INTRODUCTION:
Today, more people than ever are bringing matters to the courts
for resolution. In as much as modern legal theories have advocated
for alternative methods of dispute resolution, on the ground that
alternative dispute resolution is more expedient and less
cumbersome, there is nevertheless a growing increase in the number
of litigants willing to subject themselves to the formal system of
adjudication of disputes called litigation.
This is reinforced by the fact that alternative dispute
resolution is not suitable in some types of suits, most notably,
suits involving a declaration of the rights of the litigants; suits
involving technical and strong evidential procedure like criminal
trials, election petitions etc; suits involving limited time; suits
involving the interpretation of legal documents.
Despite the many inconveniences and unpleasant experiences
associated with litigation, litigation still remains the best
dispute resolution method in most instances. The non-desirability
of alternative modes of disputes resolution in most circumstances
makes it imperative that the courtroom be the best alternative of
settling disputes.
WHY DISCONTINUE ACTIONS?
The doors of the court are normally left open for aggrieved
persons to seek any form of judicial redress or remedy. Thus,
parties come to court for redress of alleged wrongs done to them.
Having begun an action in court, the parties are still at liberty
to discontinue at any stage the proceedings which they have
nevertheless begun. A party comes to the court for a redress of an
alleged wrong done to him, or he seeks a declaration in respect of
certain rights but the moment he decides to exercise his unfettered
right not to pursue his action, what is left for the courts is the
order to be made as it is outside the court’s jurisdiction to force
a party to continue an action filed by him.
Discontinuance of actions at the trial courts ordinarily arise
as a result of many factors. The factors include, but not limited
to:
- where a plaintiff/claimant realizes the weakness of his claim
in the light of the defence put up by the defendant, he might
decide to discontinue the action; - where the plaintiff’s vital witnesses are not available at the
material time and will not be so at any certain future date; - where the plaintiff decides that by abandoning the case, he
could substantially reduce the high costs that would have otherwise
followed after a full-scale but unsuccessful litigation; - where the plaintiff may possibly retain the right to the claim
at a more auspicious time, if necessary.
WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO DISCONTINUE AN ACTION?
It is not in doubt that parties, undeniably, have a right to
discontinue his action if so chooses. After all, the mere filing of
an action does not necessarily imply that the parties have
irrevocably committed themselves to resolving their dispute by
litigation. It must be established at this point that a right of
discontinuance of an action ennures to the benefit of the
plaintiff. The defendant can only apply for a striking out or a
dismissal of the suit on whatever grounds he might base his
application on. Even so, as we will see hereafter, the remedy
available to the plaintiff on an application for discontinuance is
the same as the benefit that accrues to the defendant on an
application for striking out or dismissal of the suit.
What we will attempt to delineate by this treatise if to find
out the attitude of courts in Nigeria when a plaintiff seeks to
discontinue his action.
However, in the Anambra state High Court (Civil
Procedure) Rules, 2006, Order 23 Rule 2 gives a right
of withdrawal of the suit to both the defendant and the plaintiff.
In such instance, once both parties consent to the withdrawal of
the suit in writing, the trial judge is mandated to strike out the
matter even in the absence of the parties or their legal
practitioners.
PROCEDURE FOR DISCONTINUANCE OF ACTIONS:
In Aghadiuno v Onubogu (1998) 5 NWLR (pt. 548) 16 at
35, para. D, the Supreme Court established, first
off, that an application to discontinue a suit can be made by way
of motion on notice or orally or by way of notice, as was done in
the instant case. The rule of court on discontinuance has not
prescribed a particular mode. That much is clear and accepted.
Discontinuance of actions can even be made orally to the courts.
However, for the sake of posterity and clarity, it is advised that
a counsel making an application for discontinuance of action does
so by way of motion on notice. The reason is very obvious. When the
contest gets tough and the appellate court wants to look into the
records of the trial court, there will be nothing on the records,
aside what the trial judge recorded, to show that an application
was made by the counsel. The trial judge’s recording might even be
contested for a long time, thus prolonging the matter
unnecessarily.
