Section 36(5). This principle forms
the foundation of our criminal system, of which no departure is
accommodated. In the celebrated case of Woolmington v
DPP[1], it was referred to as the
“golden thread” that runs throughout criminal law. It was held
that;

 “Throughout the web of English Criminal Law, one
golden thread is always to be seen, that is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt…. No matter what the
charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must
prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law and no
attempt to whittle it down can be entertained” Per Viscount
Sankey.

At all stages of a criminal proceeding, and under all
conditions, the departure from the golden thread is not
permissible. It is the rule in criminal law that a prosecution has
to make out their case beyond all reasonable doubt, and until this
is done, the accused is presumed innocent. In a case where an
accused pleads guilty to a charge of murder, being a capital
offence, the practice is thus; in view of the nature of the
offence, that plea must be put aside, and a plea of not-guilty
recorded for the accused. The plea ought not to be given effect to
and allowed to negate the presumption of innocence in respect of
the charge. Only a full-blown trial can determine whether that is
the case or not. The Supreme Court in Nkie v. FRN [2]held as follows;

“If a person charged with murder or any other offence which
the law prescribes the death penalty pleads guilty to it, a plea of
not guilty is to be recorded by the Court on his behalf and the
case heard as if he had pleaded not guilty. In any other
circumstance, his actual plea is to be recorded”.

Furthermore, a weak and false defence on the part of an accused
does not disturb this presumption, for the inaccuracy or weakness
of the case of the defence does not aid a shaky prosecution case.
No circumstance beyond positive proof of guilt by the prosecution
beyond all reasonable doubt can negate the original presumption of
innocence in favour of an accused.

The Indian Supreme Court in the case of Nisar Ali v
State of U.P.,[3] in overturning
the decision of the Court of Appeal quoted a passage from the
judgement of the Court of Appeal as follows:

“The respondent himself did not have the courage to say that
he did not find them at the spot. If he were innocent, he must have
come out of his house immediately on hearing the noise and must
have known who was present there and who was not.”

It then went on to hold that:

“The above passage is so destructive of the cardinal
principle of criminal jurisprudence as to the presumed innocence of
an accused person till otherwise proved, that it has become
necessary to reiterate the rule that it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt, subject to any statutory
exceptions.”

The last statement above ‘subject to any statutory provisions’
provides the most complex facet of the doctrine of presumption of
innocence. This caveat is also instant in the 1999 constitution, by
Section 36(5) where it stated;

“…………. Provided that nothing in this section shall
invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes upon any
such person the burden of proving particular facts.”

On the clause, ‘subject to any statutory provisions’, there has
been a lot of mêlée as to its effect vis-à-vis
the principle that burden of proof lies on the prosecution.

The question that is most frequently asked is, whether in the
case of a statutory provision placing the burden of proving any
particular fact on an accused, the burden on the prosecution is
therefore lifted and whether it displaces the presumption of
innocence on his behalf?

The Evidence Act provides some interesting examples. Section 135
(2) provides that: “The burden of proving that any person is
guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to the provisions of
Section 139 of this Act, on the person who asserts it, whether the
commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in
action.”

Section 139(1) in turn provides that the burden of proving any
circumstance, the existence of which might afford an accused any
exemption, exception, qualification or operation of law against the
offence he is charged with is on the accused.

From the onset, it is hereby submitted that Section 139 does not
relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove beyond reasonable
doubt in anyway, neither does it shift or contemplate to shift that
burden away from the prosecution. A community reading of Section
36(5) of the Constitution, Section 135(2) and Section 139(1) of the
Evidence Act, clearly shows that the prosecution maintains the
burden of proving his case beyond reasonable doubt, which he shares
with no one, and upon the discharge of the duty, the burden of
casting reasonable doubt now shifts to the accused, of which he may
then raise any of the qualifications, exemptions or exceptions
provided for by Section 139(1) of the Evidence Act. It is the same
for many of the numerous presumptions found in the Evidence Act and
in cases where the defence intends to rely on the defence of
intoxication or insanity. Nwadialo in his book, while relying on
the case of Areh v COP[4], argued
that:

“The same proposition also follows from the fact that it is
the prosecution which asserts the affirmative of the issue of the
guilt of the accused and therefore must prove this issue and also
from its burden of rebutting the presumption of
innocence.”

