The Nigeria’s Whistleblowing Policy: Incentives And Disincentives By; Chioma Okeke

 ABSTRACT.

In the fight against corruption, Nigerian government has
adopted a Whistleblowing Policy (Policy). With the aid of primary
and mainly secondary sources distilled from different libraries,
including e-libraries and the internet, this research explores the
incentives and disincentives associated with the Policy, and
concludes that the disincentives which tend to outweigh the
incentives will potentially discourage potential
whistleblowers. It therefore recommends that
factors which are likely disincentives to whistleblowing, and
possibly a clog to achieving the goal of the Policy be taken into
consideration in the Whistleblowers Protection Bill which has been
passed but yet to be assented to.

Keywords: Corruption, Nigeria, Whistleblowing
Policy.

1.Introduction

Corruption is a trans-historical phenomenon.[1]
It is ubiquitous,[2]  and tends to affect
governments at all level of development.[3]  Nonetheless, while some countries may be
seen to be improving their corruption perception index[4] through enactments of relevant laws and
strategic implementations, some other countries’ indices are on a
steady decline as a result of massive and pervasive public sector
corruption.[5]

Corruption has no universally shared definition,[6] but the definition used by the World Bank is
‘the abuse of public office for private gain’.[7]
However, the definition by the Transparency International (TI) as
‘the misuse of entrusted power for private gain’,[8]
will be adopted because it covers all forms of corrupt practices
regarding public funds irrespective of whether it is in private or
public office, which is the primary focus of this article.

Corruption may take several forms,[9]
including bribery, theft, embezzlement, extortion[10] or   different fraudulent activities
such as bloated government contracts, listing ghost workers,
establishing fake companies etc. Beyond these commonly associated
corrupt activities are also other corrupt activities like
favouritism, nepotism and clientelism.[11]
Morris argues that in describing the forms of corruption, where the
focus is on the corrupt actors, it is best described as political
or administrative corruption[12]and this occurs
where government officials abuse their powers, roles, or resources
found within the public service.[13]

Corruption thrives on factors, generally consisting of a mixture
of attitudes, situations and processes that are better understood
as facilitators.[14] These factors are summarily
divided into bureaucratic factors, political institutional factors,
economic and demographic factors, and geographical and cultural
factors.[15]  For instance, the growth of
international business and trade has created situations for the
payment of bribes, often referred to as commissions. Just as
widespread illiteracy, greed, vast size of population, poor
infrastructure and low salaries may create wrong attitudes for the
value system and ethics which may lead to election malpractices and
lack of intense outcry by the public against corruption.

The effects of corruption are readily apparent in any economy
and polity. They are often severe and include misallocation of
resources, distortion of labour markets and decisions on public
sector projects,[16] thereby inhibiting
investment in the economy,[17] as well as
lowering levels of economic growth and development.[18] Corruption may result in armed
conflict,[19] financial crisis, crime and
poverty, human rights abuses, and prostitution.[20] Curiously, some writers tend to suggest that
corruption has some value in promoting efficiency and even
growth[21] by greasing the process and
removing rigidities imposed by government which may impede
investment or interfere with economic decisions favourable to
growth.[22] For instance, Indonesia and
Thailand are reported as countries growing due to their high levels
of corruption relating to a low degree of uncertainty.[23]

Unfortunately, these seemingly benefits of corruption ‘creates
incentives for more and higher bribes in previously bribe-free
activities.’[24] Moreover, it redirects
‘attention from providing services to the public to maximizing
illicit incomes’.[25] No doubt, corruption is a
problem, which in recognition of this, most international and
non-governmental organisations have stepped up corruption reduction
initiatives. Many national governments are strengthening
institutions, establishing special anti-corruption agencies, and
passing several laws to monitor and punish corrupt
officials.[26] For instance, the notorious
financial scandals of Worldcom and Enron prompted the passing of
the United States (US)’s Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX Act),
which applies to all companies, whether US company or not,
registered with their Security and Exchange Commission.[27] Another important strategy many different
economies are now adopting is the use of whistleblowing programme.
Interestingly, whistleblowers are reported to be key triggers for
successful investigations of corrupt practices,[28] for without an insider information, corruption
often thrive undetected. The next section will explore the concept
of whistleblowing.

2.2- Whistleblowing.

The concept of whistleblowing has long existed,[29] and like corruption, it has no universally
accepted definition.[30] It
originated  in the United States,[31]
and is generally used for any disclosure about unethical or corrupt
acts.[32] That is, an act of someone who,
believing that the public interest overrides other interests he
serves, blows the whistle that someone or an organization is
involved in an illegal, fraudulent, corrupt or harmful
activity.[33]  This alleged misconduct may
be ‘a violation of a regulation, law or direct threat to the public
interest such as health /safety violation, fraud and
corruption.’[34] Whistleblowing procedures
promotes ‘a communications culture and the practical benefit of
facilitating the early rectification of wrongdoing’.[35] Whistleblowing may be differentiated from
other related activities like raising a grievance, making a
complaint or insider trading. Unlike the first two activities, the
whistleblower reports matters that are of public interest rather
than personal concerns,[36] and for an
insider trading, the whistleblower speaks rather than trade the
information.[37]

There are generally two types of whistleblowing: internal and
external.[38] Internal whistleblowing occurs
where the recipient of the report of wrongdoing is the higher
management in the organisation. Whereas, it is external if the
whistleblower irrespective of whoever, decides to go public,[39] and this often occur where no channel of
reporting exists or the whistleblower is not comfortable or
confident to use the internal channel or there has been delays or
lack of response to concerns raised.[40]
Whatever channel the whistleblower decides to take, it is necessary
that the whistleblower is accorded some form of protection.[41] This is  because whistleblowers often
face dangers [42]  such as retaliation
against the whistleblower, in form of loss of job,[43] forced retirement,[44]
and even death.[45] In addition, there is an
ethical dilemma in the act of  whistleblowing.

This dilemma usually arises where a whistleblower who witnesses
infractions against public interest is constrained not to disclose
such wrong doing due to the existence of confidentiality agreements
or policies, or fear of facing disciplinary actions and
retaliations. However, Rachagan and Kuppusamy have rightly opined
that, loyalty cannot imply that the unethical conduct of others,
especially those prejudicial to the safety of the public should not
be reported.[46] Thus, for these anticipated
risks, many conventions on corruption require State parties to
employ all available mechanism to encourage whistleblowers by
discouraging retaliation[47]  and
protecting whistleblowers.[48] Such mechanism
includes a comprehensive and clear legislation,[49] incentives,[50] clear
remedies and sanctions[51] etc.

2.THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA.

Corruption is one of Nigeria’s biggest challenge, and is
reported by analysts to be the cause of poor economic development
in the country.[52] The notoriety probably led
the British former Prime Minister, David Cameron to describe
Nigeria as ‘fantastically corrupt,’[53] and this
also explains the consistent poorly ranking of Nigeria by the TI’s
corruption perception index over many years. For instance, in 2018
Nigeria was placed 148^th on the corruption ranking of
180 countries,[54] with a score of 28%.[55] However, in discussing the problem of
corruption in Nigeria, this section takes a descriptive analysis
and focuses on the various subtle and disturbing forms which
corruption manifest, the multiple causes, the rippling effects, and
the various anti-corruption strategies employed so far by
successive governments.

2.1- Forms of Corruption.

Corruption in Nigeria is systemic,[56]
and as Ukwaba noted that, corruption can be said to be systemic
where ‘major private and individual institutions and processes of
State are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and
groups, and in which, most people have no alternatives in dealing
with the problem’.[57] Corruption seems to have
become official and well instituted in Nigeria[58] being so entrenched in the system that any
person hoping to have any form of business transactions with public
service bureaucracy should, sadly, take that into
consideration.[59]

Corruption has bedevilled even the political sphere featuring
abuses by government officials through bribery, embezzlement, and
other fraudulent activities such as rigging elections, inflation of
government contracts, falsifications of accounts, supply of
substandard goods, foreign exchange hoarding, swindling, and
smuggling etc. In addition, especially manifest in public offices,
are payment of ghost workers, paying heavily to secure government
jobs, spoliation of documents, and diversion of workers’ salaries
and allowances for personal use. It is quite disheartening that one
will have to bribe for virtually every service sought for. For
example, to renew one’s Nigerian passport as a citizen, you need to
bribe one of the officers in charge to prevent your file from being
kept in view ad infinitum.[60] Notwithstanding
the fact that almost every government office has a Service Compact
with All Nigerians (SERVICOM) unit which ought to ensure that
public offices deliver efficient, timely and transparent
services.