Whether or not leave of court is required to discontinue an
action depends. Where the plaintiff has been served with the
defendant’s statement of defence, or even after receiving the
statement of defence but he does not take a further step in the
matter, then he does not require the leave of court. Where,
however, the plaintiff has received the statement of defence and he
goes a step further in the matter, he will require the leave of
court before discontinuing the action. In the former case, the
plaintiff has a duty to file in court and serve on the defendant
against whom he seeks to withdraw, a notice of discontinuance or
withdrawal. Once the defendant is served, then the suit is
discontinued. In the latter case, however, the plaintiff is duty
bound to bring an application for a discontinuance of the suit by
way of motion on notice seeking the leave of the court to
discontinue the suit.
WHAT THE RULES OF COURT SAY ON
DISCONTINUANCE:
The rules of court make provisions for discontinuance of
actions. On its part, Order 23 Rule 1 (1) High Court of
Anambra state (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2006, provides
thus:
“The plaintiff may at any time before receipt of the defence by
notice in writing duly filed and served, wholly discontinue his
claim against all or any of the defendants or withdraw any part or
parts of his claim. He shall thereupon pay such defendant’s costs
of the action, or if the action be not wholly discontinued, the
coasts occasioned by the matter so withdrawn.”
The rules of court are very clear that once a plaintiff applies
for a discontinuance of the suit and the court accedes to his
request, such a discontinuance is a mere striking out as the
plaintiff can still go ahead to re-file same suit against the same
defendant subsequently. The wordings of the Rules of court are very
clear on this. They state thus:
“ A discontinuance or withdrawal as the case may be
shall not be a defence to any subsequent action.” See Order 23 Rule
1 (2) High Court of Anambra state (Civil Procedure) Rules,
2006.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE COURTS TO
DISCONTINUANCE:
In Ekundayo v Keregbe (2008) 4 NWLR (pt. 1077)
422, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s and
Court of Appeal’s refusal to strike out the suit when the
plaintiffs/appellants applied for a discontinuance of the action on
the ground that the plaintiffs’/appellants’ three witnesses had
earlier testified before the trial court in the suit. The Supreme
Court reasoned that it will work unjust hardship in the
defendants/respondents. Curiously enough, at page 430-431, paras.
E-F, the same Supreme Court admitted in the same
Ekundayo’s case that whether the court
will grant an application for discontinuance brought by the
plaintiff depends on what terms the court might impose on the
plaintiff.
In the same Aghadiuno’s case (supra),
the Supreme Court laid down what it terms the proper order to be
made by the trial court where a plaintiff applies for a
discontinuance of the action after issues have been joined by the
parties, by holding thus:
“Where a plaintiff has applied for leave to discontinue his
claim against the defendant or the defendant, his counter-claim,
after the date fixed for hearing of the suit what order the court
would make is a matter exclusively for it in due and deliberate
exercise of its judicial discretion and the court must inevitably
take into consideration all the circumstances of the case. The
court will decide whether:-
- to grant leave for the suit to be withdrawn simply on terms
that the same be struck out subject to costs; or - to grant leave for the suit to be withdrawn, subject to the
imposition of certain conditions to be fulfilled before a fresh
suit concerning the same subject matter and the same parties may be
instituted; or - to refuse such leave; in which case the suit must be dismissed
also on terms as to costs.”
Procedurally in every trial, after the case has been mentioned,
it is incumbent on the parties to the dispute to file and exchange
pleadings for each of the parties to be aware of the case of the
other party. This is called the joining of issues by the parties.
Normally, with the coming into effect of the frontloading system in
courts, the plaintiff’s case is almost always known even before the
mention of the case. Thus, it is the defendant that joins issues
with the plaintiff when the defendant files and serves on the
plaintiff his statement of defence. At this point, the parties
would be said to have reached the point of litis
contestatio, that is, the point of no return, where a legal
issue has emerged from the opposing statements of the parties;
where a joinder of issues by the parties arising from the defence
in a lawsuit that has been lodged. In essence, the Supreme Court in
Ekundayo’s case formulated a new rule of
procedure, different from the provision of the rules of court, to
the effect that what is to be done in an application for
discontinuance of an action depends on whether the point of
litis contestatio has been reached or not. Where the point
of litis contestatio has been reached, then the courts
will dismiss the suit. When the point has not been reached, then
the court will strike out the suit.