Similarly, a statute may permit a natural presumption of fact
from certain proved facts, for instance, under Section 167(a) of
the Evidence Act, a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon
after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods
knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his
possession. This presumption is only permissible, and it is not to
be drawn unless and until the explanation of the accused is
considered and found unsatisfactory. The law in this instance
follows that, where the accused offers a reasonable explanation
which may be true and therefore raises a doubt of his guilt, he is
entitled to an acquittal, for the presumption of innocence in his
favour is not displaced. Where the law places a presumption against
an accused, the degree of proof required to rebut the presumption
is likened to that of civil cases; which is on the preponderance of
evidence.

Daudu v FRN

The case of Daudu v FRN[5] was
met with a lot of literature. The Supreme Court had the privilege
of pronouncing on Section 19(3) of the Money Laundering Act, which
says if an accused person is in possession of pecuniary resources
or property which is disproportionate to his known source of
income, or he obtained an accretion to his pecuniary resources or
property, the burden of giving a satisfactory account of how he
made the money or obtained the accretion shifts to him.

The Supreme Court in its decision held that:

“Proving Money Laundering cases is a herculean task because
it requires a prior establishment of the predicate offence before
the money laundering aspect can be established. To obviate this
problem a remedy was introduced by statutorily inferring money
laundering from not only the conduct of the defendant but his
lifestyle which is similar to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 of the
UK. Even though Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution provides
that every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
to be innocent until he is proven guilty, the proviso allows for
shifting the burden of proof on the defendant”
………………………………….

The prosecution is relieved of the burden of having to prove
that the money so found in his account or in his possession is
proceeds from illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances or of any illegal act. To explain the point further,
where A is a fixed salary earner and suddenly his account is
credited with an amount beyond his income or has property which his
legitimate income cannot afford, the burden shifts to him to
explain how he got the money with which he bought the property or
the legitimate transaction he was engaged in for which the account
was credited”.

The most prevalent argument against the decision of the Supreme
Court above is that it trumps on the age-old principle of criminal
jurisprudence that the onus of proof lies solely on the
prosecution. I submit with due respect that this is a
mis-construction of the Supreme Court’s rationale.

The prosecution at all times, has the general burden of proof in
a criminal matter, that is the duty of proving the guilt of an
accused is solely on the prosecution, however, there is a lower
burden, known as evidential burden, which shifts from the
prosecution to the accused and vice versa as the case progresses.
There is also a general burden of proof of reasonable doubt on an
accused, which only comes to play when the prosecution has proved
its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is at this point that the
burden can be said to have shifted. Section 135(3) of the Evidence
Act provides that:

“If the prosecution proves the commission of a crime beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of proving reasonable doubt is shifted
on to the defendant.”

In Daudu v FRN (supra), it is not the contemplation of the
Supreme Court to usurp the constitutionally prescribed presumption
of innocence and the burden of proof of the prosecution in money
laundering cases.  A defendant is not expected to lead
evidence before the prosecution in satisfaction of Section 19(3) of
the Money Laundering Act, but once the prosecution has proved the
ingredient of Money Laundering, the burden shifts to the accused to
prove the legitimacy of the money in question. The burden in this
case is not to proof his innocence, but to create a reasonable
doubt on the case of the prosecution as provided for by Section
135(3) of the Evidence Act. Section 19(3) of the Money Laundering
act and the provisions of other relevant statutes that place a
burden on a defendant to prove certain facts do not remove or
contemplate to remove the original burden on the prosecution to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It must be noted, that the
burden of proof on the accused in such cases is lesser than that of
the prosecution and it is enough for the accused to make out the
truth of his defence in all reasonable probability but not beyond
doubt.