Regrettably, key public agencies are inclusive in Nigeria’s
malady. For instance, despite the military’s decried detest for
corruption by the civilian regime, they have been found to be
involved in scandals bordering on arms procurement deals, which
reportedly have weakened every effort to battle Islamist
fundamentalist insurgency of Boko Haran.[61]
The police extort money from the masses on suppose road
check-points,[62] and even aid criminals with
small and light arms. Custom officers confiscate goods for their
usage,[63] and those in the temple of justice
conscientiously pervert justice.[64] Corruption
also manifests in the private sector. For instance, in the banking
sector corporate corruption exists, with all manner of vices
employed to exploit excessive gains. Also, private individuals and
companies aid in laundering the proceeds of corruption. [65]

2.2- Causes of Corruption.

Generally, corruption in Nigeria is caused by a combination of
several factors. Firstly, political offices are viewed as a means
of gaining access to wealth. Thus, unpopular candidates get rigged
into various offices by their god-fathers, against the will of the
masses.[66] Again, costly election
campaigns[67] which surpasses the normal sources
of funding impel successful candidate, upon assuming office to
recoup their election expenses. Hence, the award of bloated
contracts to close allies and family members, and engaging in all
manner of corrupt activities out of their desperate need to amass
funds to rig more elections. These election malpractices and lack
of due processes in public offices are made possible due to weak
government institutions, electoral commissions, and law enforcement
mechanism.

Another major cause of corruption is the love for easy wealth
while losing appetite for hard work. Many Nigerians seem to live
above their legitimate income, without any clear explanation for
all the luxurious mansions and expensive luxury cars they own.
Unfortunately, in Nigeria, conspicuous consumption and flamboyant
affluence are one of the indices for good life, and this has led
many Nigerians into dubious activities including ritual murder,
kidnapping, armed robbery, theft, and all manner of trafficking.
For instance, the notorious case of Clement Duru (alias Otokoto)
who owned and used his hotel to kill and sell human parts of some
of the travellers that lodged in the hotel.[68]
Also recently, billionaire kidnapper, Chukwudi Onwuamadi (alias
Evans), who was reported to have kidnapped over 200 victims with
ransom paid in foreign currency was arrested by the Nigerian
police.[69] Sadly, many Nigerians are now
preoccupied with how to share in the so-called national cake,
abandoning agriculture, the former mainstay of the country’s
economy.

Again, lack of ethical standards in private and public sectors
have increased corrupt activities. Many officeholders, including
other employees do not have a clear conception of the ethical
demands of their position. Those who are appointed to fight
corruption are also found as culprits in the very problem they are
fighting. For instance, the former Chairman of the EFCC, Ibrahim
Larmode was accused of diverting proceeds recovered by the agency
to his personal use.[70] There are also
reports of State Governors opening numerous accounts with different
names with the aim of siphoning money.[71]
Again, the lukewarm attitude on the part of those who are to
enforce the laws of the land has also led many to engage in corrupt
activities believing that they would get away with it. For
instance, the many revelations of embezzlements of public funds by
panels of inquiry set up by different administrations are still
actively covered up. Till today, nothing was done concerning the
Pius Okigbo’s panel of inquiry’s revelations that 12. 4 billion
dollars of Nigeria’s revenue from crude petroleum was diverted into
accounts owed by the former military President, General
Babangida.[72]

Finally, institutional, and cultural factors like nepotism,
ethnicity and favouritism have also fuelled corruption.[73] In Nigeria, allegiance to ethnic interests is
often considered more important to national interest,[74]  and this reduces fair representation and
accountability in policy making. Thus, activities like appointments
and recruitments which should respect the federal character
principle are often compromised due to these factors. Other causes
of corruption include unemployment, poor reward system, greed, poor
education and illiteracy, poverty, and indirect acceptance by the
populace by honouring individuals who were associated with crimes
or even convicted, with titles and awards.  Indeed, ‘Thieves
are owned in Nigeria.’[75]  A good
example is a former Governor of Delta State, Nigeria, James Ibori,
who was accused and convicted of corruption in the UK.[76] Upon serving his jail term in the UK, he
returned to Nigeria to a rousing and hero’s welcome by his
kinsmen.[77] It is imperative to note that a
Nigerian court has earlier acquitted him of corruption
charges.[78] This sends the wrong signals to
the public and may play a large role in the public perception of
corruption.

2.3- Cumulative Consequences of Corruption.

The effects of corruption in Nigeria can never be
overemphasised. It causes diversion of public resources and
distorted priorities of public policies.[79]
Government divert public expenditure from sectors that really need
it to projects where kickbacks will be readily available for public
officials. Corruption perpetuates political, economic, and social
inequality as the poor often pay portion of their income as bribes
and this aggravates mass poverty leading to retarded economic
growth.[80] Moyosore observed that, ‘the
misappropriation and mismanagement of public resources by
successive regimes, has rendered millions of Nigerians poor,
unemployed and uneducated.’[81]Commenting on
the effects of corruption in Nigeria, Ejikeme stated that ‘the
menace of corruption leads to slow movement of files in offices,
police extortion, tollgates on highways, port congestion, queues at
passport offices and petrol stations, ghost workers syndrome,
election irregularities among others’.[82]

Indeed, the effect of corruption particularly in the public
service has been pernicious, and has caused bad image for the
public sector. It has resulted in delays and reduced quality of
public service, as many government workers wait to be tipped
(bribed) before providing services. Consequently, this has
increased bureaucracy and has made dealing with the government very
unattractive. Corruption impacts negatively on human rights of
citizens, and the effective mobilisation and management of
resources as many Nigerians who feel frustrated with the system
tend to leave the country for greener pastures. Again, corruption
has caused low investment by discouraging many foreign investments
and donors, and for those who risk investing, they are faced with
unpredictable government policies.

The ruling class cabals have taught a disheartening lesson to
the public, that being law abiding and honest does not pay because
crime culprits walk away without being punished. Hence, those who
have learnt this lesson replicate these corrupt practices at their
lowly levels in the form of petty acts of peculation, bribery, and
embezzlement of public funds.[83] Resources
earmarked for building and maintaining public institutions are
diverted to private use or substandard services provided. Thereby
subverting these institutions and making them less efficient or
even completely handicapped in carrying out assigned tasks. These
in turn endangers the lives and properties of citizens whom these
public institutions are meant to serve. Most government schools and
hospitals lack facilities, and this explains why thousands of
Nigerians travel abroad every year for study and medical treatment
respectively. Ironically, Nigerian who illegally divert these funds
rarely patronise hospitals in Nigeria. Hence, it is not surprising
that most of our leaders rush to the foreign land for the slightest
medical issues.

Further, corruption is responsible for many deaths and causing
many people so much pain as money meant for the provisions of
social amenities and other developments are diverted for private
use. The government owe workers several months arrears of
salary,[84] and this has resulted in incessant
strike actions in government parastatals and ministries and higher
institution of learning, with many undergraduates waiting extra
years to graduate.

Again, corruption lowers the quality of standards of compliance
with environmental, construction, and other regulations. This
offers reasons for the spates of buildings collapse in
Nigeria.[85] On 12 September 2014, a building
belonging to Prophet T Joshua collapsed killing about 115
worshippers.[86] Preliminary enquiries
showed that there was no strict compliance with construction
standards and earlier approval from the relevant authority.[87] The same fate was suffered by a church,
Reigners Bible Church, in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria, on 10 December
2016 where about 27 worshippers lost their lives and many more such
cases which most times are covered up by the government officials
themselves to protect the owners of the collapsed buildings.[88] Also, in November 2018, seven-storey building
reportedly collapsed in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, leaving many
dead and many injured.[89]

 2.4- War Against Corruption in
Nigeria.

Many strategies have been adopted to curb corruption and to
reform national and individual ethics and values. For example, the
General Obasanjo’s Jaji declaration aimed at taking on a new spirit
of service,[90] President Shehu Shagari’s
ethical revolution in 1981,[91] General
Buhari’s War Against Indiscipline and Corruption in 1985,[92]General Babangida’s national reorientation
programmes and late President Yar’adua’s Due Process Policy.[93] Under the President Jonathan’s government, a
Special Adviser on National ethics and value was appointed, and the
slogan ‘good people, great nation’ was launched.[94] Subsequently, specialised anti- corruption
agencies have been established and anti-corruption laws passed.
Above all, the Nigerian Constitution and most of the professional
and institutional regulatory bodies recognise the place and role of
ethics in our national and individual lives.[95]
Despite all these noble strides, corruption has reportedly remained
ever increasing in Nigeria,[96] and seems to
have ‘defiled all solutions’.[97]

Happily, though, a new wave of hope came with the coming into
power of the present Nigerian government led by President Muhammadu
Buhari who made fighting corruption the main thrust of his
administration. Curiously, the four times President Buhari
contested for the office of the president, he promised Nigerians
that he will tackle corruption if elected. True to his words, on
assumption of office, he launched the ‘change begins with me’
campaign.[98] The essence was to emphasize the
place of the Nigerian citizens in addressing the state of decadence
in the society and accordingly, enthroning the positive change the
country craves. The President also placed anti-corruption war as
his topmost priority, and this earned him applause and pledges of
support from different foreign government like the US and the
UK.[99] Although the Buhari’s
led-administration has been accused and criticised for a selective
war against corruption,[100]^[1]
his government has insisted on their commitment to fighting
corruption. Thus, in the later part of 2016, the Federal Executive
Council announced the adoption of the Whistle blowing Policy. The
next section focuses on the Policy, its purpose, application, and
incentives.