In Abayomi Babatunde v Pan Atlanitic Shipping and
Transport Agencies Ltd. & 2 Ors. (2007) 13 NWLR (pt. 1050)
113, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to state
clearly the approach of the courts to applications for
discontinuance of actions. That case shows the difficulty trial
judges ordinarily face when confronted with applications for
discontinuance of actions. There, the 1st respondent, as
the plaintiff before the trial judge, sued the appellant and the
2nd respondent over a land dispute in 1988. The
3rd respondent was later joined in the suit by an order
of the court. Pleadings were settled between the parties, but
before commencement of trial, the 1st
respondent/plaintiff filed an application for summary judgment. The
application was heard and dismissed on the grounds that triable
issues were disclosed in the pleadings, and the suit was adjourned
for trial. The case commenced and the 1st
respondent/plaintiff’s witness testified. The suit was adjourned
for cross-examination. Before the date fixed for the
cross-examination, the trial judge was elevated to the Court of
Appeal. The suit had to recommence de novo before another trial
judge, but before that judge could begin to hear the matter, he
took ill. The case was thereafter transferred to yet another judge.
Before the third judge could begin to hear the suit, the
1st respondent brought an application for a
discontinuance of the suit. The trial judge, however, in his
ruling, dismissed the suit against the appellant and the
2nd respondent, while it struck out the suit against the
3rd respondent on the basis that the 3rd
respondent had not filed its pleadings. On appeal to the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court, the orders of dismissal were
overturned to orders of striking out, however, without the courts
ordinarily making pronouncements on the proper position of the
law.
CONCLUSION:
From a dispassionate analysis of the cases herein, it is humbly
submitted that the courts are more in favour of outright dismissal
of suits once an application for discontinuance has been brought by
the plaintiff when the parties have joined issues. Such dismissal
will enable the defendant to raise the plea of estoppel per rem
judicatam subsequently, thus extinguishing whatever right the
plaintiff had to have his matter heard. With due respect, this
author believes that should not be the case. We rather submit that
a striking out of the suit should be the proper order to be made by
the court. The wordings of the Rules of court are very clear on
this. They state thus:
“A discontinuance or withdrawal as the case may be
shall not be a defence to any subsequent action.”
The courts, rather, in their bid to be seen to do substantial
justice, rather went too far, to develop the practice of outrightly
dismissing the case on the basis that there must be an end to
litigation. Withdrawn cases should not usually be dismissed by a
mere a wave of the hand on the grounds that issues have been joined
by the parties. Dismissal of an action is the greatest punishment
that a plaintiff can suffer in civil litigation. When courts shut
the doors of justice to the plaintiff by outrightly dismissing his
action, it has a tendency to dissuade litigants from further
approaching the courts for redress of wrongs done to them. The
courts are enjoined to ensure that it properly looks into the
matter before it before deciding to dismiss a case based on an
application for discontinuance brought by the plaintiff. It is only
when the justice of the case tilts in favour of a dismissal that a
court should do so. It is very possible that the plaintiff might be
willing to abandon the claim for a more auspicious time. It might
be the case that the plaintiff’s case is not yet fully formed, thus
rather than waste the time of the court and the defendant the
plaintiff is applying for a discontinuance of the case. There are a
million and one reasons why a plaintiff might decide to discontinue
his action. The rules justify the stance taken by this author by
providing that: “The court hearing an application for
leave may refuse the application whereupon if the party refuses or
fails to proceed, the Court shall dismiss the action or the claim
and award costs to the deserving party.”
See Order 23 Rule 1(4) Anambra state High Court (Civil
Procedure)Rules, 2006.
On the other hand, it must be conceded that in deciding which
path to tow when faced with an application for discontinuance, the
courts take into consideration the convenience and inconvenience of
the plaintiff as well as the defendant. After all, justice is a
two-way street. Thus, with the rising costs of litigation these
days, it makes more sense and it is more logical for a court to
impose some measure of punitive sanctions on the defendant before
exercising their discretion in his favour to discontinue the
action. The defendant will not ordinarily be in court had it not
been for the plaintiff. This, in effect, will compensate the
defendant for his time wasted by the plaintiff. Even the Rules lay
more emphasis on costs rather than an outright dismissal of the
suit notwithstanding that the defendant has filed his statement of
defence.
It is finally submitted that the courts are wrong in their
approach to applications for discontinuance of actions.