Lifestyle Audit

On the 22^nd of March 2021, an aide to the President
communicated via a tweet that Lifestyle Audit was now legal in
Nigeria. Although the legal backing of the message of the tweet is
still a mystery, there were concerns as to whether a lifestyle
audit would be an infringement on the constitutionally prescribed
presumption of innocence. Lifestyle audit is a tool used to
determine the income of a person. It involves background searches,
suspect profiling, financial investigation, lifetime analysis among
others.

Lifestyle audits are hinged upon the belief that the quality of
one’s life and possession are an indication of their financial
capacity. The Kenyan Supreme Court in the case of Kenya
Anti-Corruption Commission v. Stanley Mombo Amuti[6] opined as follows: “Any indication
of incongruity between an individual’s income and their lifestyle
should therefore call for investigations and possible recovery of
the proceeds of corruption”.

Although I have reservations on the effectiveness of Lifestyle
Audits and also maintain the concern for the possible abuse of the
machinery by officials, I posit that Lifestyle Audits are not in
any way an affront on the presumption of innocence. In fact,
agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
already have similar powers under their enabling laws.

For example, Section 7 of the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (Establishment) Act of 2004, already allows for
lifestyle audit. Specifically, Section 5 of the Act provides
that:

“(1)     The Commission has power to –
Special powers of the Commission

(a)       cause investigations
to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate Commission body
or organization has committed any offence under this Act or other
law relating to economic and financial crimes

(b)      cause
investigations to be conducted into the properties of any person if
it appears to the commission that the person’s lifestyle and extent
of the properties are not justified by his source of
income;

It is the submission of the writer therefore, that Lifestyle
Audits are not a breach of a person’s right of the presumption of
innocence. The right is constitutional and can only be taken away
by a repeal of the Constitution. Lifestyle audits allow only for
investigation and questioning, and not a presumption of guilt, as
the guilt of a suspect or accused can only be determined by a Court
of law. As a reiteration, the Court in Auta v. The State
[7]held:

“So, the duty on the prosecution is to prove all cases
beyond reasonable doubt before the Court can pronounce the guilt of
the accused person.”

Conclusion

It has been shown that the principle of presumption of innocence
is well rooted in criminal jurisprudence and it is the influence of
the fundamental principle that permeates every criminal trial,
rearing its head in the disposal of criminal cases, whether the
prosecution by its evidence has failed to satisfy the necessary
degree of proof for conviction, or it is held that suspicion is not
proof, or it is shown that there is no legal proof of crime as the
ingredients have not been proven, or the finding is sort to be
defended by the notorious maxim that “it is better that ten guilty
men should be set free than one innocent man to suffer”. It is also
why any doubt in the case of a prosecution is resolved in the
favour of the accused.

REFERENCES

1. Y H Rao and Y R Rao, criminal trial: fundamentals &
   evidentiary aspects (4^th ed.) 2011,
   LexisNexis.
2. J.A. Agaba, practical approach to criminal litigation in
   Nigeria (3^rd ed.) 2015, Emerald publication.
3. The Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as
   amended).
4. The Evidence Act of 2011.

Written by FESTUS IBUDE

Festus is the Team lead of the Dispute Resolution/Litigation
Group at Omaplex Law Firm. His practice focuses on working with
clients to manage crises and defend complex multiparty and
multi-jurisdictional matters. He handles a diverse range of
litigation matters in State and Federal Courts across the country,
with interest in civil and criminal litigations. Festus also has
significant experience defending class actions and election
petitions.

Festus has represented private clients and government agencies
in crisis management situations, including engaging with regulators
and law enforcement, developing litigation strategy, and defending
clients through all stages of litigation and arbitration.

He has experience of all forms of commercial dispute resolution,
including substantial contract, partnership, property and corporate
disputes, professional negligence, class actions, judicial review
and financial services litigation.