3.NIGERIA’S WHISTLEBLOWING POLICY (Policy).

The Policy is a 5-page document which regulates whistleblowing
in corruption cases in Nigeria. It outlines the nature of
information involved, avenues of reporting, incentives, aims and
objectives of the Policy, and it is found on the Federal Ministry
of Finance (FMF)’s website.[101]^[2]
This section will explain the purpose and the scope of the Policy,
and then explore available incentives to whistleblowing in
Nigeria.

3.1- Purpose and Application of the Policy.

This policy is designed to encourage members of the public to
support the fight against corruption by exposing financial or
finance related crimes, to improve confidence, transparency, and
accountability in both private and public activities.[102] It aims to improve Nigeria’s open
government ranking and ease of doing business indicators, and the
recovery of public funds that can be deployed to finance Nigeria’s
infrastructure.[103] The policy does
not have restrictions regarding the organisations targeted or does
it exclude certain persons from both protection and incentives as
long as the whistleblower meets the conditions set out under the
Policy. For instance, the whistleblowing must disclose one or such
several categories of wrongdoing covered by the Policy. These
categories are information relating to management of public funds &
assets, financial malpractices, solicitation of bribes, diversion
of revenues, fraudulent and unapproved payments, splitting of
contracts, and all forms of corruption.[104] However, private matters concerning
private contracts or agreements are excluded. [105]^[3][4][5][6]

3.2- Incentives for Potential
Whistleblowers.

3.2.1- Opportunity to Make a Positive
Change

The Policy offers opportunity to any Nigerian who understands
the numerous advantages of a corrupt-free society, as it aims to
team with well-meaning Nigerians in the fight against corruption.
At times, people may desire to expose illegal activities but find
it difficult to, due to situations they find themselves. They may
be faced with an unappealing circumstance of either covering an
illegal act and potentially harming the public,[106]^[7]   or expose
the illegal act and face the fear of rejection based on betrayal.
However, for whatever reason, they may find themselves more tilted
towards exposing the wrong but feel safer to secretly disclose it.
Luckily, the Policy affords such persons, safe channels of
reporting illegal activities and serving as agents of changing the
current state of moral decadence in the society. This way, a
whistleblower gets the satisfaction of helping to check losses,
save lives, avert harm, and ultimately safeguard the rule of
law.[107]^[8]
In addition, they have a sense of achievement on remedying a
negative course of event and promoting a safer society and the
public good.

Further, where whistleblowers utilise this opportunity of
creating change by disclosing illegal activities, they expect the
government to take appropriate follow-up actions, including
prosecuting and convicting offenders. Thus, where the government
responds appropriately, it increases the faith of the citizen in
the government, thereby encouraging more whistlebowers who desire
to make it right to come forward. Although it may be argued that
many Nigerians are ambivalent about corruption and its many
problems in the country; many have unequivocally condemned it.
Hence, the high utilisation of the channel of reporting provided
under the Policy which the FMF claimed to have received over 2000
communications and over 300 tips from many patriotic Nigerians, and
these have led to the recovery of substantial public assets that
were illegally acquired.[108]^[9]

 

3.2.2- Anti-Retaliation Provisions.

The FMF or other regulatory authorities conducts investigations
as to the veracity of the information disclosed against any
person(s) based on the information forwarded by the whistleblower.
The nature of such enquiries may uncover or hint at the identity of
the whistleblower, thereby exposing the whistleblower to
retaliations. For these reasons, both the UNCAC[109] and the AUCPCC,[110] encourage State Parties to
incorporate appropriate legal protection for whistleblowers.[111] Now, regardless of whether concerns
raised by the whistleblower is upheld against any party, once the
disclosure was made in good faith and in public interest, if the
whistleblower suffered adverse treatment in form of harassment,
victimisation, or intimidation, he or she may file a formal
complaint to the relevant authority stating all relevant
details.[112]^{[10][11][12][13]}

The Policy places the burden of disproving retaliation for the
disclosure by the whistleblower on the perpetrator.[113] Thus, once a  whistleblower
establishes a prima facie case of suffering adverse treatment, the
FMF may carry out further investigations, institute disciplinary
action against the perpetrator, and make restitution to the
whistleblower for any loss suffered.[114]  The nature of the restitution
is unclear as restitution generally connotes that the whistleblower
will be restored to status quo ante. That notwithstanding, Rapp has
expressed optimism that an appropriate sanction levied against
perpetrators will deter reprisals, compensate whistleblowers and
increase effective whistleblowing,[115]^[14][15][16]

3.2.3- Channel of Reporting.

The channel of reporting a wrong as argued by Morberly may be
more important than the anti-retaliation provision.[116]^[17] The FMF has dedicated a
secured online portal through which disclosure can be made and
status of the report checked. The online portal is opened to
internal stakeholders, inter-government stakeholders, institutional
stakeholders, and any person with relevant information.[117]^[18] Thus, potential
whistleblowers with any documentary evidence or information within
the contemplation of the Policy, with specific facts such as who is
involved, dates and what occurred, could lodge an entry on the
portal.[118]^[19] Upon receipt,
information provided will be analysed and decision made
on whether to open an investigation on the matter.[119]^[20] The Policy did not
state what happens after investigations are conducted, but a
concerted reading of the Policy seems to suggest that
investigations which discloses cause of action or prima facies case
against the perpetrator will be pursued.

Under the Policy, concerns may be made openly, confidentially,
or anonymously.[120]^[21] Most potential
whistleblowers may be attracted to anonymous reporting because of
the very high personal cost they may face for whistleblowing, and
the reluctance to sacrifice a steady income over an abstraction
like the interest of the public. Again, with recent incidences of
kidnapping and assassination in the country,[121]^[22] most whistleblowers
will opt for anonymity, or probably go for confidential
whistleblowing, only to ensure their proper details are kept for
their financial rewards. Anonymous reporting has the advantage of
causing people to focus on the merits of the message that is being
conveyed rather than the possible motives of the discloser.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that raising issues openly or
confidentially makes the assessment, understanding and
investigation of the issue easier, and the whistleblower better
protected.[122]^[23] Again, that, anonymity
tend to reduce the credibility of the whistleblower, making it
unfair to the perpetrator, who is denied the identity of those who
accuse him and the opportunity to answer them. [123]^[24] However, whichever
argument is adopted, it is only reasonable that reporting
anonymously should be preferred rather than remaining silent.

3.2.4- Financial Incentives.

Like the US’s Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act),[124] the Policy promises the
whistleblower who has met all requirements a reward of between 2.5
and 5 percent of any voluntarily returned funds.[125] This financial reward is essentially
to encourage the attitude of disclosing illegal activities, and
considering the high levels of extreme poverty in Nigeria, this
financial reward seems the most appealing part of the Policy.
Interestingly, some Nigerians may have embraced the act of
whistleblowing as an alternative source of income.  This is
likely as the Nigerian government claimed recently that the
provision of incentives for whistleblower’s divulgement of vital
information has been effective in countering fraud and easing the
restoration of millions to government Treasury.[126]^[25][26][27]

On the contrary, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) posit that financial
incentives do not necessarily encourage whistleblowing.[127]^[28] In fact, that it rather
undermines the effective internal whistleblowing mechanisms,[128]^[29] and leads to unethical
behaviour like malicious reporting, entrapment etc.[129]^[30] They argue that
financial incentives may be wrongly perceived by the public as
paying a person for fulfilling a public duty, and even tend to
prevent the report of petty crimes when a financially motived
whistleblower believes that the reward might be little. Again, that
financial incentives potentially attract complex and costly
government structures,[130]^[31] and merely increases
the quantity and not the quality of information received by
relevant authorities. In other words, financial incentives reduce
the level of caution that would have been exercised by potential
whistleblowers and create more opportunity for unverified
information, and this potentially redirects the primary focus of
patriotism to personal aggrandisement. Fortunately, this situation
may not arise or may be curtailed, as a whistleblower who makes
false or malicious disclosure may face prosecution unless the
whistleblower reasonably believes, as at the time of disclosing the
information, that he believed same to be true and made in public
spirit and good faith.[131]^[32] Having laid out the
different incentives to the Policy, the next section will explore
possible disincentives to the Policy.