Collins Ogonnaya Arikor, Esq., collins.arikor@gmail.com
INTRODUCTION:
Today, more people than ever are bringing matters to the courts
for resolution. In as much as modern legal theories have advocated
for alternative methods of dispute resolution, on the ground that
alternative dispute resolution is more expedient and less
cumbersome, there is nevertheless a growing increase in the number
of litigants willing to subject themselves to the formal system of
adjudication of disputes called litigation.
This is reinforced by the fact that
alternative dispute resolution is not suitable in some types of
suits, most notably, suits involving a declaration of the rights of
the litigants; suits involving technical and strong evidential
procedure like criminal trials, election petitions etc; suits
involving limited time; suits involving the interpretation of legal
documents.
Despite the many inconveniences and unpleasant experiences
associated with litigation, litigation still remains the best
dispute resolution method in most instances. The non-desirability
of alternative modes of disputes resolution in most circumstances
makes it imperative that the courtroom be the best alternative of
settling disputes.
WHY DISCONTINUE ACTIONS?
The doors of the court are normally left open for aggrieved
persons to seek any form of judicial redress or remedy. Thus,
parties come to court for redress of alleged wrongs done to them.
Having begun an action in court, the parties are still at liberty
to discontinue at any stage the proceedings which they have
nevertheless begun. A party comes to the court for a redress of an
alleged wrong done to him, or he seeks a declaration in respect of
certain rights but the moment he decides to exercise his unfettered
right not to pursue his action, what is left for the courts is the
order to be made as it is outside the court’s jurisdiction to force
a party to continue an action filed by him.
Discontinuance of actions at the trial courts ordinarily arise
as a result of many factors. The factors include, but not limited
to:
- where a plaintiff/claimant realizes the weakness of his claim
in the light of the defence put up by the defendant, he might
decide to discontinue the action; - where the plaintiff’s vital witnesses are not available at the
material time and will not be so at any certain future date; - where the plaintiff decides that by abandoning the case, he
could substantially reduce the high costs that would have otherwise
followed after a full-scale but unsuccessful litigation; - where the plaintiff may possibly retain the right to the claim
at a more auspicious time, if necessary.
WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO DISCONTINUE AN ACTION?
It is not in doubt that parties, undeniably, have a right to
discontinue his action if so chooses. After all, the mere filing of
an action does not necessarily imply that the parties have
irrevocably committed themselves to resolving their dispute by
litigation. It must be established at this point that a right of
discontinuance of an action ennures to the benefit of the
plaintiff. The defendant can only apply for a striking out or a
dismissal of the suit on whatever grounds he might base his
application on. Even so, as we will see hereafter, the remedy
available to the plaintiff on an application for discontinuance is
the same as the benefit that accrues to the defendant on an
application for striking out or dismissal of the suit.
What we will attempt to delineate by this treatise if to find
out the attitude of courts in Nigeria when a plaintiff seeks to
discontinue his action.
However, in the Anambra state High Court (Civil
Procedure) Rules, 2006, Order 23 Rule 2 gives a right
of withdrawal of the suit to both the defendant and the plaintiff.
In such instance, once both parties consent to the withdrawal of
the suit in writing, the trial judge is mandated to strike out the
matter even in the absence of the parties or their legal
practitioners.
PROCEDURE FOR DISCONTINUANCE OF ACTIONS:
In Aghadiuno v Onubogu (1998) 5 NWLR (pt. 548) 16 at
35, para. D, the Supreme Court established, first
off, that an application to discontinue a suit can be made by way
of motion on notice or orally or by way of notice, as was done in
the instant case. The rule of court on discontinuance has not
prescribed a particular mode. That much is clear and accepted.
Discontinuance of actions can even be made orally to the courts.
However, for the sake of posterity and clarity, it is advised that
a counsel making an application for discontinuance of action does
so by way of motion on notice. The reason is very obvious. When the
contest gets tough and the appellate court wants to look into the
records of the trial court, there will be nothing on the records,
aside what the trial judge recorded, to show that an application
was made by the counsel. The trial judge’s recording might even be
contested for a long time, thus prolonging the matter
unnecessarily.