[1] 1935 AC 462

[2] (2014) LPELR-22877 (SC)

[3] AIR 1957 SC 366,

[4] (1959) WRNLR 230

[5] (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt.1626) 169

[6] [2011] eKLR

[7] (2018) LPELR-44490(CA)

By Festus Ibude

INTRODUCTION

The administration of justice as a system tries to maintain a
core balance between the search for truth, the fairness of the
process and ensuring justice. To this end, one of the major
cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence is that an accused
person must be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved
by credible and legal testimony beyond reasonable doubt. If there
is a single principle of criminal jurisprudence that is well rooted
and jealously guarded, it is that an accused person must in every
case be presumed to be innocent unless and until the contrary is
established. This is enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, in Section 36(5). This principle forms
the foundation of our criminal system, of which no departure is
accommodated. In the celebrated case of Woolmington v
DPP[1], it was referred to as the
“golden thread” that runs throughout criminal law. It was held
that;

 “Throughout the web of English Criminal Law, one
golden thread is always to be seen, that is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt…. No matter what the
charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must
prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law and no
attempt to whittle it down can be entertained” Per Viscount
Sankey.

At all stages of a criminal proceeding, and under all
conditions, the departure from the golden thread is not
permissible. It is the rule in criminal law that a prosecution has
to make out their case beyond all reasonable doubt, and until this
is done, the accused is presumed innocent. In a case where an
accused pleads guilty to a charge of murder, being a capital
offence, the practice is thus; in view of the nature of the
offence, that plea must be put aside, and a plea of not-guilty
recorded for the accused. The plea ought not to be given effect to
and allowed to negate the presumption of innocence in respect of
the charge. Only a full-blown trial can determine whether that is
the case or not. The Supreme Court in Nkie v. FRN [2]held as follows;

“If a person charged with murder or any other offence which
the law prescribes the death penalty pleads guilty to it, a plea of
not guilty is to be recorded by the Court on his behalf and the
case heard as if he had pleaded not guilty. In any other
circumstance, his actual plea is to be recorded”.

Furthermore, a weak and false defence on the part of an accused
does not disturb this presumption, for the inaccuracy or weakness
of the case of the defence does not aid a shaky prosecution case.
No circumstance beyond positive proof of guilt by the prosecution
beyond all reasonable doubt can negate the original presumption of
innocence in favour of an accused.

The Indian Supreme Court in the case of Nisar Ali v
State of U.P.,[3] in overturning the
decision of the Court of Appeal quoted a passage from the judgement
of the Court of Appeal as follows:

“The respondent himself did not have the courage to say that
he did not find them at the spot. If he were innocent, he must have
come out of his house immediately on hearing the noise and must
have known who was present there and who was not.”

It then went on to hold that:

“The above passage is so destructive of the cardinal
principle of criminal jurisprudence as to the presumed innocence of
an accused person till otherwise proved, that it has become
necessary to reiterate the rule that it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt, subject to any statutory
exceptions.”

The last statement above ‘subject to any statutory provisions’
provides the most complex facet of the doctrine of presumption of
innocence. This caveat is also instant in the 1999 constitution, by
Section 36(5) where it stated;

“…………. Provided that nothing in this section shall
invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes upon any
such person the burden of proving particular facts.”

On the clause, ‘subject to any statutory provisions’, there has
been a lot of mêlée as to its effect vis-à-vis
the principle that burden of proof lies on the prosecution.

The question that is most frequently asked is, whether in the
case of a statutory provision placing the burden of proving any
particular fact on an accused, the burden on the prosecution is
therefore lifted and whether it displaces the presumption of
innocence on his behalf?

The Evidence Act provides some interesting examples. Section 135
(2) provides that: “The burden of proving that any person is
guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to the provisions of
Section 139 of this Act, on the person who asserts it, whether the
commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in
action.”

Section 139(1) in turn provides that the burden of proving any
circumstance, the existence of which might afford an accused any
exemption, exception, qualification or operation of law against the
offence he is charged with is on the accused.

From the onset, it is hereby submitted that Section 139 does not
relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove beyond reasonable
doubt in anyway, neither does it shift or contemplate to shift that
burden away from the prosecution. A community reading of Section
36(5) of the Constitution, Section 135(2) and Section 139(1) of the
Evidence Act, clearly shows that the prosecution maintains the
burden of proving his case beyond reasonable doubt, which he shares
with no one, and upon the discharge of the duty, the burden of
casting reasonable doubt now shifts to the accused, of which he may
then raise any of the qualifications, exemptions or exceptions
provided for by Section 139(1) of the Evidence Act. It is the same
for many of the numerous presumptions found in the Evidence Act and
in cases where the defence intends to rely on the defence of
intoxication or insanity. Nwadialo in his book, while relying on
the case of Areh v COP[4], argued
that:

“The same proposition also follows from the fact that it is
the prosecution which asserts the affirmative of the issue of the
guilt of the accused and therefore must prove this issue and also
from its burden of rebutting the presumption of
innocence.”