4.DISINCENTIVES TO WHISTLEBLOWING IN
NIGERIA.

Generally, it is often emotionally, professionally, and
otherwise, difficult to blow the whistle on ‘one’s employer,
colleagues, or friends’.[132]^[33] Whistleblowing is a
venture fraught with risks and dangers, with severe possible
threats to safety, especially in Nigeria ‘where corruption is
deeply entrenched and impunity has been the norm’.[133]^[34] Whistleblowers, like
anti-corruption activists and journalists face threats and risks of
being kidnapped or assassinated for exposing corruption.[134]^[35] Thus, notwithstanding
the incentives above, there are several counterincentives that can
discourage potential whistleblowers. The following section explores
and interrogates possible disincentives to the achievement of the
aims and objectives of the Policy.

4.1- Ethical Issues.

Several ethical questions may be of concern to potential
whistleblowers. Firstly, the Policy is silent as to what happens
where the FMF fails or refuses to pay the percentage of reward
promised. It is not clear the mechanisms put in place to compel the
government to pay the reward due in the unfortunate event that the
government refuses or fails to pay. Obviously, the Policy does not
envisage such situations or probably it just expects Nigerians to
believe and trust the government. Even with the recent payment of
first sets of whistleblowers by the FMF,[135]^[36] many Nigerians may
still be sceptical about its continuity.[136]^[37] This is due to the
several unfulfilled promises of providing basic amenities,
compromising public security in complete disregard to lives and
properties, and arbitrarily diverting public funds not minding the
abject state of poverty most of its citizens find themselves. Many
Nigerians may likely be discouraged to blow the whistle based on
these precedents and reluctant to start exploring means of getting
their reward.

Secondly, most, if not every government that came into power in
Nigerian has displayed utmost disregard for predecessor’s policies
and guidelines. Successive Nigerian governments seem to have a
problem with continuity. Each government finds pleasure in
discrediting predecessors, and this has accounted for millions of
abandoned multi trillion-dollar projects which would have
benefitted the masses.[137]^[38] Many Nigerian roads,
electricity projects, steel industries, dams, markets, schools
awarded to contractors for either constructions or rehabilitation
are abandoned, and the same contracts awarded, are re-awarded by
the next government. No one seems to have explanation as to what
happened to the already approved and disbursed project funds.

Further, the use of information disclosed may be a concern to
whistleblowers. Some potential whistleblowers may not be
forthcoming because of the very low probability of perpetrators
being punished or the funds recovered being properly utilised. Many
have raised concern about the government’s speedy prosecution of
some few targeted persons while wearying out Nigerians with
protracted investigations of government allies. Again,
whistleblowers may also be sceptical to whistleblow where there are
no means of ensuring that information given are not suppressed or
used to the private benefit of the government officials collating
the information. Also, with the high rate of corruption and very
low ethical culture in the country, it is not unlikely that
anti-corruption officials may compromise the identity of
whistleblowers, especially with allegations of corruption against
some of the heads of such anti-corruption agencies.[138]^[39]

4.2- Legal Issues.

A government policy, such as the Policy outlines what a
government ministry hopes to achieve and the principles and methods
it will use in achieving them.[139]^[40]  Unlike a law
which often require two-third majority of members of a legislative
body to repeal,[140]^[41] a policy can be
reversed by mere statement of any administration. Where there is an
infraction of the law, those responsible for breaking them can be
prosecuted in court, but what happens where a policy is broken?
Unfortunately, a policy lacks statutory backing, and this raises
several concerns. There is no law to define the framework of the
Policy and to address other pertinent issues like the right of a
person whose property was raided and destroyed based on false
information advanced by a whistleblower who reasonably believed the
information to be true.

Again, where the government fails to pay the reward as envisaged
under ethical issues, does this failure vest in a whistleblower a
right to claim the reward, or claim redress in the event of any
victimisation? It may be argued that a whistleblower may sue
because a unilateral contract is created once the whistleblower
fulfils his or her own part by providing information used in the
recovery of looted fund.[141]  In FGN v
Zebra Energy Ltd, Mohammed SCJ held that, ‘Unilateral contract is
accepted on commencement of performance, even though completion of
performance is a condition precedent to the offeror’s liability to
perform his promise’.[142]^[42][43]

Interestingly, the FMF recently amended the Policy, and
introduced a formal legal agreement between whistleblowers and the
Federal Government, which is executed by the Attorney General of
Federation (Minister of Justice).[143] This automatically creates a
contract between a whistleblower and the federal government, but
not a third party based on the doctrine of privity of
contract.[144] Again, in
Max-Clean Becal Ventures ltd v Abuja Environmental Protection
Board,[145] the CA reiterated that, ‘Parties are
bound by their agreement.’ These cases thus show that a
whistleblower can claim incentives offered by the Policy.
Additionally, the reliability of the evidence of a whistleblower by
the court of law may also be doubtful in view of the financial gain
the whistleblower stands to gain. This may affect the probative
value of such evidence.[146]^{[44][45][46][47]}

4.3- Personal Losses and Liability.

Even with the anti-retaliation provision in the Policy providing
for a restitutionary relief, a whistleblower who exposes illegal
activities, especially major fraud may suffer personal losses,
including dismissal from work. Like the case of the former CBN
Governor,[147] a director with
the Directorate of Technical Cooperation in Africa (DTCA), was
dismissed by the Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs for
reporting fraud within the directorate.[148]  Commendably though, the
federal government of Nigeria has been making efforts in
reinstating whistleblowers who have suffered dismissal, especially
in government offices. For instance, Mr Thompson, an assistant
director in one of the federal government parastatals who was
sacked for exposing fraud was recently recalled by the
government.[149]^[48][49][50]

Further, the fear of being ostracised from social groups may
discourage whistleblowing. Ostracism may range from giving the
whistleblower cold shoulders to full blown rejection, and this can
pose a psychological challenge to the whistleblower. Whistleblowers
may also suffer blacklisting in form of negative employment
references, and may be concerned as to violations of any fiduciary
duties or confidential contractual agreements with the employer.
This does not seem to pose a problem if the information disclosed
falls within the categories envisaged under the Policy. It is
unlikely that the court will award damages against a whistleblower
who discloses fraud.

4.4- Financial Reward.

Although the Policy has somewhat provided adequate financial
reward for potential whistleblowers, the conditions a whistleblower
must fulfil before qualifying for the reward seems stringent.
Firstly, the whistleblower must provide the government with
information it does not already have and could not have obtained
from any other publicly available source.[150]^[51] The actual recovery of
illegal funds must also be based on the information the
whistleblower discloses.[151]^[52] In other words,
financial reward is dependent on the importance of the information
advanced to the investigation leading to the recovery of funds. Who
then determines the relevancy of the information, or put in another
way, what remedy is open to a whistleblower who believes that he
has offered a vital information which the relevant government
agency considers as inadequate. Again, the phrase, ‘any other
publicly available source to the government’ could discourage
potential whistleblowers who may believe that the information they
are about to disclose may already be available to the
government.

Importantly, unlike in the US, where the actual amount of a
whistleblower’s award is ascertainable,[152]^[53] and the decisions of
the regulatory authority is made subject to judicial review,[153]^[54] the Policy’s financial
reward is unclear. It merely states the reward to be between 2.5
and 5 percent, and these financial incentives are paid at the
discretion of the FMF. There is neither certainty of amount due to
the whistleblower nor any judicial review of the FMF’s decisions,
and uncertainty may create room for abuse by the relevant
government agency. Again, since the financial reward is paid from
voluntarily returned funds, this means that a whistleblower will
not receive a reward out of funds forfeited to the government after
a conviction. This will likely discourage some potential
whistleblowers.

4.5- Anonymity and Protection from
Victimisation.

A whistleblower that is unsure how his or her identity will
remain confidential within the regulatory or investigating
authority, or does not have the assurance of remaining anonymous
may be reluctant to whistleblow. Thus, apart from the identity
being compromised, the checks in place to ensure the security of
information fed into the whistleblowing portal may be a concern for
a potential whistleblower, particularly with the absolute incessant
attempts by internet hackers. In 2015, there were reports that
several Philippine government websites were subjected to all forms
of cyberattacks following the release of a ruling on an arbitration
case filed by Philippines against China.[154]^[55] This shows that the FMF
portal for whistleblowers can be target of hacking by perpetrators.
However, with the recent introduction of some procedures by the FMF
to protect the identity of whistleblowers, especially during
payment process as Ujah claimed.[155]^[56] it is hoped that the
security of the portal will be ensured.