Whether or not leave of court is required to discontinue an
action depends. Where the plaintiff has been served with the
defendant’s statement of defence, or even after receiving the
statement of defence but he does not take a further step in the
matter, then he does not require the leave of court. Where,
however, the plaintiff has received the statement of defence and he
goes a step further in the matter, he will require the leave of
court before discontinuing the action. In the former case, the
plaintiff has a duty to file in court and serve on the defendant
against whom he seeks to withdraw, a notice of discontinuance or
withdrawal. Once the defendant is served, then the suit is
discontinued. In the latter case, however, the plaintiff is duty
bound to bring an application for a discontinuance of the suit by
way of motion on notice seeking the leave of the court to
discontinue the suit.
WHAT THE RULES OF COURT SAY ON
DISCONTINUANCE:
The rules of court make provisions for discontinuance of
actions. On its part, Order 23 Rule 1 (1) High Court of
Anambra state (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2006, provides
thus:
“The plaintiff may at any time before receipt of the defence by
notice in writing duly filed and served, wholly discontinue his
claim against all or any of the defendants or withdraw any part or
parts of his claim. He shall thereupon pay such defendant’s costs
of the action, or if the action be not wholly discontinued, the
coasts occasioned by the matter so withdrawn.”
The rules of court are very clear that once a plaintiff applies
for a discontinuance of the suit and the court accedes to his
request, such a discontinuance is a mere striking out as the
plaintiff can still go ahead to re-file same suit against the same
defendant subsequently. The wordings of the Rules of court are very
clear on this. They state thus:
“ A discontinuance or withdrawal as the case may be
shall not be a defence to any subsequent action.” See Order 23 Rule
1 (2) High Court of Anambra state (Civil Procedure) Rules,
2006.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE COURTS TO
DISCONTINUANCE:
In Ekundayo v Keregbe (2008) 4 NWLR (pt. 1077)
422, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s and
Court of Appeal’s refusal to strike out the suit when the
plaintiffs/appellants applied for a discontinuance of the action on
the ground that the plaintiffs’/appellants’ three witnesses had
earlier testified before the trial court in the suit. The Supreme
Court reasoned that it will work unjust hardship in the
defendants/respondents. Curiously enough, at page 430-431, paras.
E-F, the same Supreme Court admitted in the same
Ekundayo’s case that whether the court
will grant an application for discontinuance brought by the
plaintiff depends on what terms the court might impose on the
plaintiff.
In the same Aghadiuno’s case (supra),
the Supreme Court laid down what it terms the proper order to be
made by the trial court where a plaintiff applies for a
discontinuance of the action after issues have been joined by the
parties, by holding thus:
“Where a plaintiff has applied for leave to discontinue his
claim against the defendant or the defendant, his counter-claim,
after the date fixed for hearing of the suit what order the court
would make is a matter exclusively for it in due and deliberate
exercise of its judicial discretion and the court must inevitably
take into consideration all the circumstances of the case. The
court will decide whether:-
- to grant leave for the suit to be withdrawn simply on terms
that the same be struck out subject to costs; or - to grant leave for the suit to be withdrawn, subject to the
imposition of certain conditions to be fulfilled before a fresh
suit concerning the same subject matter and the same parties may be
instituted; or - to refuse such leave; in which case the suit must be dismissed
also on terms as to costs.”
Procedurally in every trial, after the case has been mentioned,
it is incumbent on the parties to the dispute to file and exchange
pleadings for each of the parties to be aware of the case of the
other party. This is called the joining of issues by the parties.
Normally, with the coming into effect of the frontloading system in
courts, the plaintiff’s case is almost always known even before the
mention of the case. Thus, it is the defendant that joins issues
with the plaintiff when the defendant files and serves on the
plaintiff his statement of defence. At this point, the parties
would be said to have reached the point of litis
contestatio, that is, the point of no return, where a legal
issue has emerged from the opposing statements of the parties;
where a joinder of issues by the parties arising from the defence
in a lawsuit that has been lodged. In essence, the Supreme Court in
Ekundayo’s case formulated a new rule of
procedure, different from the provision of the rules of court, to
the effect that what is to be done in an application for
discontinuance of an action depends on whether the point of
litis contestatio has been reached or not. Where the point
of litis contestatio has been reached, then the courts
will dismiss the suit. When the point has not been reached, then
the court will strike out the suit.