Similarly, a statute may permit a natural presumption of fact
from certain proved facts, for instance, under Section 167(a) of
the Evidence Act, a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon
after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods
knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his
possession. This presumption is only permissible, and it is not to
be drawn unless and until the explanation of the accused is
considered and found unsatisfactory. The law in this instance
follows that, where the accused offers a reasonable explanation
which may be true and therefore raises a doubt of his guilt, he is
entitled to an acquittal, for the presumption of innocence in his
favour is not displaced. Where the law places a presumption against
an accused, the degree of proof required to rebut the presumption
is likened to that of civil cases; which is on the preponderance of
evidence.

Daudu v FRN

The case of Daudu v FRN[5] was
met with a lot of literature. The Supreme Court had the privilege
of pronouncing on Section 19(3) of the Money Laundering Act, which
says if an accused person is in possession of pecuniary resources
or property which is disproportionate to his known source of
income, or he obtained an accretion to his pecuniary resources or
property, the burden of giving a satisfactory account of how he
made the money or obtained the accretion shifts to him.

The Supreme Court in its decision held that:

“Proving Money Laundering cases is a herculean task because
it requires a prior establishment of the predicate offence before
the money laundering aspect can be established. To obviate this
problem a remedy was introduced by statutorily inferring money
laundering from not only the conduct of the defendant but his
lifestyle which is similar to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 of the
UK. Even though Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution provides
that every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
to be innocent until he is proven guilty, the proviso allows for
shifting the burden of proof on the defendant”
………………………………….

The prosecution is relieved of the burden of having to prove
that the money so found in his account or in his possession is
proceeds from illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances or of any illegal act. To explain the point further,
where A is a fixed salary earner and suddenly his account is
credited with an amount beyond his income or has property which his
legitimate income cannot afford, the burden shifts to him to
explain how he got the money with which he bought the property or
the legitimate transaction he was engaged in for which the account
was credited”.

The most prevalent argument against the decision of the Supreme
Court above is that it trumps on the age-old principle of criminal
jurisprudence that the onus of proof lies solely on the
prosecution. I submit with due respect that this is a
mis-construction of the Supreme Court’s rationale.

The prosecution at all times, has the general burden of proof in
a criminal matter, that is the duty of proving the guilt of an
accused is solely on the prosecution, however, there is a lower
burden, known as evidential burden, which shifts from the
prosecution to the accused and vice versa as the case progresses.
There is also a general burden of proof of reasonable doubt on an
accused, which only comes to play when the prosecution has proved
its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is at this point that the
burden can be said to have shifted. Section 135(3) of the Evidence
Act provides that:

“If the prosecution proves the commission of a crime beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of proving reasonable doubt is shifted
on to the defendant.”

In Daudu v FRN (supra), it is not the contemplation of the
Supreme Court to usurp the constitutionally prescribed presumption
of innocence and the burden of proof of the prosecution in money
laundering cases.  A defendant is not expected to lead
evidence before the prosecution in satisfaction of Section 19(3) of
the Money Laundering Act, but once the prosecution has proved the
ingredient of Money Laundering, the burden shifts to the accused to
prove the legitimacy of the money in question. The burden in this
case is not to proof his innocence, but to create a reasonable
doubt on the case of the prosecution as provided for by Section
135(3) of the Evidence Act. Section 19(3) of the Money Laundering
act and the provisions of other relevant statutes that place a
burden on a defendant to prove certain facts do not remove or
contemplate to remove the original burden on the prosecution to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It must be noted, that the
burden of proof on the accused in such cases is lesser than that of
the prosecution and it is enough for the accused to make out the
truth of his defence in all reasonable probability but not beyond
doubt.