Ironically, a whistleblower who is denied reward or has his
reward unduly delayed may be faced with a dilemma. Such
whistleblower would be reluctant to pursue his case in the law
court against the government for reasons of confidentiality since
doing so would expose his identity. This grim situation is no less
different where the whistleblower decides to escalate the
non-compliance through other means such as the media; the anonymous
nature of the stealth transaction will still be compromised or
threatened, ultimately exposing the whistleblower to an even higher
risk of possible retaliation. Further, instances where a court
order may require a disclosure of certain information which
discloses or hint at the whistleblower’s identity may not augur
well with a whistleblower. However, this may not be a justified
concern because, ideally a court of law should take full
consideration of all issues pending before it before granting such
an order.

Furthermore, it is not certain how whistleblowers who may face
victimisation leading to dismissal in private organisations will
fit into the anti-victimisation plan. It tends to be easier for the
government to mandate the reinstatement of a government employee,
but one wonders if such power can be exercised in respect to
private organisations. The government will unlikely force an
employee on an unwilling employer, and even when the private
organisation decides to reinstate a whistleblower who was dismissed
from work, the new work environment may not be conducive again for
the employee. Also, potential whistleblowers might discount
anti-retaliation protection based on the difficulty in proving
subtle forms of retaliation and the low probability of having a
successful anti-retaliation claim.[156]^[57]

4.6- Data Protection Issues.

The Data Protection principles are important in the use of
whistleblowing procedures as they may impinge upon whistleblowing
policies and procedures[157]^[58] because whistleblowing
schemes mainly involve the disclosure, collection, registration,
storage, or destruction of data related to an identifiable
person.[158]^[59] Apart from section 37
of the Nigerian Constitution, which guarantees the ‘privacy of
citizens, their homes, correspondence, and telegraphic
communications’ there is no comprehensive data protection law in
Nigeria.[159]^[60] However, there are a
few ‘industry-specific and targeted laws and regulations’ providing
additional privacy related protections.[160]^[61] The most prominent is
the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA)
Guidelines which prescribes the ‘minimum data protection
requirements for the collection, storage, processing, management,
operation, and technical controls for information.’[161]^[62] Others are the Nigerian
Communications Commission Regulations(NCCR),[162]^[63] Child Rights Act 2003
(CRA),[163]^[64] Freedom of Information
Act 2011 (FOI)[164]^[65] etc.

Thus, as whistleblowing procedures rely on the processing of
personal data, it follows, according to Abdulrauf and Fombad
that:

[P]ersonal data must be processed fairly and lawfully; they must
be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate reasons and not
be used for incompatible purposes. Additionally, the processed data
must be relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected and/or further processed… Whatever the
scope of the whistleblowing procedure, the personal data processed
must be limited to that which is strictly and objectively necessary
to verify the allegations made. It is also recommended that
complaint reports should be kept separate from other personal
data.[165]^[66]

Since most Whistleblowers’ Laws provides immunity from liability
if the disclosure is based on the reasonable belief that the
information is true,[166] it has been
argued that the alleged perpetrator should enjoy the same rights in
relation to the processing of personal data.[167]^[67][68]

5.RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. There is need to adopt a proactive and preventive measure
   targeted at enhancing public engagement and transparency,
   establishing standards, and reducing opportunities for corrupt
   practices in high prone activities such as public procurement and
   the judiciary.[168]^[69]
2. With the current state of Nigeria’s polity, Nigerians must
   introduce hygiene in their polity, [169]^[70]with election campaigns
   financed with clean money, and only men and women of integrity
   elected in public offices. Again, Nigerians must interrogate their
   ethical education curriculum, and openly condemn those unethical
   conducts that have been condoned privately or publicly. Thus, the
   three organs of government, including all well-meaning Nigerians
   should support and be part of the fight against corruption. The
   legislators must make up-to-date laws, the executive must ensure
   their effective & efficient implementations and sustainability, the
   judiciary must dispense justice without fear or favour. There must
   be zero tolerance for any form of corruption from the top
   government officials to the lowest level public officers.
3. The federal government should as much as possible employ
   mechanisms that will mitigate the risks faced by whistleblowers,
   and also ensure all risks are balanced with adequate incentives
   especially, in respect to their financial rewards, compensations
   for losses, protection, and confidence in successful investigations
   and prosecutions.
4. As was noted earlier, the Policy is a scanty document with many
   issues left unaddressed or ambiguous. The Policy document should be
   made more comprehensive, user friendly especially in Nigeria where
   there is high rate of illiteracy, be circulated among all
   government offices.
5. This government must ensure the sustenance and continuity of
   the effective implementation of the Policy. However, there is no
   better way of ensuring this than having a Whistleblowing Act. This
   Act will address most issues raised as disincentives to the Policy.
   The need for a legal framework can never be over-emphasized. A
   country’s legal system plays a key role in creating necessary
   awareness by authoritatively articulating undesirable behaviours or
   conducts, with their consequential penalties. Thus, while the
   Policy is for the interim and serving a useful purpose, there is
   need for the Bill to be assented to.

CONCLUSION

The success of the fight against corruption in Nigeria should be
the concerted efforts of both the Nigerian citizens and the
government, and this is the basis for the Policy – a people
oriented policy. This work has thus examined the use of
whistleblowing as an anti-corruption tool in Nigeria.  It
explained what corruption is, and then explored the whistleblowing,
a concept which is often not viewed positively by
organizations,[170]^[71] notwithstanding its key
role in fraud detection. Emerging from this general explanation,
the work went further to dwell more specifically on the problems of
corruption in Nigeria. These problems were discussed in terms of
its forms, causes and effects in Nigeria, and possible reasons why
they persist even with various anti-corruption wars provided. The
discussions on the Policy disclosed various incentives and
disincentives to whistleblowing in Nigeria.

The accessibility of relevant information on the Policy was
restrictive, and mostly sourced from unpublished works, but
tremendous efforts were employed to harness as much information to
produce a comprehensive writing on the topic. The scholarly
materials reviewed in the discussions reveal how corruption has
become a global problem which affects every country,[171] howbeit in different ways. Thus,
whereas the corruption level of some countries is at its barest
minimum, Nigeria’s corruption is found outrageously high. However,
the introduction of the Policy is apposite and brings much hope of
change. A culture which promotes whistleblowing can prove
beneficial to every citizen and the society at large,[172] and the importance of whistleblowing
is exemplified in a country like the US, where employees must now
sign oaths that they will report wrongdoing to the appropriate
authority thus requiring them to blow the whistle when
necessary.[173]^[72][73][74]

Although the Policy is still in its early days in Nigeria, it
has shown to be promising and the government seems to be putting
much efforts in achieving significant successes. This study
therefore, offers a comprehensive formal document on the Policy,
and provides grounds for further research and re-evaluation of the
Policy. It has discussed serious issues, if well considered by the
relevant government agency will not only aid in the achievement of
the aims and objectives of the Policy, but also add necessary
reforms to the Whistleblowing Protection Bill. Finally, it is hoped
that the Policy will resuscitate the dying culture of openness,
integrity, and uprightness amongst public officers while at the
same time balk at victimization, intimidation, and harassment of
those who call these erring officers to account, provided these are
done in good faith.

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] M Ugur and N Dasgupta, ‘Systematic Review:
Evidence on the Economic Growth Impacts of Corruption in Low-Income
Countries and Beyond’ (Evidence for Policy and Practice Information
and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI- Centre), August 2011) 3 <http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/^[75]> accessed 28 June
2017.

 

[2] B Ogungbamila, ‘Whistleblowing and
Anti-Corruption Crusade: Evidence from Nigeria’ (2014)10 (4)
Canadian Social Science 145.

[3] O Jacob, ‘The Effect of Corruption on Development in
Nigeria’ (2013) 15(6) International Organisation of Scientific
Research (IOSR) Journal of Humanities and Social Science 39.

[4] Corruption perception index was first launched in 1995 by
Transparency International, and it shows the perceived levels of
corruption, as determined by opinions surveys and expert
assessments. See ‘Corruption Perception Index: Overview’
(Transparency international, 2016))
<www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview> accessed 16
August 2017.

[5] H Ellyatt, ‘These are Most Corrupt Countries in the World’
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25 January 2017)  < www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/global-corruption-worsens-2016-last-year-autocratic-leaders-populism-egs-of-dodge-leaders-and-a7544651.html^[76]> accessed 31 July
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[6] V Tanzi, ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences,
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[7] J Balboa and E Medalla, ‘Anti-Corruption and Governance: The
Philippine Experience’ (Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
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2017.

[8] S Kimeu, ‘Corruption as a Challenge to Global
Ethics: The Role of Transparency International’ (2014) 10(2)
Journal of Global Ethics 231.

[9] N Groenendijk, ‘A Principal-Agent Model of Corruption’
(1997) 27(3/4) Crime, Law and Social Change 208.