In Abayomi Babatunde v Pan Atlanitic Shipping and
Transport Agencies Ltd. & 2 Ors. (2007) 13 NWLR (pt. 1050)
113, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to state
clearly the approach of the courts to applications for
discontinuance of actions. That case shows the difficulty trial
judges ordinarily face when confronted with applications for
discontinuance of actions. There, the 1st respondent, as
the plaintiff before the trial judge, sued the appellant and the
2nd respondent over a land dispute in 1988. The
3rd respondent was later joined in the suit by an order
of the court. Pleadings were settled between the parties, but
before commencement of trial, the 1st
respondent/plaintiff filed an application for summary judgment. The
application was heard and dismissed on the grounds that triable
issues were disclosed in the pleadings, and the suit was adjourned
for trial. The case commenced and the 1st
respondent/plaintiff’s witness testified. The suit was adjourned
for cross-examination. Before the date fixed for the
cross-examination, the trial judge was elevated to the Court of
Appeal. The suit had to recommence de novo before another trial
judge, but before that judge could begin to hear the matter, he
took ill. The case was thereafter transferred to yet another judge.
Before the third judge could begin to hear the suit, the
1st respondent brought an application for a
discontinuance of the suit. The trial judge, however, in his
ruling, dismissed the suit against the appellant and the
2nd respondent, while it struck out the suit against the
3rd respondent on the basis that the 3rd
respondent had not filed its pleadings. On appeal to the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court, the orders of dismissal were
overturned to orders of striking out, however, without the courts
ordinarily making pronouncements on the proper position of the
law.
CONCLUSION:
From a dispassionate analysis of the cases herein, it is humbly
submitted that the courts are more in favour of outright dismissal
of suits once an application for discontinuance has been brought by
the plaintiff when the parties have joined issues. Such dismissal
will enable the defendant to raise the plea of estoppel per rem
judicatam subsequently, thus extinguishing whatever right the
plaintiff had to have his matter heard. With due respect, this
author believes that should not be the case. We rather submit that
a striking out of the suit should be the proper order to be made by
the court. The wordings of the Rules of court are very clear on
this. They state thus:
“A discontinuance or withdrawal as the case may be
shall not be a defence to any subsequent action.”
The courts, rather, in their bid to be seen to do substantial
justice, rather went too far, to develop the practice of outrightly
dismissing the case on the basis that there must be an end to
litigation. Withdrawn cases should not usually be dismissed by a
mere a wave of the hand on the grounds that issues have been joined
by the parties. Dismissal of an action is the greatest punishment
that a plaintiff can suffer in civil litigation. When courts shut
the doors of justice to the plaintiff by outrightly dismissing his
action, it has a tendency to dissuade litigants from further
approaching the courts for redress of wrongs done to them. The
courts are enjoined to ensure that it properly looks into the
matter before it before deciding to dismiss a case based on an
application for discontinuance brought by the plaintiff. It is only
when the justice of the case tilts in favour of a dismissal that a
court should do so. It is very possible that the plaintiff might be
willing to abandon the claim for a more auspicious time. It might
be the case that the plaintiff’s case is not yet fully formed, thus
rather than waste the time of the court and the defendant the
plaintiff is applying for a discontinuance of the case. There are a
million and one reasons why a plaintiff might decide to discontinue
his action. The rules justify the stance taken by this author by
providing that: “The court hearing an application for
leave may refuse the application whereupon if the party refuses or
fails to proceed, the Court shall dismiss the action or the claim
and award costs to the deserving party.”
See Order 23 Rule 1(4) Anambra state High Court (Civil
Procedure)Rules, 2006.
On the other hand, it must be conceded that in deciding which
path to tow when faced with an application for discontinuance, the
courts take into consideration the convenience and inconvenience of
the plaintiff as well as the defendant. After all, justice is a
two-way street. Thus, with the rising costs of litigation these
days, it makes more sense and it is more logical for a court to
impose some measure of punitive sanctions on the defendant before
exercising their discretion in his favour to discontinue the
action. The defendant will not ordinarily be in court had it not
been for the plaintiff. This, in effect, will compensate the
defendant for his time wasted by the plaintiff. Even the Rules lay
more emphasis on costs rather than an outright dismissal of the
suit notwithstanding that the defendant has filed his statement of
defence.
It is finally submitted that the courts are wrong in their
approach to applications for discontinuance of actions.
Collins Ogonnaya Arikor, Esq., collins.arikor@gmail.com