Lifestyle Audit

On the 22^nd of March 2021, an aide to the President
communicated via a tweet that Lifestyle Audit was now legal in
Nigeria. Although the legal backing of the message of the tweet is
still a mystery, there were concerns as to whether a lifestyle
audit would be an infringement on the constitutionally prescribed
presumption of innocence. Lifestyle audit is a tool used to
determine the income of a person. It involves background searches,
suspect profiling, financial investigation, lifetime analysis among
others.

Lifestyle audits are hinged upon the belief that the quality of
one’s life and possession are an indication of their financial
capacity. The Kenyan Supreme Court in the case of Kenya
Anti-Corruption Commission v. Stanley Mombo Amuti[6] opined as follows: “Any indication of
incongruity between an individual’s income and their lifestyle
should therefore call for investigations and possible recovery of
the proceeds of corruption”.

Although I have reservations on the effectiveness of Lifestyle
Audits and also maintain the concern for the possible abuse of the
machinery by officials, I posit that Lifestyle Audits are not in
any way an affront on the presumption of innocence. In fact,
agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
already have similar powers under their enabling laws.

For example, Section 7 of the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (Establishment) Act of 2004, already allows for
lifestyle audit. Specifically, Section 5 of the Act provides
that:

“(1)     The Commission has power to –
Special powers of the Commission

(a)       cause investigations
to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate Commission body
or organization has committed any offence under this Act or other
law relating to economic and financial crimes

(b)      cause
investigations to be conducted into the properties of any person if
it appears to the commission that the person’s lifestyle and extent
of the properties are not justified by his source of
income;

It is the submission of the writer therefore, that Lifestyle
Audits are not a breach of a person’s right of the presumption of
innocence. The right is constitutional and can only be taken away
by a repeal of the Constitution. Lifestyle audits allow only for
investigation and questioning, and not a presumption of guilt, as
the guilt of a suspect or accused can only be determined by a Court
of law. As a reiteration, the Court in Auta v. The State
[7]held:

“So, the duty on the prosecution is to prove all cases
beyond reasonable doubt before the Court can pronounce the guilt of
the accused person.”

Conclusion

It has been shown that the principle of presumption of innocence
is well rooted in criminal jurisprudence and it is the influence of
the fundamental principle that permeates every criminal trial,
rearing its head in the disposal of criminal cases, whether the
prosecution by its evidence has failed to satisfy the necessary
degree of proof for conviction, or it is held that suspicion is not
proof, or it is shown that there is no legal proof of crime as the
ingredients have not been proven, or the finding is sort to be
defended by the notorious maxim that “it is better that ten guilty
men should be set free than one innocent man to suffer”. It is also
why any doubt in the case of a prosecution is resolved in the
favour of the accused.

REFERENCES

1. Y H Rao and Y R Rao, criminal trial: fundamentals &
   evidentiary aspects (4^th ed.) 2011,
   LexisNexis.
2. J.A. Agaba, practical approach to criminal litigation in
   Nigeria (3^rd ed.) 2015, Emerald publication.
3. The Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as
   amended).
4. The Evidence Act of 2011.

Written by FESTUS IBUDE

Festus is the Team lead of the Dispute Resolution/Litigation
Group at Omaplex Law Firm. His practice focuses on working with
clients to manage crises and defend complex multiparty and
multi-jurisdictional matters. He handles a diverse range of
litigation matters in State and Federal Courts across the country,
with interest in civil and criminal litigations. Festus also has
significant experience defending class actions and election
petitions.

Festus has represented private clients and government agencies
in crisis management situations, including engaging with regulators
and law enforcement, developing litigation strategy, and defending
clients through all stages of litigation and arbitration.

He has experience of all forms of commercial dispute resolution,
including substantial contract, partnership, property and corporate
disputes, professional negligence, class actions, judicial review
and financial services litigation.

[1] 1935 AC 462

[2] (2014) LPELR-22877 (SC)

[3] AIR 1957 SC 366,

[4] (1959) WRNLR 230

[5] (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt.1626) 169

[6] [2011] eKLR

[7] (2018) LPELR-44490(CA)