[10] J Omenka, ‘The Effect of Corruption on Development in
Nigeria’ (2013) 15(6) International Organisation of Scientific
Research (IOSR) Journal of Humanities and Social Science 41.

[11] M Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and
Democracy (CUP 2005) 18.

 

[12] S Morris, ‘Introduction: Forms of
Corruption’ (2011) 9(2) Peer Reviewed Journal 10.

[13] Johnston (n 11).

[14] A Mills, ‘Causes of Corruption in Public Sector and Its
impact on Development’ (UN, 25 May 2012) 7 <http://unpan1.un.
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accessed 31 July 2017.

[15] T Aidt, ‘The Causes of Corruption’ (2011) 9(2) Information
and Forschung (Research) (Ifo) Institute for Economic Research
17.

 

[16] W Darity, ‘Corruption’ International
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (2nd edn, 2008)
<www.hbanaszak.mjr. uw.edu.pl/ Tem
pTxt/Gale_2007_InternationalEncyclopediaOfTheSocialSciences_Abortion_-_Cognitive_Dissonance.pdf>
accessed 28 June 2017.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

 

[17]ibid.

 

[18] ‘Governance and Corruption’ (World
Bank Group, 2001) <www. worldbank.org/wbi/governance>
accessed 1 August 2017.

 

[19] P Billon, ‘Buying Peace or fuelling
War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts’ (2003) 15(4)
Journal of International Development 413.

 

[20]  F Raheemson, ‘Corruption and
Conflict: A Phenomenological Study of the Experiences of Nigerian
Citizens’ (DPhil Thesis, Nova Southeastern University 2016) 1
citation omitted.

 

[21] P Meon and K Sekkat, ‘Does Corruption
Grease or Sand the wheels of Growth?’ [2005] 122 Public Choice
70.

[22] Tanzi (n 6) 25.

[23] Tanzi (n 6) 22.

 

[24] Darity (n 16).

 

[24] R Goel and M Nelson ‘Causes of Corruption: History,
geography and Government’ [2010] 32 Journal of Policy Modelling
445.

[25] ‘Corruption’ International Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences (2008) <http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/whic/ReferenceDetailsPage/
DocumentToolsPortletWindow?displayGroupName=Reference&jsid=1a07c47042f9772aa1f2250377ebaf0f&action=2&catId=&documentId=GALE%7CCX3045300467&u=fl_marionlibserv&zid=a3c58d1ead3de42c3dbf70aa5749c5a2^[77]> accessed 28 June
2017.

 

[26]Darity (n 16).

[27] D Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing and Data Protection Principles: Is
the Road to Reconciliation Really that Rocky?’ (2011) 2(1) European
Journal of Law and Technology 2.

[28] ‘Whistleblower Protection and the UN Convention Against
Corruption (Transparency international, 2013) 2 <www.transparency.o
rg/whatwedo/publication/whistleblower_protection_and_the_un_convention_against_corruption^[78]> accessed 1 August
2017.

 

[29] G Myron, The Whistleblowers:
Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry (NY Basic Books
1989) 1.

[30] S Taiwo, ‘Effects of Whistle Blowing Practices on
Organizational Performance in the Nigerian Public’ (2015) 6 (1)
Journal of Marketing and Management 45.

 

[31] S Pemberton and others,
‘Whistleblowing, Organisational Harm and the Self-regulating
Organisation’(2012) 40(2) Policy
& Politics^[79] 263.

 

[32]  J Near and M Miceli,
‘Organizational dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing’
[1985] 4 Journal of Business Ethics 4.

 

[33] R Nader and others, ‘Whistle blowing’
in N Rongine (ed), Toward a coherent legal response to the Public
Policy Dilemma Posed by Whistle Blowing’ (1972) 23(2) American
Business Journal 28; M Khan, ‘Auditors and the Whistleblowing Law’
(Accountants Today, April 2009) 13 <www.researchgate.
net/profile/Rashid _Ameer
publication/256036409_Role_Typology_in_Corporate _Gove
rnance_Buddies _Bullies_and_ More/
links/0a85e52ec619dabbd6000000/Role-Typology-in-Corporate-Governance-Buddies-Bullies-and-More.pdf
> accessed 2 August 2017.

 

[34] N Hannigan, ‘Blowing the whistle on
health care fraud; should I?’ (2006) 18((11) Journal of American
Academy of Nurse Practitioners 512.

[35] Lewis (n 27) 10.

 

[36] ‘Whistleblowing Guidance’
(Office of Gas and Electricity Markets(OFGEM) Research and
Information Centre, 2013) 4
<www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/91022/externalwhistle
blowing guidance-28-10-14policyformat-pdf > accessed 2 August
2017.

[37] J Macey, ‘Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider trading’ [2007] Michigan Law
review 1912.

 

[38] J Zhang and others, ‘Decision-Making
Process of Internal Whistleblowing Behaviour in China: Empirical
Evidence and Implications’ (2009) 88(1) Journal of Business Ethics
in Greater China 26.

 

[39] H Bindu, ‘An empirical study of
whistle blowing in pharmaceutical’ (2016) 3(6) International
Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development 130.

 

[40] OFGEM (n 36) 5.

[41] F Norman, ‘Ethical Issues in Whistleblowing’ (2001) 286(9)
Journal of American Medical Association 1079.

 

[42] S Wilmot, ‘Nurses and Whistleblowing:
The Ethical Issues’ (2000) 32(5) Journal of Advanced Nursing
1056.

[43] G Rapp, ‘Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers’
(2007) 87(2) Boston University Law Review 120.

[44] J Rothschild and T Miethe, ‘Whistle-blower Disclosures and
Management Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information about
Organization Corruption’ (1999) 26(1) Work and Occupations 107.

[45] F Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and
Organizational Power (Cornell University Press 2007) 1.

[46] S Rachagan and K Kuppusamy, ‘Encouraging Whistle Blowing to
Improve Corporate Governance? A Malaysian Initiative’ (2013) 115(2)
Journal of Business Ethics 367.

[47] Section 806 of SOX; False Claims Act
31 United State Code, s3730 (d); Dodd-Frank Act, s 1057 Lewis (n
29) 2.

 

[48] UNCAC, art 8, 13 and 33; Council of
Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, art 9; Council of Europe
Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, art 22; Inter-American
Convention against Corruption, art III (8); African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 2003 (AUCPCC);
Beatt v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ
401 (CA); Kohn, ‘Whistleblower’s Handbook: A Step-by-Step Guide
to Doing What’s Right and Protecting Yourself (Lyons Press
2011) 2.

 

[49] Public Interest Disclosure Act 1999
(UK); Whsitleblower Protection Act 2004 (Japan); Whistlebowers
Protection act (Law 571) 2004 (Romania); Whistleblower Act (Act
720) 2006 (Ghana).

 

[50] Dodd-Frank Act, S 922.

 

[51] Protection of Public Interest
Whistleblowers, 2011 (Korea), art 17.

 

[52] R Onuigbo and O Eme, ‘Analyses of
Legal Frameworks for Fighting Corruption in Nigeria: Problems and
Challenges’ [2015] Arabian Journal of Business and Management
Review 2.

[53] ‘Editorial’ ‘David Cameron Calls Nigeria and Afghanistan
Fantastically Corrupt’ (BBC, 10 May 2016) < www.b^[80]bc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36260193>
accessed 18 July 2017.

 

[54]‘Editorial’ ‘Corruption Getting Worse
in Nigeria- Transparency International’ The Vanguard (Lagos, 21
February 2018)  
<www.vanguardngr.com/2018/02/corruption-getting-worse-nigeria-transparency-international>
accessed 28 January 2019.

 

[55] ibid.

[56] ‘Editorial’ ‘On Nigeria’s Systemic Corruption’ The
Guardian (Lagos, 7 March 2016) <
https://guardian.ng/opinion/on-nigerias-systemic-corruption/>
accessed 22 August 2017; E Byrne, Political Corruption in
Ireland 1922-2010: A Crooked Harp (Manchester University Press
2012) 1.

 

[57] Ukwaba I, ‘Political corruption in
Nigeria: An Assessment of the First, Second and Fourth Republic’ in
C Ugwu (ed), Corruption in Nigeria: Critical perspective
(A Book of Reading) (Chuka Educational Publishers 2002)
30.

 

[58] F Adesina, ‘Bankole and System
Failure’ Daily Sun (Lagos, 8 July 2011) 56.

 

[59] S Okoye, ‘How to Tackle Corruption
Effectively in Nigeria’ <www.gamji.com/article4000/news4930.htm^[81]> accessed 11 July
2017.

 

[60] A Abdulaziz, ‘Interview: How I am
Tackling Corruption in Nigeria Immigration Service- Comptroller
General’ Premium Times (Abuja, 22 August 2017)
<www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/240859-interview-im-tackling-corruption-nigerian-immigration-service-comptroller-general.html>
accessed 22 August 2017.

 

[61] ‘Corruption in the Army Weakens Boko
Haram Fight’ (African News, 18 May 2016) <www.africanews.com
/2017/05/18/corruption-in-nigerian-army-weakens-boko-haram-fight-says-watchdog//>
accessed 2 August 2017.

 

[62] ‘Police Roadblock, Extortion Persists
in Lagos’ (Nigeria Police Watch, 13 November 2012)
<www.nigeriapolicewatch.com
/2012/11/police-roadblock-extortion-persists-in-lagos/> accessed
8 August 2017. See further A Uzokwe, Nigeria: Contemporary
Commentaries & Essays (Universe 2015).

[63] B Oghifo, ‘Nigeria: Need to Bar Customs officials from
Nation’s Highways’ THISDAY (Lagos, 12 December 2015) <
http://allafrica.com/stories/201512120162.html> accessed 8
August 2017.

 

[64] S Tukur, ‘Nigerian Judge, Senior
Lawyer in trouble for Allegedly Colluding to Pervert Justice’
Premium Times (Abuja, 9 February 2016)
<www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/198233-nigerian-judge-senior-lawyer-trouble-allegedly-colluding-pervert-justice
.html > accessed 8 August 2017.

[65]‘Corruption and Money Laundering: Concepts and Practical
Applications: Incorporating Peer Reviewers Comments’ (World Bank
Group) < http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/887011427730119189/AML-Module-1.pdf^[82]> accessed 3 August
2017.

 

[66] A Awopeju, ‘Election Rigging and The
Problems of Electoral Act in Nigeria’ (2011) 2(4) Afro Asian
Journal of Social Sciences 1.

 

[67] A Olorunmola, ‘Cost of Politics in
Nigeria’ (Westminster Foundation for democracy) 11
<www.wfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/07/Nigeria-Cost-of-Politics.pdf> accessed 3 August 2017.

 

[68] A Odoemene, ‘Fighting Corruption
without the State: Civil Society Agency and the “Otokoto Saga”
(2012) 25(3) Journal of Historical sociology 475.

 

[69] E Nnadozie, ‘Evans, Nigerian’s Most
Dreaded Kidnap Kingpin on the loose’ The Vanguard (Lagos,
22 April 2017) <www.vangua
rdngr.com/2017/04/evans-nigerias-dreaded-kidnap-kingpin-loose/>
accessed 17 July 2017.

 

[70] ‘Why President Buhari Fired EFFCC
Boss’ (NewsZentsOnline, 13 November 2015) <http://newszents .com
/uncategorized/why-president-buhari-fired-efcc-boss/> accessed 5
August 2017.

[71] ‘Editorial’ ‘EFCC Traces N500 Million Paris Debt Money to
Governor Account, Retrieves it’ The Vanguard News (Lagos,
14 March 2017) <
www.vanguardngr.com/2017/03/efcc-traces-n500m-paris-debt-money-governors-account-retrieves/>
accessed 18 July 2017.

 

[72] S Osoba, ‘Corruption in Nigeria:
Historical Perspectives’ 2007(23) 26 Review of African Political
Economy 385.

 

 

[73] E Varda, Origins of Corruption:
irregular Incentives in Nigeria (1981) 19(1) Journal of Modern
African studies 1.v

 

[74] S Moyosore, ‘Corruption in Nigeria:
Causes, Effects and Probable Solutions’ (2015) 1(8) Journal of
Political Science and Leadership Research 29.

 

[75] P Lumumba, ‘Keynote Address: The Role
of the Legislature in the Fight Against Corruption’ (Abuja Africa
Leaders’ Summit, 2017) <
http://www.nta.ng/news/20161017-president-buhari/ > accessed 27
August 2016.

[76] H Adamu, ‘R v James Inane
Ibori — Conquering the World of Financial Crimes [2014] 219
The criminal Lawyer 3-4; ‘Former Nigeria
Governor James Ibori Jailed for 13 Years’ (BBC News, 17 April 2012)
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17739388> accessed 21 August
2017.

[77] ‘Editorial’, ‘Ibori Returns to Rousing Welcome by Kinsmen’
THISDAY (Lagos, 5 February 2017) <www.thisdaylive .com
/ind
ex.php/2017/02/05/ibori-returns-to-rousing-welcome-by-kinsmen/>
accessed 21 August 2017.

[78] ‘Nigeria Dismisses James ibori Money Laundering charges’
(BBC, 17 December 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi
/world/africa/ 8418302.stm> accessed 21 August 2017.

[79]‘Issues Paper on Corruption and Economic Growth’
(Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 3
< www.
oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/Issue-Paper-Corruption-and-Economic-Growth.pdf
> accessed 3 August 2017.

[80] Osoba (n 72).

 

[81] Moyosore (n 74) 30.

[82] P Ejikeme, ‘Corruption and Collapse of Education in
Nigeria: Pope John Paul II Annual Memorial Lecture Series, Number
6’ (Pope John Paul Awka 2011) 3.

 

[83] Osoba (n 72).

 

[84] ‘Editorial’ ’23 Nigerian States Owe
Local Government Workers’ Salaries; Some 14 Months – National Union
of Local Government Employees) Premium Times (Abuja, 26
June 2017)
<www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/235150-23-nigerian-states-owe-local-govt-workers-salaries-14-months-nulge.html>
accessed 22 August 2017.

 

[85] A Akinyemi and others, ‘Building
Collapse in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges’ (2016) 9(1) Journal of
Arts and Sciences 99.

 

[86] ‘TB Joshua Church Collapse: Lagos
Death Toll Rises’ (BBC, 22 September 2014)
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-29224936> accessed 21 August
2017.

[87] ibid.

 

[88] E Ayungbe and D Udoma, ‘Collapsed
Reigners Bible Church: Clo Alleges Government cover-up’ (BBC, 11
April 2017) <www.vangua
rdngr.com/2017/04/collapsed-reigners-bible-church-clo-alleges-govt-cover/>
accessed 21 August 2017.

[89] ‘Port Harcourt Building Collapse:
Police Arrest Property Owner’(Punchonline,29 November 2028) https://punchng.com/pharcourt-building-collapse-police-arrest-property-owner/^[83] accessed  38
January 2019

[90]  I Opara, ‘Nigerian
Anti-Corruption Initiatives’ (2007) 6(1) Journal of International
Business and Law 74.

 

[91] ibid.

 

[92] ibid.

 

[93] ibid.

[94] P Adeoye, ‘Beyond the ‘good people and great Nation mantra’
The Nation (Lagos, 23 January 2014)
<http://thenationonlineng. ne
t/beyond-the-good-people-great-nation-mantra/ > accessed 19 July
2017.

[95] 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999
Nigerian Constitution), s 23; Public Service Rules 2015, chap 8;
Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 2007; Rules
of Professional Conduct for Medical and Dental Practitioners
1995.

[96] V Egwemi, ‘Political corruption and the Challenges of
Sustainable Development in Nigeria: Focus on Third Term agenda’
(2007) NASHER Journal 5(1) 178.

 

[97] W Ademu, ‘Eradicating Corruption in
Public Office in Nigeria’ (2013) 7(2) International Journal on
Interpersonal Relationships 6.

[98] ‘Editorial’ ‘Change Begins with Me’ The Vanguard
(Lagos, 15 September 2016) < www.vanguardngr.com^[84]
/2016/09/buharis-change-begins/> accessed 19 July 2017.

[99] L Laccino, ‘Nigeria: UK Reaffirms Commitment to help
President Buhari in Anti-Corruption War’ International Business
Times (New York City, 2016) <
www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-uk-reaffirms-commitment-help-president-buhari-anti-corruption-war-1524108
> accessed 3 August 2017.

[100] ‘Editorial’ ‘Do not be selective in Anti-Corruption War,
Fasehun Tells Buhari’ Premium Times (Abuja, 11 February
2016) <
www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/190664-do-not-be-selective-in-anti-corruption-war-fasehun-tells-buhari.html
> accessed 3 August 2017.

 

[101]^[85]‘FMF – Whistle Blowing
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQS)’ (Ministry of Finance of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria) <http://
whistle.finance.gov.ng/_catalogs/masterpage/  MOF
Whistle/assets/FMF%20WHISTLEB LOWING%20FREQUENTLY
%20ASKED%20QUESTIONS.pdf > accessed 4 August 2017.

[102] ibid 4.

[103] ibid.5

[104] ibid 2.

[105] ibid 3.

 

[106]^[86] J Pearce-Smith,
‘Fiduciary Duties of Employees’ (St John’s Chambers, June 2015) 3
<www.stjohnschambers.
co.uk/dashboard/wp-content/uploads/Fiduciary-duty-talk-22.6.15.pdf>
accessed 2 August 2017.

 

[107]^[87] P Neha and P Pathak,
‘Growing Corruption: Is Whistle Blowing the Answer?’ (2014) 39(2)
Management and Labour Studies 29.

[108] E Ujah, ‘Whistle-blowers receive N375 Million Naira in
first payments’ The Vanguard (Lagos, 7 June 2017)
<www.Vanguardngr
.com/2017/06/breaking-whistle-blowers-receive-n375mn-first-payments-adeosun/>
accessed 25 July 2017.

 

[109]^[88] Art 33 of the UNCAC
provides that ‘each State Party shall consider incorporating into
its domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide
protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who
reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent
authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance
with this Convention.’

[110] Under art 5(6) of the AUCPCC, ‘State parties agree to
adopt measures that ensure citizens report instances of corruption
without fear of consequent reprisals.’

 

[111]^[89] ‘See n 50’.

[112] Policy (n 101) 3.

[113]  ibid.

[114] Policy (n 101) 4.

 

[115]^[90] Rapp (n 43) 114.

 

[116]^[91] R Morberly,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers’ [2006] Brigham Young University Law (BYUL) Review
1111.

[117] Policy (n 101) 3.

 

[118]^[92] ibid.

 

[119]^[93] Policy (n 101) 4.

[120] Policy (n 101) 3.

.

[121]^[94] (n 68).

[122] OFGEM (n 36).

[123] David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowers, Reasonable Belief and Data
Protection Issues’ (2006) 35 (3) Industrial Law Journal 326. See
also Bolton School v Evans [2006] IRLR 500 (Employment
Appeal Tribunal).

 

 

[124]^[95] Dodd-Frank Act, s
922.

 

 [125] Policy (n 101) 4.

 

 [126] C Gabriel, ‘Whistleblowing as
Panacea for Corruption’ The Vanguard (Lagos, 15 April
2017) <www.Vanguardngr.com^[96] /2017/04
/whistle-blowing-panacea-corruption/^[97]> accessed 20 June
2017.

[127] ‘Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers: Note by the
Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority
for the Treasury Select Committee’  (FCA and PRA, July 2014) 2
<www.fca.org.uk/
publication/financial-incentives-for-whistleblowers.pdf^[98]> accessed 28 
July 2017 . See also J Lee, ‘Corporate Corruption and the New Gold
Mine: How the Dodd-Frank Act Overincentivizes Whistleblowing’
(2011) 77 Brook Law Review 315 – 20.

[128] ibid.

[129] ibid.

 

[130]^[99] ibid 3.

 

[131]^[100] Policy (n 113) 3 and
4.

[132]^[101] P Bucy, ‘Private
justice’ [2002] 76 Southern California Law Review 61.

 

[133]^[102] ‘Whistleblowers Play a
Key Role in Nigerian Anti-Corruption Push…at Their Own Risk’ (Fresh
Speech Radio News, 26 April 2017) <https://fsrn.org/2017/04/whistleblowers-play-a-key-role-in-nigerian-anti-corruption-push-at-their-own-risk/^[103]> accessed 5 August
2017.

[134] ibid.

[135] Ujah (n 108).

 

[136]^[104] C Adichie, ‘Nigeria’s
Failed Promises’ The New York Times (New York City, October
2016)  <www.nytimes. com/ 2016/10/
19/opinion/chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-nigerias-failed-promises.html?_r=0>
accessed 9 April 2017.

[137]^[105] ‘Editorial’ ‘Over N5
Trillion Projects Abandoned Across Nigeria’ The Vanguard
(Lagos, 28 December 2016) <www.vanguard ngr.com/2016/1
2/n5tr-projects-abandoned-across-nigeria-reps/> accessed 23
August 2017.

[138] ‘Text to n 82 in ch 3’.

 

[139]^[106] Ogundipe v The
Minister of Federal Capital Territory (2014) LPELR – 22771
(CA).

[140]^[107] S 9 of the 1999
Nigerian Constitution provides that an amendment may be proposed
with a two-thirds majority vote in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

 

[141]^[108] Carlill v Carbolic
Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256.

 

[142]^[109] (2002) LPELR- 3172
(SC).

 

[143]^[110] Ujah (n 108).

 

[144]^[111] In Ebhota v
Plateau Investment & Property Development Co Ltd (2005) 15 NWLR (PT
948) 266 at 289 paras [D] – [E], the SC reiterated that a policy
statement or guideline by the Federal Government does not give rise
to a contractual relationship between the Government and a third
party. See also Wilkie v Federal Government of Nigeria
(2017) LPELR – 42137 (CA).

 

[145]^[112]  (2016) LPCELR –
41204 (CA).

[146]^[113] Akpan v University
of Calabar (2016) LPELR- 41242 (CA).

 

[147]^[114]‘Nigeria Central Bank
Head, Lamido Sanusi Ousted’ (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
News, 20 February 2014) <www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-26270561> accessed 4 July 2017.

[148] S Daniel, ‘Whistle Blower: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Fires Staff for Exposing N95m scam in DTCA’ The Vanguard
(Lagos, 14 March 2017) <
www.vanguardngr.com/2017/03/group-slams-minister-sack-whistleblower/>
accessed 6 August 2017.

 

[149]^[115] O Olawoyin, ‘Nigerian
Government Recalls Sacked whistleblower’ Premium Times
(Abuja, 27 June 2017) < www.premiumtimesng.com
/news/top-news/235168-Nigeria-govt-recalls-sacked-whistleblower.html^[116]> accessed 3 July
1997.

 

[150]^[117] Policy (n 113) 4.

 

[151]^[118] ibid 4.

 

[152]^[119] Dodd-Frank Act,
s748.

 

[153]^[120] ibid.

[154]^[121] J Mateo, ’68
Government websites Attacked’ (Philstar Global, 16 July 2016)
<www.philstar. com/headlines /2016/07/16/
1603250/68-govt-websites-attacked> accessed 5 August 2017. See
further J Nurton, ‘Victims of Bank Fraud Should Accept the Blame
and not Expect Automatic Refunds, the Boss of Royal Bank of
Scotland Warned Yesterday’ Daily Mail (London, 8 August
2017) 2.

[155] Ujah (n 108).

[156]^[122] Rapp (n 43) 115.

 

[157]^[123] David Lewis,
‘Whistleblowers, Reasonable Belief and Data Protection Issues’
(2006) 35 (3) Industrial Law Journal 326. See also Bolton
School v Evans [2006] IRLR 500 (Employment Appeal
Tribunal).

 

[158]^[124] Lewis (n 123).

 

[159]^[125] U Udoma and B Osagie
‘Data protection in Nigeria’ 1 <www.uubo.org/downloads/SIMM0715001-Data_Privacy_
Protection _in _Nigeria.pdf^[126]> accessed 14 August
2017.

 

[160]^[127] ibid.

 

[161]^[128] ibid.

 

[162]^[129] The NCCR for instance,
provides that all licensees must take reasonable steps to protect
customer information against improper or accidental disclosure and
must ensure that such information is securely stored.

 

[163]^[130] Section 8 of the Child
Right Act guarantees every child’s entitlement to privacy, family
life, home, correspondence, telephone conversation and telegraphic
communications, while section 205(2) prohibits the publication of
any information that will lead to the identification of a child
offender, and requires that the records of child offenders be kept
strictly confidential and closed to third parties except in certain
limited circumstances.

 

[164]^[131] Under section 14 of
the FOI Act, a public institution is obliged to deny an application
for information that contains personal information unless the
individual involved consents to the disclosure, or where such
information is publicly available.

[165] L Abdulrauf and C Fombad, ‘Personal Data Protection in
Nigeria: Reflections on Opportunities, Options and Challenges to
Legal Reforms’ [2017] 38 Liverpool Law Rev 106; ‘Guidance for
Organisations: Access to Information Held in Complaint Files’
(International Commissioner’s Office)4 <
https://ico.org.uk/media/1179/access_to_information_held_in_complaint_files.pdf
> accessed 5 August 2017.

[166] See South Australian Whistleblower Protection Act 1993, s
5(2).

[167] Lewis (n 123).

 

[168]^[132] See generally UNCAC,
art 5-14.

 

[169]^[133] Lumumba (n 87).

[170]^[134] M Miceli and others,
‘Who blows the whistle and why? [1991] 45 Industrial and labour
Relations Review 113-130.

 

[171]^[135] S Pierce, Moral
Economies of Corruption (Duke university Press 2016) 20.

 

[172]^[136] Neha and Pathak (n
107).

 

[173]^[137] S Kohn,
Whistleblower’s Handbook: A Step-by-Step Guide to Doing What’s
Right and Protecting Yourself (Lyons Press 2011) xv.